Regulation and corporate governance : a case study of the UK banking industry by Lui, Alison
1 
 
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL 
REGULATION AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: A CASE STUDY OF 
THE UK BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of 
the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in 
Philosophy 
by 
Alison Tin-Sum Lui 
March 2014 
2 
 
 
Abstract 
Financial stability remains a key theme in UK financial regulation. This thesis 
investigates important issues of financial regulation revealed in the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. It will analyse macro and micro prudential regulatory weaknesses in UK 
financial regulation in light of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The structure of the 
new ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK will be compared with the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ 
model. There are concerns that the Bank of England might have too much power and 
is thus a super single financial regulator in the ‘twin-peaks’ model. The author will 
compare the new ‘twin-peaks’ model with the German regulatory structure, where 
some similarities are found due to the sharing of supervisory responsibilities between 
the regulatory bodies in both jurisdictions. As far as the author is aware, there is a gap 
in the literature because the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK only came into existence in 
April 2013 and the literature in comparing this model with the Australian and German 
models is scarce. The thesis adopts a doctrinal, comparative case study approach, as 
well as a quantitative analysis of the important financial ratios of four major UK 
banks and four major Australian banks. 
The thesis will reveal that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) failed to supervise 
banks such as Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley and HBOS properly. The main 
regulatory and supervisory failures of the FSA are due to organisational and 
management problems. With regards to the statutory provisions on banking 
regulation, the Financial Services Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 is complicated, with 
standards and principles underpinning the FSA’s statutory core objectives. The FSA’s 
remit is too wide. It is responsible for regulating banks, deposit-taking institutions and 
insurance companies. With the development of complex products, increased use of 
securitisation and merging of financial services offered to customers, the tripartite 
system increasingly found it difficult to delineate their scope and responsibility. 
Overall, the FSA’s passive, non-interventionist and laissez-faire regulatory approach 
led to criticisms that its measures were too late and too little. In comparison to the big 
four Australian banks, the thesis revealed that the big four UK banks had on average, 
higher cash ratio, higher leverage ratio, higher loan to deposit ratio, higher capital 
ratio, lower asset quality, lower return on assets but higher return on equity than the 
big four Australian banks. 
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There is gradual convergence between the UK and Australian prudential supervisory 
models although there are still some differences between the two models. Financial 
stability is enshrined in both countries’ legislation and is a key priority after the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. Both regulators reject a ‘zero-failure’ regulatory policy. 
The Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) shares the Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority’s (APRA) opinion that it is impossible to prevent all bank 
failures. Therefore, with the Special Resolution Regime contained in the Banking Act 
2009, the PRA’s role is to minimise the systemic effect of any bank failure. The 
PRA’s supervisory style is based on judgement; risks; forward-looking and early 
intervention. This is very similar to APRA’s. PRA’s risk assessment framework and 
its supervisory responses based on the Proactive Intervention Framework. Yet, there 
are differences between the prudential regulatory and supervisory systems between 
Australia and the UK. The UK legislative framework is more complex than the 
Australian framework. Further, the PRA has policy setting powers although the 
vertical integration of financial regulation at European level may suggest that the PRA 
is unlikely to exercise this power very often. APRA on the other hand, does not have 
such wide policy setting powers. The UK Risk Assessment Framework takes more 
mitigating factors into account. Its Proactive Intervention Framework has five stages 
and early intervention is clearly a priority for the PRA, since it can start planning for 
resolution of an organisation even at stage 1. This is in contrast to the Australian 
SOARS methodology, where there are only four stages and resolution of an 
organisation takes place in the later stages. 
There are fears that the new structure within the Bank of England will make it a super 
single regulator. The thesis will compare the ‘twin-peaks’ model with the German 
regulatory structure since there are similarities in the sharing of supervisory 
responsibilities between the UK and German models. The thesis will then make 
several recommendations on how this concentration of power can be addressed. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis reflects the law and surrounding critical debate as it stood on the 1
st
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 The financial crisis of 2007-2009 
Seven years on from the financial crisis, issues about banking regulation are still 
broadcasted and debated in the media. The financial crisis has brought changes to the 
corporate, financial and regulatory scenes so the author believes that this is a critical 
moment to study the regulatory aspects of the banking sector.  
The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States commencing in September 2007 
was arguably the catalyst to the financial crisis. When borrowers of sub-prime 
mortgages failed to repay their loans, US banks faced a liquidity problem. 
Securitisation of loans, increased leverage and the development of complex financial 
products further exacerbated the liquidity problem. Globalisation meant that the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 affected most western countries simultaneously. In the 
UK, the property market suffered due to the securitised credit model and liquidity 
strains. Sir Mervyn King is of the view that liquidity strains and poor asset quality led 
ultimately to a financial crisis of solvency (cited in Pimlott 2011). Indeed, he said 
that: 
‘Right through this crisis from the very beginning ... an awful lot of people 
wanted to believe that it was a crisis of liquidity. It wasn’t, it isn’t. And until 
we accept that, we will never find an answer to it. It was a crisis based on 
solvency.’(King (2011) in Pimlott 2011) 
 
Poole echoes King’s assessment in the following quote: 
‘Throughout history, financial crises occur when liquidity dries up, usually 
because solvency concerns arise when risky assets decline in value. Why is it 
that the market seems to make the same basic mistake repeatedly? It is terribly 
important that we figure out the answer to this question, because we also 
know that markets and not government‐run economies generate economic 
growth. This financial crisis [of 2007] was costly; if we cannot figure out how 
to make market economies more stable, we risk growing government 
involvement, which we can be certain will make economies grow more 
slowly.’ (Poole 2010) 
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These quotes rebut the opinion of Tim Geithner, who believed that the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009 was one of liquidity: 
‘The growth in leverage and liquidity risk outside of banks made the system 
vulnerable to a sharp erosion in liquidity’ and he recommended ‘a system that 
is less vulnerable to margin spirals and a generalized pull-back in liquidity 
and funding’ (Geithner 2008). 
 
Paul Krugman criticised Geithner’s opinion that the financial crisis was caused by 
leverage and liquidity: 
‘At every stage, Geithner et al. have made it clear that they still have faith in 
the people who created the financial crisis—that they believe that all we have 
is a liquidity crisis that can be undone with a bit of financial engineering, that 
‘governments do a bad job of running banks’ (as opposed, presumably, to the 
wonderful job the private bankers have done), that financial bailouts and 
guarantees should come with no strings attached. This was bad analysis, bad 
policy, and terrible politics.’ (Krugman 2009 cited in Crotty 2009)   
 
The financial crisis itself triggered a plethora of debate and inquiry and therefore the 
UK government set up inquiries and commissioned reviews into the causes of the 
financial crisis. It also made recommendations on how to improve the banking 
system. For instance, since November 2008, the Treasury Select Committee Inquiry 
has called for both oral and written evidence to investigate the banking crisis. To date, 
a total of 17 oral evidence sessions have been held, where witnesses included the 
former Financial Services Authority (now divided into the Financial Conduct 
Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority), the Bank of England, HM Treasury; 
nationalised banks, hedge funds, auditors and credit rating agencies. Public interest in 
the inquiry was intense as a large proportion of the public were outraged by the 
behaviour of some senior bankers.  
The Turner Review in March 2009 was a thorough investigation into the causes of the 
banking crisis and suggestions were made to improve the regulatory aspects of the 
banking system. Lord Turner believes that the cheap credit was widely available due 
to macro-economic balances between China and emerging Asian countries on the one 
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hand and western countries such as the US, UK, Spain and Ireland on the other 
(Turner 2009). The property boom and a lowering of credit standards made credit 
cheap. In the meantime, investors wanted as much yield with their bonds as possible 
above the risk-free rate to offset the declining risk-free interest rate. The demand for 
yield increase caused a growth in securitised credit, both in value and the complexity 
of the products (Turner 2009). The rationale for this is that better value would be 
given to investors due to better risk diversification in comparison with direct purchase 
of credit exposures. To the banks, securitisation meant fewer risks. In reality however, 
the risk holdings and losses were actually held by highly leveraged banks, not the end 
investors. Instead of ultimate investors buying the securitised products, other banks 
bought them or the selling banks retained some of the risks through credit derivatives 
(Turner 2009). The Turner Review thus recommended that fundamental changes be 
made to bank capital and liquidity regulations. Regulation of credit-rating agencies 
and hedge funds is required. In addition, the Financial Services Authority will focus 
on system-wide risks and business strategies. Finally a new, independent European 
regulator with increased national powers to constrain risky cross-border activities will 
be established.  
The Turner Review focused solely on regulatory issues. The Walker Report of 
November 2009 thus reviewed the corporate governance issues in banks. In particular, 
Walker examined two issues: 
• Whether changes in governance structure are required to increase the independence 
of risk management functions and 
• The skill, level and time commitment required for non-executive directors of large 
complex banks to perform effective oversight of risks and provide challenge to 
executive strategies. 
 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards and the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee have all produced 
reports into the failures of Northern Rock, the Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS. 
These are valuable primary resources since access to the financial sector is very 
difficult to obtain due to its opaqueness. 
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1.2 Aim and objectives of the thesis 
 
In light of the impact of the financial crisis 2007-2009, the author aims to investigate 
the regulatory aspects of the UK banking industry. She has four main research 
objectives in her thesis, namely: - 
1. What are the main weaknesses of the tripartite regulatory system in the UK, in 
particular the FSA? 
2. Why did the top four Australian banks performed better than the top four UK 
banks during the financial crisis of 2007-2009? 
3.  What are the similarities and differences between the UK and Australian 
‘twin-peaks’ model? 
4. What lessons can be learnt from the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model in banking 
regulation? 
 
In arriving at these four objectives, the author pursued a rigorous and thorough 
literature review to the best of her ability. She has identified several gaps in the extant 
literature which led her to investigate these issues. The gaps include a comparison of 
the UK financial regulatory model with the Australian system due to the move from a 
single regulatory model to the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK. Australia provides a 
good learning example for the UK since it made the transition from the single 
regulatory model to the ‘twin-peaks’ model in 1998 and it was hardly affected by the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. The comparison of the banking regulation between 
these two countries is not extensive to date. Thirdly, the author will conduct a 
detailed, doctrinal analysis of the prudential regulatory and legislative frameworks 
between Australia and the UK. Finally, the most exciting part of the thesis is that the 
author reveals that the new structure within the Bank of England resembles the 
structure of the German banking regulatory system. She will therefore compare the 
two countries’ regulatory structure and see if lessons can be learnt from the German 
regulatory model. To the best of the author’s knowledge, she is not aware of any 
literature which compares the new UK macro and micro-prudential regulatory 
structure with the German regulatory structure. 
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1.3 Importance of the thesis 
 
Systemic risks across the banking sector can be seismic and have a multiplier effect 
on the rest of the economy (Alexander 2006). Banking regulation is necessary 
because the regulator can assess stakeholders’ interests and to balance those interests 
according to public interest. Regulation is not however, a substitute to corporate 
governance but it reduces the collective action problem in representing broader 
stakeholder interests to ensure that social costs of bank risk taking are mitigated.                                                                                                                                                                        
 
This thesis is original, contributes to scholarship and is robust. It is original in 
methodology and content. The author has combined quantitative methods, 
comparative legal analysis and doctrinal methods. Quantitative methods are 
demonstrated by a comparison of the financial ratios of the top four UK and 
Australian banks. The interpretation and thorough analysis of legislation, codes, 
handbooks in Australian and UK law demonstrates the comparative and doctrinal 
aspects of the author’s methodology. There is also some doctrinal analysis when the 
author examined German regulatory legislation. Regarding the originality in content, 
the author extends the work on global financial regulation. She has also chosen to 
discuss several gaps in banking regulation in light of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
An important theme running in the thesis is the balance of financial innovation with 
financial stability.  Although the UK takes third place in the Financial Development 
Index, it scored very low in overall financial stability (41
st
). It is ranked 38 out of 60 
in frequency of banking crises. Financial intermediation however, is still strong 
despite the challenging economic conditions (World Economic Forum 2011) The 
author investigates how five UK banks (Northern Rock, the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Lloyds Banking Group, Barclays and HSBC) can improve their corporate governance 
practices. Financial innovation has created new ways for creating capital and 
investing. In theory, this enhances financial development which increases economic 
growth. However, complex financial products and processes have increased moral 
hazard since financial institutions took excessive risks in search of profits. Financial 
innovation has also decreased transparency through complicated products and 
confidentiality of transactions. Ample academic literature since the financial crisis 
(Acharya et al. 2009, Goodhart 2009) has shown that Collaterised Debt Obligations 
did not shift risks in the securitisation process and so the argument that securitisation 
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can diversify risks and thus enable financial markets to grow is flawed. Financial 
stability is thus an important factor in a country’s economic growth. Sir Mervyn King 
called for greater disclosure of assets and more capital reserves to restore financial 
stability in the banking system (Pimlott 2011). The right amount of regulation is 
needed to balance financial development and financial stability. 
 
This thesis will also have practical implications for policy makers worldwide. 
Reforms in financial regulation depend on local circumstances, political principles 
and country specific preferences. The right amount of regulation is needed to balance 
financial development and financial stability. This balance is of significance on a 
global scale, so this thesis will have important implications for academics and policy 
makers on an international dimension. The concentration of power in the Bank of 
England is a real issue. Studying the German regulatory model and adopting sensible 
recommendations would be of interest to policy makers.  
 
The author believes that this thesis is robust because she reviewed a range of primary 
and secondary sources in the thesis, thus consistency through triangulation of data 
was achieved. Triangulation is useful in highlighting both consistencies and 
inconsistencies of results. An understanding of inconsistencies in findings across 
different kinds of data is beneficial. This allowed the author to corroborate the 
evidence. Finally, she has attended conferences in 2010 and 2011 to test her theories 
and arguments. Incorporating the feedback obtained from the various conferences, she 
has published several peer reviewed journal articles.  
 
1.4 Summary 
This thesis will analyse macro and micro prudential regulatory weaknesses in UK 
financial regulation in light of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The structure of the 
new ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK will be compared with the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ 
model. There are concerns that the Bank of England might have too much power and 
is thus a super single financial regulator in the ‘twin-peaks’ model. The author will 
compare the new ‘twin-peaks’ model with the German regulatory structure, where 
some similarities are found due to the sharing of supervisory responsibilities in both 
jurisdictions. 
21 
 
Following the introduction in chapter one, the author presents a critical review of 
literature in banking regulation in chapter two. Chapter three is a discussion on 
research methodology. Chapter four reviews the performance of four major UK banks 
and four major Australian banks. The author will also analyse the UK legislation on 
the nationalisation of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley. She will also provide 
an overview of the Australian rules and legislation on banking legislation and 
investigate why the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model performed well in the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. Chapter five reviews the performance of the FSA during the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. In particular, she will examine the weaknesses revealed 
in the FSA Handbook and FSMA 2000. Chapter six provides a comprehensive 
discussion of how Australian’s prudential supervision regime developed and the legal 
framework of banking regulation. She will compare and contrast the regulatory aims 
and objectives of the UK and Australian banking regulators.  Chapter seven is a 
discussion on what lessons can be learnt from the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model. The 
author examines whether the Bank of England should have a regulator role as well 
and whether it will become a single super regulator. The German banking legislation 
and regulatory system will be studied. Chapter eight is the overall conclusion of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
A literature review is a critical appraisal of extant literature on the relevant topics. It is 
an important chapter in the author’s thesis since it identifies the latest themes and 
trends in banking regulation, as well as highlighting the gaps and weaknesses in these 
topics. To the best of her ability, the author has conducted a comprehensive review of 
extant literature of banking regulation, subject to constraints such as time, access and 
resources. She has used key word searches and identified the major authors and 
journals in banking regulation. Academics, scholars and practitioners have written 
about banking regulation for many years. However, the author is focusing on recent 
literature on banking regulation in the UK. The author has used a combination of 
primary and secondary sources to gather information for her literature review. 
Primary publications such as the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 
papers; Parliamentary Commission reports and FSA reports are invaluable since 
gaining access to bank directors and employees is very difficult.  
 
The author will first discuss the rationale of banking regulation. She will then adopt a 
chronological order to her literature review, discussing the development of the UK 
banking regulatory regime. The literature review will identify the gaps in the existing 
literature on banking regulation and structure the thesis accordingly. 
 
2.2  Literature review of the development of UK banking regulation 
Banks are public corporations and as Berle and Means pointed out in 1932, the 
distinctive feature of the modern public corporation is the separation of ownership and 
control. In modern corporations, the managers decide how a corporation’s capital is 
spent, how resources are allocated and what endeavours the corporation undertakes. 
They do not however, own the capital or resources. Those in control of the 
corporation,  
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“and therefore in a position to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, 
are no longer, as owners, entitled to the bulk of such profits… The explosion 
of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption that the quest 
for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use” (Berle 
and Means 1932 p.9). 
Berle and Means believed this led to managers serving their own interests:  
“[W]here the bulk of the profits of enterprise are scheduled to go to owners 
who are individuals other than those in control, the interests of the latter are 
as likely as not to be at variance with those of ownership and…the controlling 
group is in a position to serve its own interests.” (Berle and Means 1932 
p.116) 
Thus, the main tenet of Berle and Means’s theory is that capital in the U.S. has 
become heavily concentrated during the previous few decades. Certain corporations 
became very powerful. As these corporations grew, it became increasingly difficult 
for the original owners to maintain their majority shareholdings and shares became 
dispersed amongst many small shareholders. The consequence of this dispersal, as 
Berle and Means suggested, was that power became vested in the managers, who run 
the corporations. These managers have different interests to shareholders.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed Berle and Means’s concept of separation of 
ownership and control further. Under the principle of separation of ownership and 
control, shareholders own shares in a business whilst managers run a business. The 
principal-agent theory stems from the concern that managers (agents) will pursue their 
own interests and indulge in perks whilst bearing only a proportion of the costs. 
Imperfect information (hidden action) and misaligned incentives (hidden information) 
between principal and agent are the causes of this fear.  Shareholders (principals) find 
it difficult to monitor the managers because of time and logistical constraints. 
Monitoring the managers will incur agency costs. To limit agency costs, Jensen and 
Meckling recommended that incentives should be enhanced whilst restrictions in the 
market to be removed. In their view, the focus of the principal-agent theory is 
determining the most efficient contract to align the interests of directors with 
shareholders’. The firm is regarded as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen and Meckling 
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1976) because stakeholders have contracts between themselves. Once these interests 
are aligned through contracts, directors should pursue the goal of maximising 
shareholder value.  
Maximising profit and shareholder value are the principal aims for banks. Since the 
early 1980s, banks started to use a process called securitisation. Securitisation is 
defined by Deacon as: 
‘the process of converting cash flows arising from underlying assets or debts 
(receivables) due to the originator (the entity which created the receivables) 
into a smoothed repayment stream, thus enabling the originator to raise asset-
backed finance through a loan or an issue of debt securities - generically 
known as asset-backed securities or ABS - which is limited recourse in nature 
to the credit of the receivables rather than that of the originator as a whole, 
and with the finance being self-liquidating in nature’ (Deacon (2004) cited in 
Burns 2009). 
Securitisation exacerbates agency conflicts (Gan and Mayer 2006). Berle and Means 
did not foresee the changes that technology and innovation have made to the banking 
sector.  In search of greater yield and liquidity, banks have abandoned the traditional 
‘originate-to-hold’ model to the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model. Securitisation has 
allowed banks to take on more risks and generate more profits. Ownership and 
responsibility of risks are lost in the process. Academic literature has revealed that 
securitisation is opaque and complex (Buiter 2007, Berndt and Gupta 2008, Fender 
and Mitchell 2009). Little research however, has been conducted into why 
securitisation is opaque and complex from a principal-agent angle. Ashcraft and 
Schuermann have provided an excellent account of the associated principal-agent 
problems in securitisation in seven stages (Ashcraft and Schuermann 2008). These 
include concepts such as moral hazard, information asymmetry and adverse selection.  
Traditional principal-agent theorists advocate for market efficiency and reject any 
form of external intervention or regulation (Kirkbride and Letza 2004). Advocates of 
the principal/agent theory believe that external regulation has no place in corporate 
governance. Fama (1980) argued that the market is more efficient in regulating 
managers’ behaviour because directors are concerned about the threat of takeovers 
and are under pressure from the financial markets (Manne 1965). Hart argued that 
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intervention by the government or regulator should be banned because this would 
distort the free market framework (Hart 1995). Alexander argued that the traditional 
principal-agent model fails to take account of the important role that financial 
regulation can play in representing stakeholder interests in the economy (Alexander 
2006). Financial regulation is necessary because of the multiplier effect that banking 
activities have on the rest of the economy. Supervisors and regulators are agents on 
behalf of broader stakeholder interests in the economy at large. It is therefore 
imperative that financial regulators ensure that banking and other financial institutions 
have strong governance structures. Alexander stated that the regulator should play an 
active role with bank management in designing internal control systems and risk 
management practices that seek to achieve an optimal level of protection for 
stakeholders and shareholders. 
 
The two traditional approaches to regulation are the public interest and private interest 
views. The public interest or helping hand approach (Shleifer and Vishny 1998) 
assumes that there are market failures and the government has the incentives and 
abilities to rectify these market failures for the common good. In banking, the public 
interest would be best served if the banking system allocated resources in a socially 
efficient way. ‘Socially efficient’ means allocating resources in a way that maximises 
output and is ‘distributionally preferred’ (Mishan 1969). The private interest is also 
known as the ‘regulatory capture’ approach (Stigler 1971). Regulation is perceived as 
a product, enhancing the power of bankers and politicians. Competing interest groups 
such as bankers, politicians and consumers try to influence national policies towards 
banks in ways that favour themselves even if these policies do not maximise social 
welfare. Thus, the private interest approach relies heavily on the market and 
information disclosure. The collibratory and processual approach to corporate 
governance proposed by Kirkbride and Letza is an alternative to the public/private 
debate (Kirkbride and Letza 2004). Collibration was first applied by Dunsire in the 
early 1990s. (Dunsire 1990) It recognises that there are constant tensions between 
shareholders and stakeholders, as well as other interest groups such as bankers and 
politicians as mentioned in the private interest approach to regulation. It works well in 
regulating banks because it allows the government to intervene in the social tensions 
and tip the balance in the government’s favour.  
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Barth, Levine and Caprio Junior carried out an extensive piece of research in the 
regulatory aspects of banks in 2006 (Barth et al. 2006). It offers the first 
comprehensive cross-country assessment of the impact of bank regulation on the 
operation of banks and assesses the validity of the Basel Committee’s approach to 
bank regulation. Their book also provides an empirical evaluation of the proper role 
of government in the economy and the role of politics. Barth, Levine and Caprio 
Junior find that boosting capital standards or strengthening supervision do not lead to 
better banking efficiency. They call for more market discipline such as better 
disclosure; transparency and private sector monitoring of banks than on command and 
control regulations. The author believes that Barth et al’s results should be re-
examined in view of the financial crisis. Evidence has shown that inadequate capital 
levels and excessive leverage ratios led to the downfall of banks such as Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Stearns, Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley. Innovative 
financial products and transactions created multiple agency relationships which led to 
less transparency. Numerous complicated financial products and risk shifting 
mechanisms have developed over the last decade. Regulators responded by blocking 
some products and practices. This then led to bankers finding other innovative ways 
of avoiding the regulators. Hence, the problem of ‘regulatory dialectic’. Evidence is 
mounting to suggest that market discipline alone is insufficient in regulating banks. 
Markets will not function properly where there are externalities (Stiglitz 2006). 
Persaud agrees and states that market discipline is important in bank efficiency but ‘it 
cannot be on the front line of defence against crises’ (Persaud 2009).  Blundell-
Wignall and Atkinson said that ‘the bubble at the root of the sub-prime crisis and 
crises before it suggest the systemic absence of informational efficiency’ (Blundell-
Wignall and Atkinson 2010). In view of the above, Barth et al’s study on banking 
regulation thus needs to be re-examined. Regulations are thus necessary but there are 
various problems with regulations. Kane’s ‘regulatory dialectic’ approach states that 
regulations change in response to market demands (Kane 2000). Regulations correct 
past financial misbehaviour, so they tend to lag behind. The banks find the regulations 
onerous, especially in a bull market. They circumvent the regulations by further 
innovations by adopting low-cost innovations (regulatory arbitrage) and the regulator 
has to respond again by re-regulating.  
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Regulatory arbitrage is a response to technological innovations and globalisation of 
banking. Banks have three main functions in a society: payment; intermediation and 
risk transfer (Davies and Richardson 2010). These functions are still very important in 
twenty-first century banking but the structure of the financial system has seen many 
changes. Banking regulation has thus evolved over the years to keep pace with 
financial innovation and globalisation. In the late twentieth century, two important 
phenomena changed the banking landscape. These are the Competition and Credit 
Control in 1971 and the Big Bang in 1986 (Davies and Richardson 2010). The Bank 
of England introduced Competition and Credit Control in 1971 to promote 
competition between banks on the one hand and fringe banks on the other. Fringe 
banks are non-bank intermediaries. 1971-1973 was a period of economic growth. 
Combining this growth with the objective of increasing competition, the boundaries 
between banking services and institutions became blurred. This can be seen as a 
prelude to the functional structure of financial regulatory agencies in  regulating the 
banking system, where the regulator’s focus is on regulating the business of a bank in 
comparison to the institutional structure where the emphasis is on regulating the legal 
status of a bank. One of the questions in modern banking regulation is whether a 
functional or institutional structure of the regulatory agencies will influence the 
efficiency in achieving their objectives. This is a question which will be addressed in 
this thesis. The author will compare the structure of the UK regulator with the 
Australian structure in light of the fact that both countries now operate the ‘twin-
peaks’ model. 
The secondary banking crisis of 1973-1975 put a halt to the economic growth and 
competition within the financial sector. A slump in the housing market following a 
period of growth in the 1960s and 1970s coupled with a sharp rise in oil prices, the 
stock market crash in 1973-1974, lack of informal banking regulation and poor risk 
management in banks led to the bail-out of a number of lending banks. Prior to the 
secondary banking crisis, banking regulation was the responsibility of the Bank of 
England. There was no formal statutory bestowment of regulatory powers. Rather, the 
authority of the Bank of England derived from custom and practice (Lee 1979). The 
secondary banking crisis led to a more formalised banking regulation regime in the 
UK. Parliament therefore passed the Banking Act 1979. This Act extended the Bank 
of England's regulatory powers over lenders and provided protections for their 
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depositors. The Act established two important principles. First, there is a distinction 
between ‘recognised banks’ and ‘licensed institutions’. Supervision of the former 
continues on an essentially non-statutory basis and only recognised banks have an 
absolute right to call themselves banks (Lee 1979). The Johnson Matthey Bank crisis 
in 1984 revealed weaknesses in the Banking Act 1979. The Act did not define a bank 
or “banking business” and its provisions were applicable only to deposit taking 
institutions. The 1979 Act was thus repealed and Banking Act 1987 was enacted. The 
1987 Act increased the Bank of England’s supervisory rule which includes the power 
to vet shareholders of UK banks. Under the 1987 Act, the acceptance of deposits by a 
person in the course of carrying on a deposit-taking business is strictly forbidden, 
unless that person was an “authorised institution” according to sec 67(2) of the 1987 
Act. A single system of authorisation was thus born and this applied to all institutions 
accepting deposits. The second important principle was the establishment of a deposit 
insurance fund, whereby depositors were assured that 75% of their deposits were 
protected. The fund was financed internally by recognised banks and licensed 
institutions. The establishment of a deposit insurance fund scheme is an indication of 
the Bank of England’s aim in protecting consumers. This later became an objective of 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA). A danger with the deposit insurance scheme 
is moral hazard. Moral hazard is a classical incentive problem (Mitnick 1992). It takes 
place when ‘the principal cannot observe the agent’s behaviour but can see the 
optimality of the behaviour’ (Mitnick 1992). Since the government is underwriting the 
risks of a bank failure, there is potential that bank managers will pursue their own 
interests and take excessive risks. Depositors will have less incentive to monitor the 
bank managers’ actions since they are comforted by the deposit insurance fund. Moral 
hazard is a risk in modern banking, as it is an associated problem linked to the 
principal-agent issue. To order to achieve the objective of consumer protection 
however, it appears that a deposit insurance scheme  
Davies and Richardson (2010) viewed the Big Bang as the second important 
phenomenon that changed banking regulation in the UK. Big Bang sparked off a 
period of deregulation in the banking sector. The aim was to place the UK banking 
sector in a competitive position, certainly on the same level as the US. Deregulation 
blurred the lines of financial activities so a conglomeration of banks grew whereby 
banks started to offer multiple services. This provided consumers with more financial 
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products and competitive prices. Deregulation did not make the market more efficient, 
which was contrary to the original  rationale of the Financial Services Act 1986 or the 
Banking Act 1987 (Singh 2007). Under the Financial Services Act 1986, the 
Securities and Investments Board had ultimate power to make and enforce rules. The 
Securities and Investments Board became a single financial regulator in the UK. 
Three self-regulatory organisations provided prudential and conduct of business rules 
in respect of their areas. They are the Personal Investment Authority, the Investment 
Management Regulatory Organisation and the Securities Futures Authority (Singh 
2007).   
This particular structure of the regulator gave rise to two concerns. First, the self-
regulatory organisations adopted a functional structure  to regulating banks but 
banking  was still institutional in nature (MacNeil 1999). This led to problems in co-
ordination and co-operation between the various organisations. This was seen in the 
collapse of BCCI in 1991 and Barings Bank in 1995. BCCI became insolvent as a 
result of internal fraud, mismanagement and failure of the regulator. In particular, the 
Bank of England was criticised for communicating poorly with its internal staff; the 
supervisory staff need to be more proactive and alert in detecting potential issues 
(Singh 2007). When BCCI went into insolvency, its liquidators sued the Bank of 
England for misfeasance. BCCI’s liquidators alleged that the Bank of England failed 
as a supervisor and regulator for licensing BCCI and allowing it to carry on accepting 
deposits until it closed in 1991 (Gray 2008). The liquidators withdrew the claim in 
2005 but this case highlighted that the ‘risk-based’ approach to regulation could not 
deal with uncertainties, which are different to risks. Gray (2008) submits that this 
particular inadequacy is seen again in the Financial Services Authority’s failure in 
supervising Northern Rock. The Advanced risk responsive operating framework 
(ARROW) used by the Financial Services Authority in monitoring Northern Rock 
echoed the weaknesses of the ‘rules-based’ system. The ARROW risk assessment was 
very detailed by ‘even the most sophisticated risk models and risk radar screens can 
still leave room for the wholly expected’ (Gray 2008).  
Arora opined that the BCCI saga exposed weaknesses in both national and 
international banking regulation (Arora 2006). BCCI was incorporated in 
Luxembourg but was a multi-national bank, with a branch in the UK. The Bank of 
England granted BCCI SA (a subsidiary of BCCI Holdings SA) a licence to act as a 
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deposit-taker under the Banking Act 1979. BCCI SA was trading mainly in the UK at 
that time but the Bank of England decided to rely on the Luxembourg regulator to 
supervise BCCI SA under the authority of section 3(5) Banking Act 1979. Officials of 
the Bank of England were aware that it was unsatisfactory to rely on the Luxembourg 
regulator to supervise BCCI SA in the UK and several proposals were made. These 
include the suggestion that the Bank of England supervises the entire BCCI group and 
the incorporation of BCCI Holdings in the UK to improve the effectiveness of 
monitoring BCCI’s group activities in the UK (Arora 2006). Nevertheless, the Bank 
of England continued to rely on the Luxembourg regulator’s opinion. This is 
problematic since BCCI’s external auditors were concerned about serious financial 
losses from BCCI SA’s activities but these were not reported to the Bank of England 
(Arora 2006). This episode revealed the regulatory difficulties when a bank is global. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 provided further examples of international 
regulatory failures in Lehman Brothers and Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing Banks.  
Barings Bank collapsed due to its subsidiary of Barings Futures Singapore reporting a 
loss of more than £200 million. A rogue trader called Nick Leeson was responsible 
for the huge losses when he participated in unauthorised trading activities. The Board 
of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the collapse of Barings did not hold the Bank of 
England responsible for the ultimate collapse of Barings since this was the 
responsibility of Barings’ board of directors. However, the Bank of England failed in 
its supervision of Barings. The Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry (1994) 
recommended the Bank of England to: - 
1. Improve its communication with other supervisors and regulators 
2. Improve its understanding and knowledge of financial services businesses 
3. Rely more on the Bank of England’s internal audits and meet regularly with 
the chairman of the audit committee to discuss internal control matters 
4. Review the number of staff available for on-site visits and their skills 
These recommendations are very interesting since they are similar to the 
recommendations with regards to the failures of the Financial Services Authority 
when HBOS merged with Lloyds TSB Bank to become Lloyds Banking Group in 
2008. This observation has important consequences for the study of the functional 
structure of the regulator and how it impacts upon its efficiency in achieving its 
31 
 
objectives set out in sections 3-6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA). The Financial Services Act 1986 introduced self-regulation to restore 
investor confidence after financial failures such as the collapse of BCCI, Barings 
Bank and the Maxwell affair in the 1980s-1990s. The Maxwell affair revealed that the 
UK regulatory regime had two main weaknesses. First, the financial services industry 
did not have clear objectives. Johnson Matthey Bank was given financial support 
because the government feared that its failure will affect the gold bullion market. As a 
member of the London Gold Fixing, the government feared that systemic risks would 
cause bank runs in the UK financial sector. Singh (2007) opined that the Financial 
Services Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987 promoted competition and innovation. 
More importantly, the primary objective of the two Acts was to increase efficiency in 
the financial markets. The rescue of Johnson Matthey Bank negates the primary 
importance attached to efficiency in the market. Consumer protection and confidence 
in the financial system prevailed over efficiency. Secondly, regulatory capture was a 
problem because the main players in the financial industry were acceptable to both the 
government and the financial sector. For example, Sir David Walker was appointed to 
the board of the Securities Investment Board when he was also a non-executive 
director of the Bank of England. This enabled the interests of the financial industry 
and the regulator to complement each other (Singh 2007). Regulatory capture will 
continue to be a problem if a regulator acts in the interests of private parties such as 
individual banks. Baker (2010) submits that during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, 
there was a multi-level regulatory capture in the UK. An example is how the 
Treasury, Bank of England and the FSA adopted a number of deregulatory reforms 
which were extremely favourable to the biggest banks. The author will discuss 
whether the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK will have a regulatory capture issue or 
whether it has learnt from the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
Consumer protection remained a key objective of the regulator in the 1990s. When the 
UK labour government won the election in 1997, it changed the structure of the 
regulator and adopted the tripartite system. Under the tripartite system, the FSA 
supervised financial institutions; the Treasury was responsible for legislation and the 
Bank of England for financial stability. Legal instruments such as the Bank of 
England Act 1998 and the memorandum of understanding attempt to set out the 
boundaries and responsibilities of each organisation. The Bank of England Act 1998 
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established the principle that the FSA was the sole regulator and had banking 
supervision powers. The Bank of England had the right of sole decision and action 
with regards to interest rate matters. The memorandum of understanding prescribed 
how the three organisations should work together. However, the memorandum did not 
define the role of the lender of last resort function or ‘systemic damage’ (Singh 2007). 
Nor did it state when the lender of last resort function would operate. The absence of 
such definitions proved disastrous in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 since the 
failures of Northern Rock and HBOS demonstrated the confusion in the tripartite 
system as to their roles and responsibilities. The justification for a tripartite system 
was that the boundaries between financial institutions have blurred. Banking, 
insurance and securities overlap. Complex group structures, innovative financial 
products and processes such as securitisation have led to the phenomenon of 
‘functional despecialisation’ (Taylor 2009a). Traditional banks adopted the ‘originate-
to-distribute’ model in the late 1980s and boundaries between banks, insurance and 
securities companies have blurred. Banks and the shadow banking organisations have 
thus become increasingly interwoven. A single regulator would in theory, be better 
positioned to monitor modern financial institutions. Yet, the Equitable Life scandal 
demonstrated that the statutory objective of consumer protection, set out in the 
Financial Services Markets Act 2000, failed. New pension policyholders of Equitable 
Life lost a great deal of money due to management’s miscalculation of annuity rates 
and its failure to reduce the problems. Various reports such as the Baird Report (Baird 
Report 16 October 2001), the Penrose Report (Penrose Report 8 March 2004) and the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Report (Parliamentary Ombudsman Report 2002/03) all 
criticised the FSA for not informing consumers properly about the problematic 
pensions at Equitable Life (Singh 2007). The reports recommended that the FSA 
should be more pro-active and improve its co-ordination of prudential and conduct-of-
business issues. Caution should be exercised before the FSA is too heavily criticised. 
The FSA had not implemented the single regulatory regime yet at that point, so the 
institutional structure is not entirely at fault. Yet, the Equitable Life scandal revealed 
weaknesses in regulating the insurance sector and failure to protect consumers. 
Regulation alone would not protect consumers from every risk but when financial 
products became increasingly complex, the FSA failed in relation to its objective of 
conduct of business regulation contained in the FSA Handbook.   The FSA Handbook 
sets out when the FSA will authorise regulated financial activities and how businesses 
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must be conducted. When interpreting the FSA Handbook, there are eleven principles 
of business which need to be adhered to, since breaching a principle ‘makes a firm 
liable to disciplinary sanctions’ (Principles for Business rulebook 1.1.7G). The 
principles include concepts such as integrity, skills and care, acting in consumers’ 
interests. The author will demonstrate in her thesis that some of these principles were 
breached in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 in the UK. 
 
The FSMA’s statutory objectives are guided by several regulatory principles, namely 
efficiency and economy, role of management, proportionality, innovation, the 
competitiveness of the UK and competition (Financial Services Authority). 
Deregulation throughout the 1980s-1990s; financial innovation, greater geographical 
diversification and increased inter-connectedness of banks have pushed the UK to be 
a leading financial centre in the world. In 1970, the banking sector produced 38% of 
the UK’s gross domestic product. In 2010, the percentage is 450% of the UK’s gross 
domestic product (Davies and Richardson 2010). The UK has the second largest 
financial sector amongst the G20 countries, after Switzerland (Davies and Richardson 
2010). Competition is thus important in the financial sector and the deregulatory, 
laissez-faire approach to supervision during the 1980s-1990s in the UK assisted in this 
growth. However, this regulatory style has been criticised after the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 and so financial stability has been added to the FSMA 2000 in section 3A 
as an additional statutory objective of the FSA.  
 
The bank run at Northern Rock towards the end of 2007 destabilised the financial 
system and exposed poor co-ordination between the tripartite authorities in Northern 
Rock. The FSA failed in the ARROW risk assessment. Gray (2009) submitted that the 
principles-based regulatory approach could not deal with unforeseen risks and 
uncertainty. Hudson (2009) agreed and stated that the FSA did not ‘stress-test’ 
Northern Rock properly. Northern Rock changed its banking model from relying on 
deposits to increased reliance on the wholesale and securitised markets. As a result of 
this ‘stress-test’ failure and a light-touch regulatory approach, the FSA relied on the 
information given by Northern Rock and did not exercise a more sceptical or 
investigatory style in regulating the bank. Much has since been written on both the 
regulatory and corporate governance failures of Northern Rock (Shin 2009, Bruni and 
Llewellyn 2009, Onado 2009, Choudhry 2011). The author provides originality in this 
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thesis by comparing the financial ratios such as capital, leverage, liquidity, asset 
quality, return on equity and return on assets between UK and Australian banks. A 
comparative legal analysis will benefit UK regulatory academics, scholars and 
practitioners since Australia has operated a ‘twin-peaks’ regulatory model since 1998. 
Lessons can be learnt from the Australian regulatory landscape.  The right amount of 
regulation is needed to balance financial development and financial stability. 
Australian banks performed better than UK banks in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
No Australian bank needed a bail-out. Four of the nine AA-rated banks around the 
world are Australian banks, so the Australian regulation system worked well. 
Australia has also performed well in the Financial Development Index of the World 
Economic Forum 2011 (2011). They are ranked fifth out of sixty countries in the 
overall index and scored well in stability of its banking system. The Australian 
financial system is not perfect though. The World Economic Forum states that the 
Australia banks had low Tier 1 capital and had high levels of stress. Also, its 
commercial access to capital is weak. Although the UK takes third place in the 
Financial Development Index, it scored very low in overall financial stability (41st). It 
is ranked 38 out of 60 in frequency of banking crises compared to Australia’s top 
position. Financial intermediation however, is still strong despite the challenging 
economic conditions (World Economic Forum 2011). The author aims to fill a gap in 
the literature on banking regulation, financial development and financial stability. In 
particular, little research has been done comparing the financial ratios of UK and 
Australian banks between 2004-2009 and the implications arising from the ratios.   
Liquidity, leverage and capital are all connected. Adrian and Shin (2010) submit that 
‘aggregate liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the financial intermediaries search 
for borrowers’. In the sub-prime crisis, banks lent money to customers who had no 
realistic chance of repaying it. This is because banks had surplus capital which is 
costly to retain. During a boom, asset prices increase and balance sheets are stronger. 
Banks have to find ways to use their capital to increase leverage. Brunnermeier said 
that during the financial crisis there were two “liquidity spirals.” When asset prices 
drop, financial institutions’ capital erodes and, at the same time, lending standards and 
margins tighten (Brunnermeier 2009). Both effects cause ‘fire-sales, pushing down 
prices and tightening funding even further’ (Brunnermeier 2009). These liquidity 
spirals lead to banks protecting their funds so inter-bank lending decreases. Bank runs 
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then follow and capital levels deplete. Northern Rock in September 2007 is a prime 
example. 
Hildebrand views excessive leverage as the main cause of financial fragility 
(Hildebrand 2008). Excessive leverage and over reliance on short-term borrowing 
from the wholesale market contributed to the crisis (Crotty et al. 2010). Research 
from Borio and Lowe (2002), Adalid and Detken (2007), Alessi and Detken (2009), 
Gerdesmeier et al  (2009) show that almost all major crises are preceded by a 
combination of two factors: an increase in leverage, following excessive credit 
expansion and an unusual increase in asset prices. A higher leverage ratio ‘indicates 
in general a lower capacity to absorb losses and hence greater fragility since it 
entails that many agents have issued promises to pay a certain nominal amount but do 
not have the resources to honour these promises’ (Hildebrand 2008). Moosa (2010) 
believes that ‘liquidity and leverage are, as far as risk management is concerned 
more important than capital’. He argues that Basel II fail to take liquidity and 
leverage into account. He welcomes Basel III but concludes by stating that one should 
abandon harmonisation of banking regulation. Each country should produce its own 
regulation. Whilst there is merit in this approach, the inter-connectedness of the global 
banking sector makes it hard to implement this. 
Capital acts as an absorber of losses. Berger and Bouwman explore the relationship 
between bank capital and different aspects of bank performance in crises and calmer 
times for U.S. banks (Berger and Bouwman). According to their study, better 
capitalized banks performed better in the early 1990s but not in the recent crisis. 
Demirguc-Kunt et al’s study finds that higher capital is associated with better share 
performance in larger banks. Their data consists of 381 banks in 12 economies 
between 2006-2009 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2010). Banks which relied more on deposit 
funding than wholesale funding performed better. Leverage ratios and capital are 
important in large banks because they have a higher risk of regulatory dialectic. 
Greater importance should be given to tier 1 capital and equity. This author develops 
her research further by examining data from UK and Australian financial institutions. 
Takáts and Tumbarello opine that the usual financial soundness indicators of capital, 
leverage, liquidity and profitability should be viewed alongside with asset quality 
(Takáts and Tumbarello 2009). Banks in Iceland had very strong leverage ratios but a 
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number of them failed in the financial crisis. According to Gudmundsson, the 
leverage ratio of Icelandic banks never exceeded 18% between 2003-2008 
(Gudmundsson 2010). In fact, just before the financial crisis, Kaupthing Bank had a 
leverage ratio of 15.1%. Landsbanki Bank had a leverage ratio of 20% and Glitnir had 
a ratio of 19.3% (Gudmundsson 2010). Liquidity strains were only the prelude to the 
more serious problem, namely one of solvency. Liquidity strains and poor quality 
assets led to solvency problems in a number of banks in the UK such as the Royal 
Bank of Scotland and HBOS. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
was clear in its report into HBOS’s demise. It strongly believed that solvency was the 
fundamental problem at HBOS (The Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards 2013). Therefore, asset quality and solvency are very important to financial 
soundness. Data from Wheelock and Wilson revealed that banks with little capital, 
low-quality and illiquid assets are more likely to fail (Wheelock and Wilson 2000). 
They also found that banks with relatively high non-performing loan ratios are less 
attractive takeover targets. Greater disclosure, transparency and capital reserves are 
required to restore financial stability. The Financial Reporting Council has launched 
revised guidelines for banks on solvency issues (Financial Reporting Council 2013).  
Northern Rock experienced severe liquidity and capital issues prior to the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. It went too far in favour of financial innovation and range of 
products at the expense of maintaining checks and balances. Liquidity is the main 
culprit at Northern Rock. Although it was solvent, its assets were mainly illiquid due 
to the reliance on wholesale funding. This view is confirmed by Ratnowski and 
Huang, who conducted empirical research into 72 of the largest commercial banks in 
OECD countries during the financial crisis of 2007 (Ratnovski and Huang 2009). 
Their research revealed that Northern Rock had very weak levels of capital and 
liquidity at the end of 2006. It was also 28.7% reliant on retail funding in the same 
year. The failure of Northern Rock exposed the inability of UK insolvency law to deal 
with the situation. As Lord Turner said: ‘global banking institutions are global in life 
but national in death’ (Turner 2009). UK corporate insolvency law was inadequate in 
dealing with the financial crisis. Corporate insolvency law ‘deals only with 
institutions that are already drained of economic value’ (Hupkes 2009). This is too 
late for banks. When banks are in financial distress, time is of the essence to minimise 
externalities. Government authorities need powers to rescue banks immediately to 
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avoid widespread panic. These powers were lacking under the UK corporate 
insolvency regime. The FSA were thus unable to take control of Northern Rock 
quickly when the latter was technically still solvent. This made it difficult for the FSA 
to sell Northern Rock since it had already lost franchise value (Bank of England 
2011).  
The UK government faced the choice of insolvency or nationalisation. The financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 has shown the spill over effect of banks so the UK government 
decided to nationalise Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, as well as injecting 
£850 million into the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. The Bank 
Special Provisions Act 2008 was passed on 21
st
 February 2008 to facilitate the 
nationalisation of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley. It was also used to resolve 
the UK entities of various Icelandic banks. The priority of the UK government during 
the financial crisis was to limit the costs of bank failures within the industry.  The 
Banking Act 2009 on 21
st
 February 2009 replaced the Bank Special Provisions Act 
2008 and contains a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) to deal with distressed banks. 
To date, only Dunfermline Building Society has been resolved by the SRR.  The 
Banking Act 2009 is divided into two parts. The first part deals with pre-insolvency 
‘stabilisation’ and the second part deals with banking insolvency and administration 
(Ellinger et al. 2011). Under the first part of ‘pre-insolvency stabilisation’, there are 
three stabilisation mechanisms. First, one can transfer all or part of a bank to a buyer 
in the private sector. Secondly, one can transfer all or part of a bank to a ‘bridge 
bank’. The Bank of England will set up the ‘bridge bank’. Finally, a bank can be 
temporarily nationalised (section 1(3)(c) Banking Act 2009). The stabilisation 
mechanism applies if a bank fails to satisfy the ‘threshold conditions’ for FSA-
authorisation regarding capital adequacy and suitability requirements (section 7 
Banking Act 2009). The aim is to rescue a bank as soon as there are red flags 
regarding its financial position. The second part of the Banking Act 2009 includes a 
special banking insolvency procedure and a bank administration procedure. The 
former enables depositors to access their savings guaranteed under the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme swiftly. The latter enables the ‘good’ part of the 
insolvent bank to carry on with its business activities. This is a new provision which 
was not possible under the corporate insolvency regime. 
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Apart from a new framework on rescuing banks, two  major government reports were 
produced as a result of the financial crisis: the Turner Review (Turner 2009), the 
Walker Review (Walker 2009). The Turner Review identified three underlying causes 
of the crisis: 
(i) macro-economic imbalances; 
(ii) financial innovation of little social value and  
(iii) important deficiencies in key bank capital and liquidity regulations.  These 
were underpinned by an exaggerated faith in rational and self-correcting markets. It 
stresses the importance of regulation and supervision being based on a system-wide 
macro-prudential approach rather than focussing solely on specific firms (Turner 
2009).  
The Review made the following proposals:  
1. Fundamental changes to bank capital and liquidity regulations and to bank 
published accounts;  
2. More and higher quality bank capital with several times as much capital required to 
support risky trading activity;  
3. Build counter-cyclical capital buffers in good economic times so that they can be 
drawn on in downturns and reflected in published account estimates of future 
potential losses;  
4. A central role for much tighter regulation of liquidity;  
5. Regulation of ‘shadow banking’ activities on the basis of economic substance not 
legal form: increased reporting requirements for unregulated financial institutions 
such as hedge funds and regulatory powers to extend capital regulation;  
6. Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies to limit conflicts of interest and inappropriate 
application of rating techniques;   
7. Major changes in the FSA’s supervisory approach, building on the existing 
Supervisory Enhancement Programme (SEP), with a focus on business strategies and 
system wide risks rather than internal processes and structures;  
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8. Major reforms in the regulation of the European banking market, combining a new, 
independent European regulatory authority with increased national powers to 
constrain risky cross-border activity. 
9. Remuneration policies should be designed to avoid incentives for excessive risk-
taking; risk management considerations should be closely integrated into 
remuneration decisions. This should be achieved through the development and 
enforcement of UK and global codes.  
10. New capital and liquidity requirements should be designed to constrain 
commercial banks' role in risky proprietary trading activities. Lord Turner rejected the 
principle of the Glass-Steagall Act 1933, where retail banking was separated from 
investment banking. He said that banks have failed in the past simply due to on-
balance sheet loans (US banks in 1929-30 and 1980s; Japanese and Swedish banks in 
1990s), rather than the securitised credit model as seen in this financial crisis. He 
believes that the optimal financial system will include a controlled securitised credit 
model (Turner 2009). 
Lord Turner also mentioned the controversial issue of bankers’ remuneration. It was 
Lord Walker who developed this corporate governance problem further in this review. 
The Walker Report of November 2009 reviewed the corporate governance issues in 
banks (Walker 2009). In particular, Lord Walker examined two issues: 
• Whether changes in governance structure are required to increase the independence 
of risk management functions and 
• The skill, level and time commitment required for non-executive directors of large 
complex banks to perform effective oversight of risks and provide challenge to 
executive strategies. 
The Walker Report made 39 recommendations to the corporate governance 
mechanisms of banks. In summary, the main recommendations are as follows: - 
(a) Increased role for institutional investors to challenge company directors. 
Institutional investors and fund managers will follow the Stewardship Code so 
that they engage more with the investee companies’ strategies and policies. 
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(b) Increased role for non-executive directors. The key change relates to the 
minimum expected time commitment from non-executive directors. Instead, 
the report calls for certain non-executive directors to commit 30 to 36 days, 
and for the time commitment to be agreed and made clear to shareholders on 
request. Non-executive directors should be encouraged to challenge strategy. 
(c) Risk management. The board of a FTSE 100-listed bank or life insurance 
company should establish a board risk committee separately from the audit 
committee, with the chief risk officer reporting in to the committee as well as 
the chief executive. In addition, the risk committee should be chaired by a 
non-executive director, who should carry out a due diligence appraisal of any 
strategic transaction as a matter of good practice. 
(d) Remuneration. The remuneration committee should be responsible for setting 
the overarching principles and parameters of remuneration policy on a firm 
wide basis, and should have oversight on remuneration policy in respect to all 
"high end" employees, which is defined as employees who earn more than the 
median income of the executive board. A new recommendation is that banks 
should disclose in banks the number of high end employees whose total 
expected remuneration is in the range of £1m to £2.5m, in a range £2.5m to 
£5m and in £5m bands thereafter. However, it stops short of naming the 
individual bankers. 
No matter how strict a regulatory regime can be, ultimately, it is the board of directors 
who is responsible for any failure. MacNeil (2010) opined that several UK banks 
required bail-out and/or government assistance whilst other banks did not. This 
suggests that corporate governance was a contributing factor towards the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. Although the FSA’s mandate does not embrace governance 
issues, MacNeil is of the view that risk management is a common denominator in 
regulation and corporate governance. The FSA viewed excessive remuneration as a 
contributing (and not the primary) factor to the financial crisis. Yet, the FSA wanted 
to improve risk management and therefore made changes to the Senior Management 
Arrangements, Systems and Controls section of the FSA Handbook (now the FCA 
Handbook since April 2013). A new Remuneration Code needs to be inserted into that 
section. Although corporate governance played a role in the financial crisis of 2007-
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2009, there is insufficient scope in this thesis to discuss corporate governance 
weaknesses. Rather, the focus of this thesis is on regulatory reforms. George Osborne, 
the current Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced on 16th June 2010 that the 
coalition government would reform the UK financial regulatory landscape. He 
recommended a shift from the single regulator to a ‘twin-peaks’ model on grounds 
that the tripartite system "failed spectacularly" in ensuring financial stability (BBC 
2010). The HM Treasury document of 2010: ‘A new approach to financial regulation: 
judgement, focus and stability’ explained that “The tripartite system of financial 
regulation failed to ensure financial stability - in particular by failing to identify the 
risk posed by the rapid and unsustainable increase in debt in the economy. This 
resulted in considerable economic costs in lost output and in a substantial 
deterioration in public finances. The regulatory system cannot be restructured 
without primary legislation” (HM Treasury 2010). The HM Treasury consultation 
document has raised a number of macro-prudential failures of the Financial Services 
Authority. These include: - 
1. Failure to identify the problems that were building up in the financial system; 
2. Failure to take steps to mitigate the above problems; and 
3. Failure to deal adequately with the crisis when it did break, especially during the 
first part of the crisis in the summer of 2007. 
According to the HM Treasury consultation document 2010, the macro-prudential 
failures arose due to an ‘underlap’ of macro-prudential regulation. Whilst the rationale 
of the tripartite system is an ‘overlap’ of financial products and thus the phenomenon 
of ‘functional despecialisation’ (Taylor 2009a), in reality, the structure of the tripartite 
system was weak. The Financial Services Authority was given too much work and 
responsibility in relation to financial regulation. The Bank of England had nominal 
responsibility with little power or resources. The Treasury was ill prepared and 
equipped for crises. In addition to this dismal picture, the UK lacked a single 
institution which could deal with financial regulation as a whole. With an ‘overlap’ of 
financial products and an ‘underlap’ of macro-prudential regulation, it is little wonder 
that the balance tipped in favour of financial innovation than stability. Together with 
the micro-prudential failures mentioned earlier in this paper, the HM Treasury 
consultation document 2010 states that micro-prudential regulation failed because of 
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an over-reliance on a ‘tick-box’ compliance regime. There was a lack of thorough 
understanding of business models and risk analysis. 
Against this backdrop, it is therefore necessary to consider whether the UK 
government would improve financial regulation under the twin-peaks model. Under 
Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) is 
responsible for macro-prudential regulation. It is a subsidiary of the Bank of England. 
The FPC comprises of bank executives and will have macro-prudential tools to 
regulate financial institutions. Micro-prudential regulation will be the responsibility of 
the new Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) deals with prudential and financial 
regulation (section 6 Financial Services Act 2012). The PRA is a subsidiary of the 
Bank of England. Its statutory objectives are to promote the safety and soundness of 
the firms which they regulate (section 2B Part 2 Financial Services Act 2012). Its 
regulatory style has three elements: judgement-based approach; forward-looking 
approach and a focused approach. Andrew Bailey (Bailey 2013) from the Bank of 
England submits that this will combine judgement with evidence and analysis, 
rigorous analysis of the riskiest banks by the Board. The Board is comprised of the 
Governor of the Bank of England, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability, Chief 
Executive Officer of the PRA and non-executive members. The PRA’s powers were 
further widened under Part 1 of the Financial Services Reform Act 2013. Under this 
Bill, the PRA can hold banks to account for the way they separate their retail and 
investment activities, giving it powers to enforce the full separation of individual 
banks. Meanwhile, the ‘conduct’ part of the FSA is given to the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). It is responsible for regulating business conduct of all financial 
services firms, as well as prudential regulation of firms not regulated by the PRA 
(Bailey 2013). The FCA’s objectives are to protect consumers, maintain integrity in 
the financial sector and promote competition within the industry (section 1B(3) 
Financial Services Act 2012).  The aim is for the PRA and FCA to work closely 
together. However, due to the ‘twin-peaks’ model, the FSA Handbook is divided into 
two handbooks: the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook and the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) Handbook. Conduct of business regulation is mentioned 
in both FCA and PRA Handbooks and in this thesis, the PRA Handbook applies since 
the PRA regulates banks and financial institutions since April 2013.  
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The main advantage of ‘twin-peaks’ model is that both macro and micro-prudential 
regulation are brought under one institution—the Bank of England. Proponents of the 
twin-peaks model argued that the twin-peaks model is better in times of crises. 
Having the lender of last resort and information gathered as the banking regulator 
would accelerate the decision-making process (Taylor 2009a) Drawing on the 
Australian experience will assist policy makers in deciding the right regulatory 
structure and style  for the UK.  
The rest of the thesis is divided into the following chapters: Chapter four will compare 
and contrast the performance of four major UK and four major Australian banks are 
compared. The author will analyse the UK legislation on the nationalisation of 
Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley. The author will also provide an overview 
of the Australian rules and legislation on banking regulation. She will investigate why 
the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model is better. Chapter five will review the performance 
of the FSA during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. In particular, the author will 
examine the weaknesses revealed in the FSA Handbook and FSMA 2000. She will 
then link these weaknesses to the ‘twin-peaks’ model. Chapter six provides a 
comprehensive discussion of how Australian’s prudential supervision regime 
developed and the legal framework of banking regulation. The author will discuss the 
differences in regulatory aims and objectives between the UK and Australia. Is there 
convergence or divergence between the two regulatory systems? Finally, chapter 
seven is a discussion on what lessons can be learnt from the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ 
model. The author will examine whether the Bank of England has too much power 
under the new ‘twin-peaks model’ in the UK. The position of the UK central bank is 
different to the Australian central bank. The author will investigate whether there are 
indications that the Bank of England’s status will simply replace the FSA as a single 
super regulator (Hill 2012). These are the gaps in the extant literature in banking 
regulation and the author will address them in her thesis systematically. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
‘When methods decisions are based on some universal, political mandate rather than 
on situational merit, research offers no challenge, requires no subtlety, presents no 
risk, and allows for no accomplishment’ (Patton 1999). 
Patton argues that advocacy for a single research method applicable to all research 
studies is futile. The challenge thus for researchers is to select the appropriate 
methodology to suit the empirical questions.  
The role of research methodology is to guide the researcher to undertake his study in a 
system of procedures and logical study (Gould and Kolb 1964). Methodology refers to 
the process and procedures of research. It includes the theoretical and philosophical 
assumptions upon research are based and the implications of these for the methods 
used (Saunders et al. 2007).  Positivists aim to use strict scientific methods and 
procedures in research. They will discard any personal values or beliefs and analyse 
data objectively. The goal of this approach is to ‘uncover and explain relationships 
among variables that will eventually lead to universal laws that form the foundation 
for prediction and control of phenomena’ (Ponterotto 2005). Positivists thus rely 
heavily on quantitative methods such as experiments and surveys which are 
standardised and detached. 
Meanwhile, constructivists immerse themselves in the organisation or community 
they are studying. As there is a strong relationship between the researcher and the 
participant under investigation, qualitative research methods such as interviews, 
participant observation, ethnography and action research are adopted.  
Research methodology encompasses five branches: research purpose; research 
philosophy; research design; research ethics and data analysis. Diagram 1 illustrates 
these five branches and their sub-divisions:
Diagram 1: Five branches and sub-divisions of research methodology 
Adapted from Saunders et al (2007) 45 
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3.2 Research Purpose 
The purpose of research can be divided into three stances: exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. It is possible to have more than one purpose running concurrently or 
consecutively in a research study. Thus, a researcher can adopt an exploratory and descriptive 
manner throughout his study or commence with a descriptive manner in selecting the 
research question. Exploratory methods in literature review and data collection will then be 
pursued.  
3.2.1 Exploratory study 
According to Robson, an exploratory study is a valuable means of finding out ‘what is 
happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light’ 
(Robson 2002). There are three methods of conducting exploratory research: 
 Studying and reviewing literature; 
 Interviews with experts in the research area; 
 Conducting focus group interviews. 
Flexibility and adaptability are the benefits of an exploratory approach. It is important for a 
researcher to change his direction when he discovers new data. Such flexibility however, 
does not mean that there is an absence of direction. Adams and Schvaneveldt state that the 
focus in exploratory research is broad initially but this narrows throughout the research 
journey  (Adams and Schvaneveldt 1991). 
3.2.2 Descriptive study 
The aim of descriptive study is to ‘portray an accurate profile of persons, events of 
situations’ (Robson 2002). It can be used before or after an exploratory or explanatory study. 
Descriptive studies are conducted at a specific point in time. They take the form of cross-
sectional case studies. The advantage of descriptive studies is that they reveal patterns and 
connections. They do not however, establish causal links between variables. Moreover, pure 
description is of little value to the research and academic communities.  Therefore, 
descriptive study is merely a means to an end. 
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3.2.3 Explanatory study 
The desire to know ‘why’ is the purpose of explanatory research. Causal relationships are 
examined in an explanatory study. Researchers focus on studying a specific situation or 
problem and then establish the causal links between variables. It thus builds on exploratory 
and descriptive studies and identifies the reasons for a phenomenon. It is also capable of 
extending a theory or principle to new areas, new issues and new topics. Finally, it provides 
evidence to support or refute a hypothesis. 
 
3.3 Research Philosophy 
The researcher will have his own philosophical assumptions about the way in which he views 
the world. These assumptions will influence his research strategy and methodology. Practical 
considerations, the relationship between knowledge and the process by which it is developed 
will be the deciding factors as to which philosophical approach a researcher takes. The 
different types of philosophies include positivism; relativism; social constructionism; 
objectivism; subjectivism; pragmatism; functionalist;  radical humanist and radical 
structuralist (Saunders et al. 2007). 
There are three ways of thinking about research philosophies: epistemology; ontology and 
axiology. 
 
3.3.1. Epistemology 
Johnson and Duberly define epistemology as being the study of criteria by which ‘…we can 
know what does and what does not constitute warranted or scientific knowledge’ (Johnson 
and Duberly 2000). They continue by citing Rorty (in Johnson and Duberly 2000): ‘It 
[epistemology] express the desire to find foundations to which one might cling, frameworks 
beyond which one must not stray, objects that which impose themselves, representations 
which must not be gainsaid’. Epistemology thus provides the foundation for what is 
acceptable knowledge to the researcher and the framework for data interpretation.  In social 
science, there are three types of epistemologies: positivism; relativism and social 
constructionism.  
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3.3.1.1 Positivism 
To positivists, reality is external and objective. The observer must be independent and human 
interests should not be taken into account. Comte (in Saunders et al. 2007) thus said that: ‘All 
good intellects have repeated, since Bacon’s time, that there can be no real knowledge but 
that which is based on observed facts’. Positivists make hypotheses during research and seek 
to confirm whether their hypotheses are true or not. The aim of positivist research is to 
establish the causal explanations which explain regularities in human behaviour. In order to 
generalise the results, positivists select samples of sufficient size from which inferences may 
be drawn about the population (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). 
 
3.3.1.2 Relativism 
From a relativist’s perspective, reality exists independently of the observer. Thus, the 
relativist’s role is to identify the pre-existing reality. Relativists believe that observations will 
be more accurate if several perspectives are taken (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). Triangulation 
is the strategy that relativists use in order to corroborate their results by using several sources 
of information about a phenomenon. The results will nevertheless only provide a probability 
that they are an accurate indication of the underlying situation (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008).       
 
3.3.1.3 Social constructionism 
The concept of social constructionism emerged from 1960 onwards with scholars such as 
Berger & Luckman advocating a new paradigm (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Social 
constructionists believe that reality is determined by people, not by external or objective 
factors. The focus is on what people (individually and collectively) think (Easterby-Smith et 
al. 2008). The ultimate aim of social constructionism is to gain a better understanding of the 
situation in question. Social constructionism is particularly useful when a researcher is 
pursuing studies regarding power and cultural differences (Anderson 1993, Cunliffe 2002). 
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The elements of the three epistemologies are summarised in table 1 below: - 
 
Table 1: Summary of the three epistemologies used in social science 
Social science 
epistemologies 
 
Elements of 
methodologies 
Positivism Relativism Social 
constructionism 
Aims Discovery Exposure Invention 
Starting points Hypotheses Propositions Meanings 
Designs Experiment Triangulation Reflexibility 
Techniques Measurement Survey Conversation 
Analysis/interpretation Verification/ 
Falsification 
Probability Sense-making 
Outcomes Causality Correlation Understanding 
             Source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson (2008) 
     
3.3.2. Ontology 
Ontology concerns the nature of reality (Saunders et al. 2007). More specifically, ontology 
addresses the following question: What is the form and nature of reality and what can be 
known about reality (Ponterotto 2005)? Ontology concerns issues such as how a researcher 
views himself; others; of roles occupied; of organisations and their objectives (Zakus et al. 
2007). There are two ontological positions: objective and subjective. Objectivists see reality 
as a concrete structure. Reality is hard, external to human beings and real. The social world is 
as concrete and real as the natural world (Morgan and Smircich 1980). Subjectivists see 
reality as a continuously changing process. Human beings are social actors who create social 
phenomena. Smircich  noted that subjectivists would view the culture of an organisation as 
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something that the organisation ‘is’ as a result of continuous societal changes (Smircich 
1983). Objectivists would view the culture of an organisation as something which an 
organisation ‘has’. 
Zakus, Malloy & Edwards believe that ontology is the lynchpin to truth (epistemology) and 
behaviour (axiology) (Zakus et al. 2007). Through participation and social interaction, 
individuals acquire and concurrently shape their ontological basis. Our personalities, 
knowledge and place in society will be developed through constant learning (Zakus et al. 
2007). The knowledge that we learn and use in society will ultimately depend on the settings. 
Thus, we are able to use appropriate knowledge in different settings because of our 
ontological basis. 
   
3.3.3. Axiology 
Axiology is the philosophical branch that studies judgements about values (Saunders et al. 
2007). Values act as guiding principles for individuals and organisations. To positivists, 
values; hopes; expectations and personal feelings have no role in the research process 
(Ponterotto 2005). The researcher adopts objective methods to control any influence it might 
have on the subjects under scrutiny or on the research process. Although positivist 
researchers separate their value biases during an investigation, values are reflected in their 
research areas. For example, a researcher's decision to study the disparity in wages between 
men and women would reflect his commitment to equality. 
Constructivists maintain that their values and personal experience play an inevitable role in 
the research process. The researcher should ‘acknowledge, describe and put aside his values, 
but not eliminate them’ (Ponterotto 2005). The epistemological position of subjectivists is 
one of close researcher-participant relationship. Society is shaped by individuals and they in 
turn shape others. This dialectic interaction shapes the researcher’s insight in his study. 
Therefore, biases in such an interactive relationship are sometimes difficult to be eradicated. 
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3.4. Research Design 
3.4.1 Deductive/Inductive approach 
Selecting a deductive or inductive approach is the researcher’s next task. Deductive reasoning 
works from the more general to the more specific. Sometimes this is referred to as the ‘top-
down’ approach. The researcher might begin with formulating a theory about his topic of 
interest. He then narrows it down into more specific hypotheses that he can test. Then he 
narrows it down even further when he collects observations to address the hypotheses. This 
ultimately leads him to test the hypotheses with specific data which would either verify or 
falsify the researcher’s original theories. 
Inductive reasoning works the other way, moving from specific observations to broader 
generalisations and theories. It is the ‘bottom up’ approach. In inductive reasoning, one 
begins with specific observations and measures; detects patterns and regularities; create 
tentative hypotheses that can be explored and finally end up developing some general 
conclusions or theories. 
 
3.4.2 Research Methods 
Rolfe believes that the qualitative/quantitative debate should be specifically restricted to how 
data is collated (Rolfe 2006). It is counter-productive to label all qualitative research 
methodologies as either positivist or constructionist since each study should be considered on 
its own merits. Others such as Holloway & Wheeler define qualitative research more 
generically (Holloway and Wheeler 2002). They believe that qualitative research is ‘holistic, 
emic, contextualised, interpretative and immersed’ (Holloway and Wheeler 2002). 
Approaches to qualitative research are diverse: the common research strategies are case 
study; interviews; action research; grounded theory; ethnography and archival research. 
Qualitative researchers analyse their data by using graphs, charts and statistics. Quantitative 
research methods include experiments, questionnaires and surveys. Quantitative researchers 
analyse their data by categorising data. 
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Scholars have been engaged in debating whether the qualitative or quantitative method is 
better for more than a century. As this thesis adopts the qualitative research method, the 
strengths and weaknesses of qualitative research are shown in diagram 2 below: - 
 
Strengths 
 
• The data are based on the participants’ own categories of meaning. 
• It is useful for studying a limited number of cases in depth. 
• It is useful for describing complex phenomena. 
• Provides individual case information. 
• Can conduct cross-case comparisons and analysis. 
• Provides understanding and description of people’s personal experiences of phenomena (i.e. 
the emic or insider’s viewpoint). 
• Can describe, in rich detail, phenomena as they are situated and embedded in local contexts. 
• The researcher identifies contextual and setting factors as they relate to the phenomenon of 
interest. 
• The researcher can study dynamic processes (i.e. documenting sequential patterns and 
change). 
• The researcher can use the primarily qualitative method of grounded theory to generate 
inductively a tentative but explanatory theory about a phenomenon. 
• Can determine how participants interpret constructs 
• Data are usually collected in naturalistic settings in qualitative research. 
• Qualitative approaches are responsive to local situations, conditions and stakeholders’ needs. 
• Qualitative researchers are responsive to changes that occur during the conduct of a study 
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(especially during extended fieldwork) and may shift the focus of their studies as a result. 
•Qualitative data in the words and categories of participants lend themselves to exploring how 
and why phenomena occur. 
• One can use an important case to demonstrate vividly a phenomenon to the readers of a 
report. 
•Determine idiographic causation (i.e. determination of causes of a particular event). 
 
 
Weaknesses 
 
• Knowledge produced may not generalise to other people or other settings (i.e. findings may 
be unique to the relatively few people included in the research study). 
• It is difficult to make quantitative predictions. 
• It is more difficult to test hypotheses and theories. 
• It generally takes more time to collect the data when compared to quantitative research. 
• Data analysis is often time consuming. 
•The results are more easily influenced by the researcher’s personal biases and idiosyncrasies. 
 
Diagram 2: Strengths and weaknesses of qualitative research 
Source: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004)  
 
Qualitative data has been criticised as being ‘soft’. Kuhn said that quantitative predictions are 
preferable to qualitative predictions because maths and statistics provide concreteness and 
accuracy (Kuhn 1970). Patton refutes this claim by stating that qualitative methods are 
different (Patton 1999). They are not weaker or softer since triangulation would ensure 
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quality, validity and credibility of data. The important task for a researcher is to match the 
appropriate method for the phenomena being studied. A researcher can carry out his research 
using mono method when collecting and analysing data; mixed methods or multi-method. If a 
researcher adopts the mono method, he will combine either a quantitative or qualitative 
collection technique with qualitative data analysis procedure. Multi-method refers to the 
combinations where more than one data collection technique is used with associated analysis 
techniques, but this is restricted within either a quantitative or qualitative world view 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). Mixed methods occur when both quantitative and qualitative 
methods are used in the research paradigm. Mixed methods research uses both quantitative 
and qualitative data collection and analysis simultaneously or consequentially. Mixed 
methods research is useful when investigating inter-disciplinary or complex issues since it 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of research problems than solely relying on 
either qualitative or quantitative method. Finally, there is the multi method approach. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie believe that multi methods are beneficial if they provide better 
opportunities to answer the research questions and for better evaluation of the results 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). Multi methods are particularly helpful in that different 
methods can be used at various stages of the research, i.e. one can use interviews at an 
exploratory stage before using a questionnaire. Further, the use of various data collection 
techniques will give rise to triangulation, which reinforces the construct validity of results. 
Construct validity relates to whether the correct label is attached to a piece of research, i.e. 
when a researcher is measuring what is labelled as ‘risk management’, is that really what he 
is measuring? If one can make generalisations from his own measures, then construct validity 
has been achieved. 
 
3.4.3 Methodology in thesis 
Originality is key to a successful PhD thesis. In this thesis, originality is demonstrated by a 
mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative research methods.  The 
qualitative analysis involves doctrinal research,  comparative law and a  case study because 
the author  is exploring a topical, contemporary phenomenon in the social world, namely the 
banking regulation systems of the UK and Australia  The quantitative analysis involves 
considering the financial ratios of banks to see if the various ratios such as leverage, capital 
and liquidity complied with banking regulations. These ratios are used to check the 
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correlation between leverage, capital and liquidity ratios with the performance of banks. The 
author calculated the ratios between 2004-2009. These ratios are cross-checked with data 
from Factiva, government publications such as Financial Stability Reports from the Bank of 
England; publications from the World Economic Forum and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. Quantitative research methods include interpreting financial 
ratios, graphs and charts from primary literature such as company annual reports and 
government publications. In order to achieve consistency, the author compared the financial 
ratios of four major high street UK and four Australian banks in chapter four. Northern Rock 
used to be a building society but it became a bank in 1997. Its business model is unusual 
since it combined a traditional reliance on illiquid long-term mortgage assets with a reliance 
on innovative sources such as securitisation and the wholesale market. Northern Rock was 
thus excluded in the quantitative analysis since it was difficult to find an Australian 
comparator. The author has chosen a combination of methods in her thesis since each type of 
method has its advantages and disadvantages. By offering a tailored and unique mixed 
methods approach to a critical analysis of UK and Australian banking regulation, the author 
believes that this thesis is original. The author commences her analysis by using doctrinal 
research stating what the law is on banking regulation in the UK and Australia, then uses a 
comparative case study to contrast the banking regulation regimes in the UK and Australia. 
Financial ratios of the top four UK and Australian banks are used in the case study to 
investigate regulatory weaknesses. The author now justifies her methodology by providing a 
deeper discussion of doctrinal research, comparative legal analysis and case study.  
 
3.4.3.1 Doctrinal research 
As an academic lawyer, the author uses doctrinal research when reading, interpreting and 
analysing legal sources. Doctrine is defined by Mann as ‘a synthesis of rules, principles, 
norms, interpretive guidelines and values’ which ‘explains, makes coherent or justifies a 
segment of the law as part of a larger system of law’ (Mann 2010). Doctrinal research 
involves two stages. First, a researcher locates the relevant sources of law. Secondly, the 
researcher interprets and analyses the sources. Therefore, doctrinal research involves 
deductive/inductive reasoning and hermeneutic/interpretive analysis of the law. A researcher 
carefully studies legal judgements in search of inconsistencies, ambiguities and reconciling 
such differences (Posner 1981). It has been argued that traditional doctrinal research still 
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plays an important role in academic law but interdisciplinary scholarship is growing at a fast 
pace (Posner 2002) Siems submits that pure interpretation of cases or statutes is insufficient 
to create originality (Siems 2008). For a thesis to be original, a new solution to a problem or a 
new method to interpreting cases and statutes is required  Twining opines that doctrinal 
research can be narrow and isolated: ‘it takes as its starting point and its main focus of 
attention rules of law, without systematic or regular reference to the context of problems they 
are supposed to resolve, the purposes they were intended to serve or the effects they in fact 
have’ (Twining 1976). In brief, doctrinal law does not deal with how rules can be improved 
or reformed (Hutchinson 2013). Doctrinal research is narrow and isolated because it separates 
law from policy and politics. Yet, doctrinal research is still important in legal scholarship in 
this era because it solves legal problems. It reflects the analytical approach used by judges 
when deciding cases. More importantly, it is a useful starting point to research since it 
determines ‘what the law is’. The author thus commences her thesis with doctrinal research to 
determine ‘what the law is’ by analysing the development of UK and Australian banking 
regulation through various important pieces of legislation (for example: Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 in the UK; 
Corporations Act 2001 in Australia) and case law.  The author then supplements her 
methodology with comparative law and a case study.  
 
3.4.3.2 Comparative law  
Kahn-Freund describes comparative law as a method and not a topic (Kahn-Freund 1966). 
Advocates of comparative law submit that there are four elements of distinctiveness. First, 
comparative law provides originality because when making comparisons between two or 
more legal systems, it is possible to make policy recommendations (Siems 2008). A 
researcher can thus create research of impact and of use in practice. Secondly, comparative 
law provides a new perspective to legal research (Legrand 1995). Thirdly, when using 
comparative legal analysis, a researcher needs to be committed to theory. Finally, the 
researcher also needs a commitment to inter-disciplinarity (Legrand 1996). The author is 
keen to produce policy recommendations of use in practice, therefore she believes that by 
adopting a comparative legal analysis, she can produce new knowledge by comparing the 
banking regulation regimes in the UK and Australia. By comparing the similarities and 
differences between these two legal regimes, as well as the weaknesses exposed by the 
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regulators in these countries, she can make policy recommendations on banking regulation. 
The UK and Australia are both common law countries and the regulatory systems share many 
similarities. Yet, after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the regulatory systems of both 
countries revealed different issues. More importantly, lessons can be learnt from Australia’s 
‘twin-peaks’ regulatory model as the UK has switched from a tripartite regulatory model to 
the ‘twin-peaks’ model in 2013. The comparative method gives the researcher a new 
perspective to her research. Studying the UK regulatory model alone is useful but the 
Australian experience with the ‘twin-peaks’ model adds another dimension to her research. 
For example, the role of the Central Bank is different between the two countries under the 
‘twin-peaks’ model. This merits further discussion in the author’s thesis and will have policy 
implications in banking regulation. Legrand’s emphasis on commitment to theory and inter-
disciplinarity  refers to the hermeneutic/interpretative approach in comparative legal analysis. 
Legal texts are not mere objects. Comparative lawyers interpret legal texts in a social context; 
‘deconstruct the law ‘object’ as an object in itself and reconstructing it an interdisciplinary 
context which will reveal its cultural complexity’ (Legrand 2009). This 
hermeneutic/interpretative approach is used in doctrinal law and case study within the 
author’s thesis. Throughout the research process, the author interpreted legal texts as well as 
financial ratios and statistics in analysing the data on financial regulation. Her policy 
recommendations are based on the findings after rigorous data interpretation and analysis. 
Comparative law is therefore, not just another positivistic subject in that lawyers are merely 
concerned with the rules of a legal system. It is a more complex and interesting research 
method of comparing legal systems, unravelling the law and rebuilding it in an 
interdisciplinary subject. Banking regulation is a fundamental part in a society. Banks have a 
wide stakeholder interest and regulating the financial sector well is essential to a healthy and 
financially sound economy. It is with this social context that a case study approach enhances 
the originality and robustness of the author’s thesis. 
 
3.4.3.3 Case Studies 
Positivists were the first to use case studies in their research. Nevertheless, case studies can 
be adapted so that they are consistent with relativist and constructionist perspectives 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). Positivists and relativists generally use multiple cases whilst 
constructionists tend to adopt single cases. 
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According to Robson, a case study is ‘a strategy for doing research which involves an 
empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple sources of evidence’ (Robson 2002) . It is particularly suitable when the 
phenomenon being studied has no distinct boundaries with the context under scrutiny (Yin 
2003). Examples of recent case studies used in the field of social science include Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt’s study on strategy and financial performance in the wireless gaming industry 
(Ozcan and Eisenhardt 2009) and the study by Faems, Janssens et al (2008) on alliance 
governance (Faems et al. 2008). 
Case studies provide descriptions of phenomena, develop and test theory (Darke et al. 1998). 
It provides evidence for hypothesis generation and for investigating areas where little is 
known (Darke et al. 1998). Grounded theory advocates, where data is first collected and 
hypotheses generated later, use case studies to develop their theories (Glaser and Strauss 
1967).  Eisenhardt builds on the existing literature in qualitative method (Eisenhardt 1989, 
Miles and Huberman 1988), case study design (Yin 1981) and grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967) by creating a ‘roadmap’ for building theories in case study research. She inserts 
concepts such as multiple investigators and a priori specification of concepts to the existing 
process of case study to create a fuller framework for generating and building theories from 
case study research. Her relativist stance has been widely adopted by researchers using case 
studies, especially in North America. 
Adopting the case study methodology would lead to an exploratory and explanatory journey. 
Questions beginning with ‘how and why?’ would be answered. Direct causal links in social 
science are difficult to establish because links are strongly influenced by the context (Perry 
2000). The complex causal links in the context of a situation are known as ‘causal tendencies’ 
or powers (Bhaksar 2008). Case study research is thus an in-depth qualitative research 
strategy used to investigate causal links and generate theory. 
The unit of analysis, or what constitutes a case, is very important in the case study. The case 
can focus on an individual but case studies are more suitable for complex situations. Thus, a 
case would usually involve two or more individuals and/or their organisations (Perry 2000). 
Yin has identified four case study strategies based upon two dimensions (Yin 2003): 
 Single case v multiple case; 
 Holistic v embedded case. 
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Single case studies are justifiable if they meet at least one of the three criteria set by Yin 
(2003): 
 The case is critical in confirming, challenging or extending a theory since it is the 
only one that meets all the conditions of the theory. A critical case study is one of 
strategic importance in relation to the general problem (Flyvberg 2006); 
 The case is rare or extreme and finding other cases is so unlikely that research about 
the situation cannot be carried out if the single case was not investigated (i.e. Freud’s 
Wolf-Man); 
 The case provides unusual access for academic research. 
 
An example of single-case studies within social science is of Graham Allison in Essence of 
Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 1971). The single case is the 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the placement of 
offensive missiles in Cuba. Allison has three competing organisational models. By comparing 
each theory with the actual events, Allison shows how one can provide the best explanation 
for this type of crisis (Perry 2000). A more recent example is of Derek Matthews’s study into 
London & County Securities Bank, where he examined the audit and regulatory failures of 
the bank. By focusing on one of the most significant UK corporate fraud scandals and 
regulatory failures in recent decades, Matthews has provided an in-depth analysis into the 
insufficiency of self-regulation (Matthews 2005). 
Multiple case studies allow cross-case analysis and comparison, as well as the investigation 
of a particular phenomenon in diverse settings (Darke et al. 1998). Multiple cases can be used 
to predict similar results (literal replication) or to produce contrasting results for predictable 
reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin 2003). Examples of multiple case studies in social 
science include those of Banfield and Knoff’s study into the legislative and judicial rights in 
Canada and Australia (Banfield and Knopff 2009) and Wise & Mahboob’s study on corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility in Bangladesh (Wise and Mahboob 2008). 
Holistic cases are used when one wishes to study an organisation as a whole. Embedded cases 
concern studies of parts of an organisation. Each sub-case is embedded in the bigger unit of 
analysis. Researchers using embedded cases should analyse each sub-case and compare with 
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other sub-cases before examining the big cases. Further, researchers should always consider 
whether the findings are practical since some observations can be quite abstract (Perry 2000).  
Case study research normally combines theory building (induction) with theory testing 
(deduction). The balance of induction versus deduction is a moot point in case study research. 
Prior theory is not utilised in a pure inductive approach. Dyer and Wilkins focus on the rich 
descriptions of the context within the social events occur (Dyer and Wilkins 1991). They 
believe that case studies should be more stories and theories should not be used. Pure 
induction is open-ended and exploratory but without prior theory, the researcher might not 
benefit from existing theory (Perry 2000). Pure deduction is narrower in nature and is 
concerned with testing or confirming hypotheses. The disadvantage of pure deduction is that 
a researcher might not benefit from the development of new and useful theory (Perry 2000). 
Thus, Parkhe said that ‘both extremes [of induction and deduction] are untenable and 
unnecessary’ and ‘continuous interplay’ is required to advance theories (Parkhe 1993).  
The classic barometer test for quality research is validity and reliability (Perry 2000). Validity 
includes construct, internal and external validity (Yin 2003). Construct validity concerns 
whether the right labels have been used for the concepts being measured in the investigation. 
Yin suggested using triangulation, i.e. multiple sources of evidence such as interviews, 
observations and surveys, to achieve construct validity (Yin 2003). A common 
misunderstanding about triangulation is that its aim is to demonstrate that different data 
sources or inquiry approaches give the same result. The aim of triangulation is really to test 
for consistency. According to Patton, ‘different sources of data may yield somewhat different 
results because different types of inquiry are sensitive to different real world nuances’ (Patton 
1999). Thus, an understanding of inconsistencies in findings across different kinds of data 
can be beneficial. The discovery of such inconsistencies offers further opportunities for 
studying the relationship between the research method and phenomenon in question.  
Internal validity refers to the accuracy of cause and effect relationships discovered (Perry 
2000). It is achieved by using prior theory, probing questions and in-depth listening 
techniques in interviews (Perry 2000). External validity is whether the results of the research 
can be generalised to other settings or contexts. A frequent criticism faced by case study 
researchers is ‘how can one generalise when x=1?’ Yin distinguishes analytic from statistical 
generalisation (Yin 2003). He said that: ‘in analytic generalisation, previously developed 
theory is used as a template against which to compare the empirical results of the case study’ 
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(Yin 2003). In essence, case studies are in-depth investigations of a single phenomenon. 
Thus, it is difficult to generalise from a single event. Simons said that she welcomes the 
paradox between the study of the singularity and the search for generalisation (Simons 1996):  
‘One of the advantages cited for case study research is its uniqueness, its capacity for 
understanding complexity in particular contexts. A corresponding disadvantage often 
cited is the difficulty of generalising from a single case. Such an observation 
assumes a polarity and stems from a particular view of research. Looked at 
differently, from within a holistic perspective and direct perception, there is no 
disjunction. What we have is a paradox, which if acknowledged and explored in 
depth, yields both unique and universal understanding.   
[We need to] embrace the paradoxes inherent in the people, events and sites we study 
and explore rather than try to resolve the tensions embedded in them. ... Paradox for 
me is the point of case study. Living with paradox is crucial to understanding. The 
tension between the study of the unique and the need to generalise is necessary to 
reveal both the unique and the universal and the unity of that understanding. To 
live with ambiguity, to challenge certainty, to creatively encounter, is to arrive, 
eventually, at ‘seeing’ anew.’ 
Statistical generalisation is therefore not applicable to case studies. Single case studies can, 
according to Yin, generalise if it is a critical case; extreme or unique or if it is revelatory (Yin 
2003). Multiple case studies are according to Yin, generalised on replication logic (Yin 
2003). Multiple cases are to be chosen so that they either predict similar results (literal 
replication) or contrary results but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication).  
Reliability is the final test for good quality research. It refers to the consistency of the 
techniques used in the research. It is achieved through maintaining clear and structured 
processes for collecting and analysing data (Perry 2000). Additional reliability can be 
achieved by having a group of colleagues to design and monitor the research project. Such a 
group would bring objectivity to the research. 
Validity and reliability of data are of importance to this thesis. The author reviewed a range 
of primary and secondary sources in the case study, thus consistency through triangulation of 
data was achieved. Triangulation is useful in highlighting both consistencies and 
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inconsistencies of results. An understanding of inconsistencies in findings across different 
kinds of data is beneficial.  
The author achieved internal validity by combining prior theory with hypotheses testing. 
External validity concerns whether the results can be generalised into another setting or 
context. Since the case study in this thesis is a multiple case study, it can be used to predict 
similar results or contrary results but for predictable reasons. The caveat is regulation of 
banks is a study of a social phenomenon, since banking is an integral part of most societies. 
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to predict with precision or to generalise the author’s 
results in another setting with exact consequences. Nonetheless, as long as the reader is 
aware, this is acceptable. 
Reliability is the final test for good quality research. The author achieved consistency and 
maintained clear and structured processes for collecting and analysing data. Further, she has 
attended conferences, presented papers and published papers whilst writing this thesis. This 
has enabled her to improve the validity and reliability of her data. Between 2010-2011, she 
attended the following conferences: - 
October 2011 Presented paper at the INSEAD/EABIS 10
th
 Annual Colloquium 2011 
in Fontainebleau, Paris 
June 2011 Guest speaker at Warwick University’s conference on ‘Sovereign Debt 
and the Banking Crisis’.  
April 2011 Presented paper at the Second Corporate Governance and Finance 
Conference in Melbourne, Australia 
September 2010 Presented paper at the Corporate Governance & Global Financial 
Crisis Conference at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia. 
May 2010 Co-ordinated PhD Colloquium and presented paper at Poznan 
University of Economics, Poland 
After the conferences, the author incorporated the feedback and generated new ideas into her 
thesis. She has published three papers in the following academic journals: - 
63 
 
1. Turmoil in the financial world: Financial innovation, multiple principal-agent 
problems and regulatory dialectic’, Poznan University of Economics Review (2011), 
Vol. 11 (2), pp. 47-72 
2. Macro and micro prudential regulatory failures amongst financial institutions in the 
United Kingdom: Lessons from Australia, Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance (2013), Vo. 21(3) 
3. Single or twin? The UK financial regulatory landscape after the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. Journal of Banking Regulation (2011), Vol. 13(1), 24-35. 
 
The author found it beneficial to test and present her research materials at conferences which 
became good training grounds for herself in the pursuit of new dimensions in banking 
regulation. Publication in the journals mentioned above is a rigorous process, where the 
author received constructive feedback from the reviewers. 
 
3.4.4 Time horizons 
Phenomena can either be studied at a particular time or over a period of time. Cross-sectional 
studies study the former whilst longitudinal studies study the latter. Case studies and surveys 
are often used for cross-sectional studies. The main advantage of longitudinal studies is the 
ability to study changes and developments over time. Adams and Schvaneveldt said that a 
researcher can have control over variables being studied in longitudinal studies (Adams and 
Schvaneveldt 1991). It is possible to bring in a longitudinal element into research even if 
there are time constraints. One can re-analyse published data collected over time to achieve 
this longitudinal element.  
 
3.5. Research Ethics 
Social science involves the study of human beings and societies. In view of this, a researcher 
will encounter ethical issues during his research process. Ethics are ‘moral principles, norms 
or standards of behaviour that guide moral choices about our behaviour and our relationships 
with others’ (Blumberg et al. 2008). A researcher’s responsibility is to ensure that his 
research paradigm is methodologically sound and morally defensible. Views on what is 
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morally defensible vary as social norms differ between countries and societies.  Further, 
philosophical stances on ethics differ. The deontological view states that unethical means will 
never justify the research results even if it was necessary to breach ethical codes during 
research (Saunders et al. 2007). In contrast, advocates of teleology argue that the results 
justify the means even though a researcher engaged in unethical conduct. 
Researchers are guided by a code of ethics. The Economic and Social Research Council have 
identified the following six key principles which should be followed whenever applicable: 
 Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity and quality 
(quality of research); 
 Research staff and subjects must be informed fully about the purpose, methods and 
intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the research entails 
and what risks, if any, are involved. Some variation is allowed in very specific and 
exceptional research contexts for which detailed guidance is provided (consent); 
 The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the anonymity of 
respondents must be respected (confidentiality); 
 Research participants must participate in a voluntary way, free from any coercion 
(voluntary nature); 
 Harm to research participants must be avoided (non-maleficence); 
 The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest or partiality 
must be explicit (objectivity). 
 
3.5.1 Ethical issues during design and gaining access 
In the early stage of research design, the availability of primary and secondary data to a 
researcher will depend on his access to sources.  Access to data should be granted freely and 
voluntarily, without the participant feeling oppressed (Robson 2002). 
An important issue in the design stage is the non-maleficence principle, Saunders submits 
that the non-maleficence principle is the ‘cornerstone of ethical issues that confront those 
who undertake research’ (Saunders et al. 2007). To comply with this principle, consent from 
participants must be obtained and confidentiality upheld. When designing data collection 
methods, participants must understand their rights and that they have the option to refuse.  
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3.5.2 Ethical issues during data collection 
Irrespective of the data collection technique, there are two important ethical principles that 
should be followed: objectivity and confidentiality. Objectivity applies to data collection 
because this affects the validity and reliability of data. Hence, any fabrication of data is 
totally unacceptable and unethical (Saunders et al. 2007). 
Great caution should be exercised to protect each participant’s right to anonymity (Saunders 
et al. 2007).  Easterby-Smith et al.  reinforce this point when interviewing participants in an 
organisation (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). The initial participant who discloses something of 
interest or significance may lead the researcher to interview others. Care must be taken not to 
reveal the identity of the initial participant who aided the researcher. Otherwise, the non-
maleficence principle would be breached. 
 
3.5.3 Ethical issues associated with data processing and storage 
Having obtained relevant date for the research work, one needs to consider the stages of data 
processing and storage. The Data Protection Act 1998 (‘the Act’) applies to all individuals 
and organisations that process, store and move personal data. The Act works in two ways. 
Firstly, it states that anyone who processes personal information must comply with eight 
principles, which make sure that personal information is: 
(1) Fairly and lawfully processed;  
(2) Processed for limited purposes;  
(3) Adequate, relevant and not excessive;  
(4) Accurate and up to date;  
(5) Not kept for longer than is necessary;  
(6) Processed in line with rights granted to the data subjects by the Act;  
(7) Secure;  
(8) Not transferred to other countries without adequate protection  
The second area covered by the Act provides individuals with important rights, including the 
right to find out what personal information is held.  
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Research projects would seem to contravene some of the above principles. The provision of 
the 'Research, history and statistics' exemption in section 33 of the Act however, allows 
personal data to be stored indefinitely for research purposes provided that relevant conditions 
are met: 
 Data is not processed to support measures or decisions relating to particular 
individuals.  
 Data is not processed in such a way that substantial damage or substantial distress, is 
or is likely to be, caused to any data subject. (section 31(1)) of the Act) 
Finally, personal data may contain sensitive information such as the data subject’s ethnic 
origin, religious or other similar beliefs. Sensitive data can only be processed if at least one of 
the conditions in Schedule 3 of the Act is satisfied. Explicit consent from the data subject 
would meet the condition in Schedule 3.  
 
3.5.4 Ethical issues related to analysis and reporting 
Maintenance of objectivity is essential during the analysis stage. Lack of it would distort the 
researcher’s conclusions. Care must be taken to protect names of participants, as reporting 
data attributable to a particular individual may cause embarrassment and even harm 
(Blumberg et al. 2008).  
 
3.6. Data collection and analysis 
This thesis uses both quantitative and qualitative data although the focus of the thesis is on 
qualitative data collection and analysis. The goal of data collection in qualitative research is 
to provide evidence for the experience it is investigating (Polkinghorne 2005). The evidence 
gives people’s accounts of their experiences. The researcher analyses the evidence to produce 
a description of the experience. When drafting the research report, the researcher reports the 
evidence in the data to the readers. Qualitative data are collected primarily in the form of 
non-numerical sources. Transcripts of interviews are then produced as records of evidence. 
The ideas and their interpretations are the evidence. As Polkinghorne adds, ‘the textual 
evidence is indirect evidence’ (Polkinghorne 2005). Qualitative data analysis is the study of 
patterns and themes within the available data (Patton 1999). There is a wide range of  
67 
 
literature on the underlying assumptions and procedures associated with analysing qualitative 
data. Many of these are associated with specific approaches such as grounded theory (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998), phenomenology (Van Manen 1990), discourse analysis (Potter and 
Wetherall 1994) and narrative analysis (Lieblich et al. 1998). However, some analytic 
approaches are generic and do not fall within the distinctive branches of qualitative research 
(Ezzy 2002). Thematic approach is such an example and can be applied across a range of 
epistemological and theoretical theories (Braun and Clarke 2006).  
This thesis uses an interpretist case study approach. Walsham recommends that several 
methodological issues should be discussed in interpretive case studies (Walsham 1995). 
Interpretists should elucidate whether theory is used as an initial guide for data collection; as 
part of an iterative process of data collection and analysis or as a final product of the research. 
Researchers are further advised to discuss their etic/emic position. Furthermore, Walsham 
recommends that precise details on data sources, collection and analysis techniques should be 
given. Klein et al. propose a set of principles to conduct and evaluate interpretive case 
research (see diagram 3) which are based on the philosophical perspective of hermeneutics 
and which mostly apply to studies of this nature (Klein and Myers 1999). They use the word 
‘principles’ to emphasise that researchers should decide whether and how these principles 
should be applied in their research studies. Seven 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 3: Seven principles for interpretive case research (Klein et al., 1999) 
1. The fundamental principle of hermeneutic circle  
2. The principle of conceptualisation 
3. The principle of interaction between researchers and subjects 
4. The principle of abstractions and generalisation 
5. The principle of dialogical reasoning 
6. The principle of multiple interpretations 
7. The principle of suspicion 
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Grounded analysis is suitable for interpretive case studies. Suddaby asserted that grounded 
analysis is ‘suited to efforts to understand the process by which actors construct meaning out 
of inter-subjective experience’ (Suddaby 2006). Grounded analysis should also be used in a 
logical manner consistent with ‘key assumptions about social reality and how that reality is 
known’ (Suddaby 2006). Glaser and Strauss proposed grounded analysis as a practical 
method for conducting re-search that focuses on the interpretive process by analysing the ‘the 
actual production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real settings’ (Gephardt 
2004). They argued that new theory could be developed by paying attention to the contrast 
between ‘the daily realities’ and the interpretations of those activities made by the 
participants. Grounded analysis relies heavily on two concepts: constant comparison and 
theoretical sampling. The iterative nature of constant comparison of data between the 
collection and analysis stage and theoretical sampling would ensure that the data is fully 
comprehensive. It also provides flexibility to the researcher since the research design can be 
changed easily due to the continuous changing nature of the theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 
Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter focused first on general research methodology and then the methodology utilised 
by the author in her thesis. A mixed-methods methodology is used whereby doctrinal 
research, comparative legal analysis and case study are adopted for qualitative results. 
Doctrinal research was used to provide an analysis of the development of banking regulation 
in the UK and Australia. It also enabled the author to focus on what the current law on 
banking regulation is in both countries. By using a multiple, comparative case study of the 
period 2004-2009, the author utilised financial ratios in her financial regulation chapters and 
obtained generally  reliable results. This is because she believes that it is only through 
analysing a comparison of fundamental financial ratios between the relevant banks that 
problems can be identified and recommendations can be made. This is the quantitative aspect 
of her thesis. The qualitative aspect of her methodology involved examining primary and 
secondary sources. This enabled her to identify why the UK regulator failed in its role and 
how the UK can learn from the Australian ‘twin-peaks model’. Triangulation of a range of 
primary and secondary sources, presenting papers at conferences and publication of papers in 
academic journals all improved the validity and reliability of the author’s results. These all 
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prove that the author’s work was accepted, enriched and tested before an international 
audience of academics and practitioners. The author is thus confident that her thesis is 
rigorous, robust, as well as original. 
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Chapter Four 
Macro and micro prudential regulatory failures between banks in the United Kingdom 
and Australia 2004-2009 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the performance of banks in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Australia between the period 2004-2009. Data from the Financial Development 
Report of the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum 2011) as well as liquidity, 
debt, capital, asset quality and profitability ratios from four UK banks and four Australian 
banks will be examined. The data highlights macro prudential weaknesses in contemporary 
banking such as high leverage and debt ratios, poor liquidity and systemic risks. This chapter 
analyses why UK banks were more vulnerable than Australian banks in the financial crisis. 
Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley had to be nationalised in 2008. The chapter 
analyses the UK legislation regarding the nationalisation of these banks and discuss whether 
Basel III’s recommendations solve the problems raised by the crisis. Finally, the chapter via a 
comparative legal analysis will give an overview of the Australian legal framework to 
banking regulation and investigate why the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model is better than the 
current UK model. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 provides a valuable opportunity to study the corporate 
governance and regulatory aspects of the banking sector, a critical moment in the 
development of regulation in the financial sector. The chapter aims to fill a gap in the 
literature on banking regulation, financial development and financial stability. In particular, 
little research has been done comparing the financial ratios of UK and Australian banks 
between 2004-2009 and the implications arising from the ratios.   
The financial crisis has exposed serious regulatory failures in the UK financial sector. The 
UK government had to nationalise Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, injecting £850 
billion into banks such as the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group to stabilise 
the banking system. The UK sees a shift from the universal regulator (the Financial Services 
Authority) to a ‘twin-peaks’ model. This gives the Bank of England banking supervisory 
powers and its subsidiary, the  Prudential Regulation Authority will deal with prudential and 
financial regulation. The Financial Conduct Authority   promotes confidence, maintains 
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integrity in the financial sector and promotes competition within the industry (section 1B(3) 
Financial Services Act 2012).     
Australian banks have withstood the financial crisis better than UK banks. Australia did not 
have any bank runs. Four of the nine AA-rated banks around the world are Australian banks, 
so the Australian regulation system worked well. Australia has also performed well in the 
Financial Development Index of the World Economic Forum 2011 (World Economic Forum 
2011). They are ranked fifth out of 60 countries in the overall index and scored well in 
stability of its banking system. However, the Australian financial system is not perfect 
though. The World Economic Forum states that the Australia banks had low Tier 1 capital 
and had high levels of stress. Also, its commercial access to capital is weak. Although the UK 
takes third place in the Financial Development Index, it scored very low in overall financial 
stability (41
st
). It is ranked 38 out of 60 in frequency of banking crises compared to 
Australia’s top position. However, financial intermediation is still strong despite the 
challenging economic conditions (World Economic Forum 2011). 
This study extends the academic literature on regulation of banks. The most extensive piece 
of research in the regulatory aspects of banks was carried out by Barth et al in 2006 (Barth et 
al. 2006). It offers the first comprehensive cross-country assessment of the impact of bank 
regulation on the operation of banks and assesses the validity of the Basel Committee’s 
approach to bank regulation. Barth et al find that boosting capital standards or strengthening 
supervision do not lead to better banking efficiency. They call for more market discipline 
such as better disclosure; transparency and private sector monitoring of banks than on 
command and control regulations (Barth et al. 2006).  
Barth et al’s results should be re-examined in view of the current financial crisis. The author 
combines a comparative approach with empirical findings to investigate how UK banks can 
improve their financial performance. Financial innovation has created new ways for creating 
capital and investing. In theory, this enhances financial development which increases 
economic growth. However, complex financial products and processes have increased moral 
hazard since financial institutions took excessive risks in search of profits. Financial 
innovation has also decreased transparency through complicated products and confidentiality 
of transactions. Ample academic literature since the financial crisis (Acharya et al. 2009, 
Goodhart 2009) has shown that Collaterised Debt Obligations did not shift risks in the 
securitisation process and so the argument that securitisation can diversify risks and thus 
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enable financial markets to grow is flawed. Financial stability is thus an important factor in a 
country’s economic growth. The right amount of regulation is needed to balance financial 
development and financial stability. 
This study will have practical implications for policy makers worldwide, especially in the UK 
and Australia. Although both the UK and Australia are common law countries, they are 
different in terms of population, economy and culture. Reforms in financial regulation depend 
on local circumstances, political principles and country specific preferences. Basel III’s ‘one-
size fits all’ approach does not treat banks and other financial institutions equally. Financial 
institutions such as hedge funds which operate in the shadow banking sector are not as tightly 
regulated as banks. ‘Shadow banks’ raise ‘short-term funds in the money markets and use 
those funds to buy assets with longer-term maturities’ (Kodres 2013). They are not regulated 
like commercial banks. The question whether the shadow banking industry should be brought 
into the remit of Basel III will be discussed. Australian banks rely more on intermediation 
than securitisation. Is it fair to apply stricter capital, liquidity and leverage requirements to 
Australian banks? The Australian government is currently reviewing its liquidity 
requirements, along with other G20 countries. Australian banks seem capable of meeting the 
proposed Basel III capital standards, but application of the proposed new liquidity level in 
Australia is hard due to the low level of domestic government debt for banks to hold as liquid 
assets. 
Ranciere et al suggests that countries that have experienced occasional financial crisis have, 
on average, demonstrated higher economic growth than countries that have shown more 
stable financial conditions (Ranciere et al. 2008). Whilst Ranciere et al are not suggesting that 
financial crises are good for economic growth, they suggest that the systemic risk-taking that 
overcomes financial hindrances to economic growth is associated with occasional financial 
crises. The right amount of regulation is needed to balance financial development and 
financial stability. This balance is of significance on a global scale, so this chapter will have 
important implications for academics and policy makers on an international dimension.  
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Therefore, the chapter examines four UK banks and four Australian banks. The UK banks are 
HSBC, Barclays, the Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS (part of Lloyds Banking Group 
from January 2009). The thesis concentrates on HBOS rather than Lloyds TSB since the 
literature review revealed that HBOS’s business model was too risky. The Australian banks 
are Westpac Banking Corporation, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, ANZ and National 
Bank of Australia. These independent retail banks play a vital role in the economies of the 
UK and Australia respectively. These banks also have complex balance sheets and are 
exposed to securitisation in the wholesale funding market. The author has taken the ‘big four’ 
Australian banks for comparison with the ‘big four’ in the UK to maintain consistency. 
Northern Rock is not included in the quantitative analysis  because its business model is 
different to the other four UK banks.  
Variables affecting bank profitability can be divided into internal and external determinants 
(Athanasoglou et al. 2005). This chapter focuses on the internal determinants. The data for 
this study comprises liquidity, debt, capital, asset quality and profitability ratios. These 
financial ratios are used by regulators to evaluate banks. These ratios are used to check the 
correlation between the former four with the performance of banks. The author calculated the 
ratios over a five year period, namely between 2004-2009. The period of 2004-2009 was 
particularly volatile and the author would have liked to analyse data from 1999-2003 to 
provide a more balanced set of data.  
The cash ratio is the figure for cash and cash equivalent divided by current liabilities. It 
refines the current and quick ratios to reveal the most liquid of assets, cash. Two types of debt 
ratios are used: bank leverage (total debts divided by shareholder equity) and loan to deposit. 
Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets gives the tier 1 capital ratio. Asset quality is the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. This is important in light of the solvency 
problem encountered by several UK banks. Finally, profitability is measured by return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) ratios. The ROA ratio indicates the capital intensity 
of banks. This is useful in light of the debate of whether more capital would benefit banks. 
The ROE measures the efficiency of banks in generating profits. A weakness of the ROE 
ratio is that it does not take debt into account. If a bank can issue debt at a lower interest rate 
than the rate of return on its investments, it could increase its return on equity. However, 
higher debt also increases the risk of failure for a bank. The data thus includes ROA ratios. 
The ROA and ROE ratios are considered by Sinkey (Sinkey 2002) as the best measures of a 
bank’s overall performance (Ho and Wu 2006, Beck et al. 2005) although the ROA appears 
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to be the key ratio for measuring bank performance (Sundararajan et al. 2002). Calculations 
are checked against market data and secondary sources where possible to ensure robustness.  
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4.2 Descriptive results 
Bank Country Cash 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Debt-
to-
Equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Loan to 
deposit 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Tier 1 
Capital 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Asset 
quality 
(impaired 
loans to 
total 
loans %) 
5 year 
average 
Return 
on 
equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Return 
on 
assets 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
UK 16.68 21.1 115.22 8 2.11 9.26 -0.3 
HSBC UK 44.67 16.07 96.64 8.8 2.21 7.26 0.66 
Barclays UK 55.72 25.9 93.28 8.8 2.72 20.96 0.35 
HBOS UK 5.1 38.98 179.24 7.2 2.06 0.23 0.04 
Average   30.54 25.51 121.1 8.2 2.28 9.43 0.19 
Standard deviation 
  
23.61 9.83 39.95 0.77 0.30 8.61 0.41 
Co-
efficient 
of 
variation 
  0.77 0.39 0.33 0.09 0.13 0.91 2.19 
Table 2a: Liquidity, Debt, Capital, Asset Quality and Profitability Ratios of UK Banks 
between 2004-2009 
Source: Published annual reports; Factiva and Financial Times 
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Bank Country Cash 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Debt-
to-
Equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Loan to 
deposit 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Tier 1 
Capital 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Asset 
quality 
(impaired 
loans to 
total 
loans %) 
5 year 
average 
Return 
on 
equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Return 
on 
assets 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Westpac 
Banking 
Corporati
on 
Australia 22.68 20.02 135 7.3 0.25 19.57 0.95 
Common
wealth 
Bank of 
Australia 
Australia 24.12 16.8 134.22 7.68 0.17 17.64 0.98 
ANZ Australia 26.49 15.09 124.34 7.74 0.23 14.54 0.89 
National 
Australia 
Bank 
Australia 43.92 17.24 116.92 7.65 0.21 12.26 0.75 
 
SD 
  
9.87 
 
2.04 
 
8.63 
 
0.20 
 
0.03 
 
6.88 
 
0.66 
 
Average 
 26.76 18.81 105.1 7.59 0.18 10.97 0.65 
 
Coefficient of 
variation 
0.37 0.11 0.08 0.26 0.19 0.63 1.01 
Table 2b: Liquidity, Debt, Capital, Asset Quality and Profitability Ratios of Australian banks 
between 2004-2009 
Source: Published annual reports; Factiva and Financial Times 
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4.3 Discussion of results 
(1) Liquidity 
Tables 2a and 2b revealed that UK banks had on average higher cash ratio, higher leverage 
ratio, higher loan to deposit ratio, higher capital ratio, lower asset quality, lower ROA but 
higher ROE than the Australian banks. These results are revealing because despite the high 
cash ratio and higher capital ratio amongst top four UK banks, their performance was worse 
than the top four Australian banks. It is surprising to note that UK banks had higher cash and 
capital ratios than Australian banks. Table 3 provides a clear comparison of the liquidity 
ratios between UK and Australian banks during the period of 2004-2009. 
 
Bank Cash ratio 5 year average in 
% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 16.68 
HSBC 44.67 
Barclays 55.72 
HBOS 5.1 
Average 30.54 
Standard deviation 23.61 
  
Westpac 22.68 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 24.12 
ANZ 26.49 
NAB 43.92 
Average 26.76 
Standard deviation 9.87 
Table 3: Liquidity ratios of UK and Australian banks between 2004-2009 
Source: Published annual reports; Factiva and Financial Times 
Amongst the UK banks, HSBC and Barclays had the highest cash ratios. HSBC and Barclays 
did not receive financial help from the UK government during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. In November 2007, HSBC spent $45 billion bailing out its Special Investment Vehicle. 
After the bail-out, HSBC weathered the financial crisis and focused on expansion in the 
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emerging markets such as China (Doherty 2008).  Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
on 14th September 2008, Barclays bought the investment bank and capital markets branches 
of Lehman Brothers two days later (Doherty 2008). This deal boosted the US investment 
banking branch of Barclays. Some argue that Barclays were fortunate in the financial crisis 
due to the financial assistance from the Middle East, failed attempt to purchase ABN Amro 
and their purchase of part of Lehman Brothers (Jenkins 2010). Barclays had to raise £4.5 
billion in September 2008 to strengthen its balance sheet. The strong cash ratio of Barclays 
certainly boosts its financial position to withstand the financial crisis.  
National Australia Bank had a very high cash ratio. According to market data provided by the 
Financial Times (Financial Times 2011), National Australia Bank increased its cash reserves 
by 6.33% in 2010. Further, it used very little or no debt in their capital structure. This is 
reflected in the low debt-to-equity and loan to deposit ratios. Overall, Australian banks had a 
healthy cash ratio. It is worth noting from the standard deviation that Australian banks are 
more uniform and consistent than UK banks in their liquidity ratio. 
 
(2) Debt-(Leverage ratio and loan-to-deposit ratio) 
The high leverage ratio amongst UK banks is expected. Diagram 4 below illustrates  that the 
average leverage ratio amongst UK banks between 2005-2009 is approximately 20%. Apart 
from HSBC, all the UK banks had a higher than average leverage ratio. The author’s data 
shown in table 4 includes data from 2004 as well, which explains the average leverage ratio 
of 25.51 amongst UK banks. 
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Diagram 4: Leverage ratios of major UK banks 
Source:  Bank of England Financial Stability Report (2010) 
(a) Excludes Northern Rock.  (b)  Asset weighted. 
 
Bank Leverage ratio 
5 year average 
in % 
Loans-to-Deposits ratio 
5 year average in % 
Royal Bank of Scotland 21.1 115.22 
HSBC 16.07 96.64 
Barclays 25.9 93.28 
HBOS 38.98 179.24 
Average 25.51 121.1 
Standard deviation 9.83 39.95 
   
Westpac 20.02 135 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 16.8 134.22 
ANZ 15.09 124.34 
NAB 17.24 116.92 
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Average 18.81 105.1 
Standard deviation 2.04 8.63 
Table 4: Debt ratios of UK and Australian banks between 2004-2009 
Source: Published annual reports; Factiva and Financial Times 
The high leverage ratio of HBOS is one of the indicators of poor performances: Lloyds TSB 
took over HBOS in 2009. Lending in the wholesale market dried up when the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis hit banks, especially HBOS. Paul Moore, the ex Head of Regulatory Risk at 
HBOS explained that excessive exposure of HBOS to the wholesale market led to huge 
losses. HBOS pursued a ‘sales driven’ policy, putting profits before ethics (Moore 2009b). It 
is the ‘search for yield’ argument that banks moved from the ‘originate-to-hold’ model to 
‘originate-to-distribute’ model in the late 1980s.  
The ‘originate-to-distribute’ model relies on securitisation. Two schools of thought on 
securitisation have since emerged. According Greenlaw et al (2008), securitisation is to be 
celebrated because it reduces default risk by dispersing risks along the process and thus 
strengthens the financial system (Greenlaw et al (2008) cited in Shin 2009). However, 
Acharya et al rebut this argument and counterclaim that the securitisation market collapsed in 
early 2007 due to banks ignoring their own model of securitisation and failed to transfer 
credit risks (Acharya et al. 2009). Banks moved from the ‘originate-to-hold’ model to 
‘originate-to-distribute’ model because in theory, securitisation would give greater liquidity; 
more borrowing capacity and ability to transfer credit risks to ultimate investors. In reality, 
the latter was not achieved (Acharya et al. 2009, Goodhart 2009). Acharya et al (2009) 
believe that between 2003-2007, banks utilised securitisation to avoid Basel II Accord on 
capital requirements. Regulatory dialectic thus became the aim of banks, not transferring 
credit risks to investors. The term ‘originate-to-pretend-to-distribute’ model should be more 
accurate to describe securitisation (Goodhart 2009).  
The second school of thought on securitisation is one of misalignment of incentives 
(Paligorova 2009). Securitisation contributed to the collapse of the financial system because 
incentives were distorted in all the stages of the securitisation process. The end result is that 
the ultimate investors at the end of the process will end up with the ‘hot potato of bad loans’ 
(Shin 2009). In Shin’s view, the ultimate investors did not end up with the bad loans. He 
argues that the financial crisis was severe because the bad loans were not all passed on to 
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final investors. Instead, the bad loans remained in the securitisation process, on the balance 
sheet of financial intermediaries or special purpose vehicles that sponsored them (Shin 2009).  
Therefore, the thesis supports the second school of thought on securitisation. UK banks with 
high leverage ratios performed badly in comparison to the other banks because of excessive 
risks which were not shifted from the banks in the securitisation process. Diagram 5 shows 
that HBOS had a high percentage of securitised mortgage stock. These banks performed 
poorly in the financial crisis. Australian banks on the other hand, relied more on 
intermediation than on securitisation (Hawtrey 2009). In fact, less than 10% of bank funding 
was from securitisation between 2006-2010 (RBA, 2010). Australian banks had a more 
conservative and controlled approach to banking because risks were better monitored. 
Further, only 18% of Australia’s housing loans were securitised (International Monetary 
Fund 2008), so Australian banks suffered less direct losses. 
 
 
Diagram 5: Share of UK mortgages securitised by UK banks versus growth in stock of 
mortgages  
Average annual growth in mortgage stock from end of 2004 to end of 2007 
Source: Bank of England (2009) 
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The loan to deposit ratio reveals how heavily a bank is reliant on borrowing. HBOS stands 
out with a very high borrowing ratio. According to Sir Victor Blank, the former Chairman of 
Lloyds Banking Group): ‘HBOS was borrowing too much from the wholesale markets. 
HBOS’s problem was really about the model, it was about the dependence on the inter bank 
markets’ (Randall 2009). This heavy reliance proved to be a dangerous model when the 
short-term and interbank markets froze (Shin 2009). HBOS became insolvent due to its 
maturity mismatch of balance sheets and the inter-connectedness of banks.  
HSBC and Barclays all had lower loan to deposit ratios. In particular, it can be argued that 
because HSBC have a strong presence in Asia, they are more conservative in their banking 
models. They performed better because their leverage and liquidity ratios were controlled. 
HSBC’s Chief Executive believes that HSBC performed better than other banks because of 
its ‘subsidiarised’ banking model. Each business division controls the amount of capital and 
liquidity. These two items can be easily separated by a crisis hits the bank (Ahmed 2010). 
Jaspal Bindra, Asia CEO at Standard Chartered, disagrees and claims that the notion of 
subsidiarisation is a safer banking model "may be illusory in practice". Empirical evidence on 
the contrary needs to be collated to prove that subsidiarisation is not a viable option. The 
Independent Commission on Banking has considered subsidiarisation (Vickers 2011a). The 
Independent Commission discussed the advantages and disadvantages of various types of 
subsidiarisation. Retail ring-fencing is considered a compromise since full subsidiarisation is 
too costly and operational subsidiarisation is too minimal. The Independent Commission of 
Banking published its final report on 12th September 2011. They recommended ring-fencing 
retail banking and a 10% equity baseline. In December 2012, the Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking led by Andrew Tyrie proposed to ‘electrify’ ring-fencing of banks. This gives the 
regulator more enforcement powers (Jenkins 2012). The government has since adopted retail 
ring-fencing and electrified it. The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act came into force 
in December 2013 and incorporates the ‘electrification’ of retail ring-fencing in Part 1, clause 
4 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.  
The author believes that this is positive news since depositors will receive more protection 
under the new recommendation. The author’s descriptive data from table 2a shows that 
HBOS has an unusually high loan to deposit ratio. There is empirical evidence that there is a 
negative relationship between profitability and debt ratios (Kester 1986, Titman and Wessels 
1988, Rajan and Zingales 1995). However, Long and Malitz (1985) do not find such a 
relationship between leverage and profitability. Whilst the results show that there is a 
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relationship between the two variables, the strength was not as stark as envisaged. Naturally, 
profitability of banks is affected by a range of factors, both external and internal. Therefore, 
leverage is only one factor which affects profitability. Nonetheless, it appears that the high 
leverage ratios amongst UK banks question the view of Myers & Majluf (1984). Myers & 
Majluf (1984) state that firms have a hierarchy of financing. First, firms prefer to use retained 
earnings. Secondly, firms use debt financing. Finally, firms issue new shares. Their view is 
somewhat dated in modern finance. Over the past 20 years, it became apparent that banks 
relied more and more on debt financing, especially in the wholesale market. The hierarchy of 
financing has thus changed in banking and perhaps the pendulum should swing back towards 
retained earnings. Since the financial crisis, UK banks have reduced their dependence on 
wholesale markets for funding. Just 15% of customer loans are now funded through the 
wholesale markets, a level not seen since 2003. Australian banks have reduced their short-
term borrowing from just above 30% in 2006 to just above 20% in 2010 (Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2010). They have also increased their liquid assets to improve the liquidity position 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2010).  
 
(3) Capital 
In relation to the capital ratios, the difference between Australian and UK banks is slight. 
Both countries had ratios very close to the 8% as laid down by the Basel II Accord. Diagram 
6 shows that the average core tier 1 ratio of major UK banks hovers around the Basel II 
requirement of holding 8% capital of total risk-weighted assets. The diagram also triangulates 
with the author’s data in table 5. 
Table 5: Capital ratios of UK and Australian banks between 2004-2009 
Bank Tier 1 capital ratio 5 year average in 
% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 8 
HSBC 8.8 
Barclays 8.8 
HBOS 7.2 
Average 8.2 
Standard deviation 0.77 
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Westpac 7.3 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 7.68 
ANZ 7.74 
NAB 7.65 
Average 7.59 
Standard deviation 0.20 
Source: Published annual reports; Factiva and Financial Times 
Basel II Accord is an international agreement that sets guidelines for bank regulation. Under 
the Accord, banks must hold at least 4% in Tier 1 capital. Apart from HBOS, all the UK 
banks from the author’s table had healthy Tier 1 capital ratios. Basel II Accord has been in 
force in Australia since 1st January 2008. Australian banks held capital just below 8% 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2010). 
Capital, especially equity, is viewed as a shock absorber, protecting a bank from externalities. 
A drop in asset price combined with an increase chance of default by banks means that in 
difficult times, banks have to sell their assets at market price. More capital is required in such 
a case (Powell and Allen 2011). However, some banking professionals argue that high levels 
of capital would not have prevented the recent financial crisis (Financial Services Authority 
2010). Higher capital retention alone would not be the solution. Better quality of capital is the 
key to better absorption of shock. Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson (2010) have produced a table 
which shows that some US and European banks’ losses would have absorbed all or most of 
their capital during the crisis. Their calculation is based on the new leverage ratio (equity less 
goodwill) under Basel III. The author’s results are supported by the IMF’s data of 2010. 
Australian banks had a 0.2% non-performing loans to total loans between 2004-2007, rising 
to 0.8% in 2008 and 1.1% in 2010. UK banks hovered at 1% between 2002-2006, rising to 
1.6% in 2009 and 3.3% in 2010 (IMF, 2010). Better quality of assets is thus important to 
absorb losses. 
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Diagram 6: Core Tier 1 ratios of major UK banks 
Source: Bank of England Financial Stability Report (2010) 
 
(4) Asset quality 
Oshinsky and Olin (2006) submit that the combination of low capital ratios and risky assets 
lead to bank failures. Jin et al (2011) conducted research into the factors leading to bank 
failures during the financial crisis of 2007. They obtained data from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago’s Bank Holding Company. The author is particularly interested in their 
research into loan quality. They used several variables such as proportion of securitised assets 
to total assets, level of non-performing loans, growth in various loan categories and loan 
portfolio mix in predicting bank failure. Data about non-performing loans are found in annual 
reports and are a useful source of information about loan default (Liu and Ryan 2006). Their 
results show that non-performing loans have a positive correlation with bank failures. Due to 
difficult in obtaining data, the author has only managed to obtain information on non-
performing loans in UK and Australian banks. Table 6 shows that Australian banks have a 
better asset quality ratio, with an average of 0.18% of impaired loans compared to an average 
of 2.28% impaired loans among UK banks.  
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Bank Asset quality ratio 5 year 
average in % 
Royal Bank of Scotland 2.11 
HSBC 2.21 
Barclays 2.72 
HBOS 2.06 
Average 2.28 
Standard deviation 0.30 
  
Westpac 0.25 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 0.17 
ANZ 0.23 
NAB 0.21 
Average 0.18 
Standard deviation 0.03 
Table 6: Asset quality ratios of UK and Australian banks between 2004-2009 
Source: Published annual reports; Factiva and Financial Times 
 
(5) Profitability 
Bank ROE 5 year average 
% 
ROA 5 year average 
% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 9.26 -0.3 
HSBC 7.26 0.66 
Barclays 20.96 0.35 
HBOS 0.23 0.4 
Average 9.43 0.19 
Standard deviation 8.61 0.41 
   
Westpac 19.57 0.95 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 17.64 0.98 
ANZ 14.54 0.89 
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NAB 12.26 0.75 
Average 10.97 0.65 
Standard deviation 6.88 0.66 
Table 7: Profitability ratios of UK and Australian banks between 2004-2009 
Source: Published annual reports; Factiva and Financial Times 
 
Profitability is measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) ratios. The 
ROA ratio indicates the capital intensity of banks. The ROE measures the efficiency of banks 
in generating profits. A weakness of the ROE ratio is that it does not take debt into account. If 
a bank can issue debt at a lower interest rate than the rate of return on its investments, it could 
increase its return on equity. However, higher debt also increases the risk of failure for bank. 
The author thus included ROA ratio in her data. Beltratti & Stulz (2009) conducted research 
at cross-country and bank levels as to why some banks performed better than others in the 
financial crisis of 2007. Focusing at a bank-level, they found that banks with more Tier 1 
capital and more deposit at the end of 2006 had higher returns during the crisis. Banks with 
more loans and more liquid assets performed better during the month following the Lehman 
bankruptcy. Beltratti & Stulz’s study has a limitation in that they only studied the return 
regressions during 2007-2008. The author’s study spans across five years and shows that 
Australian banks had a higher profitability ratio both in terms of ROE and ROA. Australian 
banks are more efficient since they have a higher ROE. A paper by Vu and Turnell (2011) 
reveals that the big four Australian banks were efficient before the financial crisis of 2007. 
Profit efficiency fell during the financial crisis but recovered towards the end of 2009. This 
phenomenon supports Blejer’s research in 2006 that efficient financial systems are better 
insulated from externalities (Blejer 2006). ROA is a more accurate measure of productivity 
since it takes debt into account. ROA is flat in the UK whilst ROE increased during the 
financial crisis due to higher leverage ratios.  
 
4.4 Basel III reforms 
In light of the correlation between capital/liquidity; capital/loan to deposit ratio and 
capital/asset quality, it is only justifiable to examine whether the Basel III proposals will 
address the problems manifested in the financial crisis.  Basel III recommendations include 
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higher and better quality capital, counter-cyclical buffer of 0-2.5%, tier 1 leverage ratio (ratio 
of book capital to assets) of 3% and maintenance of minimum liquidity. Tier 1 capital ratio 
will increase from 4% to 6% but the overall capital ratio remains at 8%. There is some 
flexibility for national differences in adoption and implementation by way of a ‘comply or 
explain’ provision. Changes will be implemented gradually until 2019. Basel III 
recommendations are necessary to address the problems encountered by several UK banks 
during the crisis. Problems however, exist. 
Basel III fails to address the problem of regulatory dialectic in the shadow banking sector. 
Basel III only applies to banks, not the shadow banking sector. Thus, many banks will 
continue circumventing Basel III rules by relying on securitisation, a way to create apparently 
risk-free assets out of risky pools. Northern Rock is an example. Northern Rock was a 
building society but has gradually become a commercial bank in the UK. Northern Rock was 
adequately capitalised but illiquid prior to its collapse. It utilised a Structured Investment 
Vehicle called Granite which had £50 billion worth of mortgages. Mortgages are considered 
by Basel II as low risk assets. Granite was an off-shore vehicle and is thus unregulated for 
capital purposes. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) failed to notice that Northern Rock 
had only a 2% capital-to-assets ratio in June 2007. Until the definition of capital includes the 
shadow banking sector, an increased capital ratio will not be sufficient to counter 
externalities. 
Australian regulators have recently increased regulation of the shadow banking institutions. 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission now grants licences and imposes 
certain obligations on these institutions. The regulatory coverage of credit products under the 
National Consumer Credit Code has been expanded to include investor-housing mortgages. 
The UK government needs to adopt similar measures. It is encouraging to note that on an 
international dimension, several advanced economies are working towards increased 
regulation of hedge funds and credit rating agencies.  
Hildebrand supports a leverage ratio because it acts as ‘a complementary instrument to risk-
weighted requirements when assessing banks’ capital adequacy’ (Hildebrand 2008). Recent 
empirical evidence reveals that when asset growth is controlled by several instruments, banks 
performed better (U.S Securities and Exchange Commission 2008). Canadian banks are 
governed by a leverage ratio and there have been no bank bail outs in the financial crisis. The 
governor of the Bank of Canada believes that lower leverage leads to better performance in 
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banks (Carney 2008). Hildebrand mentions that a leverage ratio ‘does not address credit 
concentration, excessive maturity mismatch or undue reliance on asset market liquidity’ 
(Hildebrand 2008). Nonetheless, a leverage ratio should be introduced to curb excessive 
leverage. Bank directors must then review the funding position of its bank to ensure that 
liquidity is adequate.  
 
4.5  UK legislative framework for nationalisation of Northern Rock and Bradford and 
Bingley 
Having reviewed the Basel III reforms, the chapter examines the reforms introduced in the 
UK with regards to rescuing banks during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 has shown the spill-over effect of banks when the UK government had to 
nationalise Northern Rock and part of Bradford & Bingley, as well as injecting £850 million 
into the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. With the former two banks, the 
UK government faced the choices of insolvency or nationalisation. The existing UK 
insolvency law did not provide a mechanism to resolve a financially distressed bank. The 
Bank Special Provisions Act 2008 was passed on 21st February 2008 to facilitate the 
nationalisation of Northern Rock and part of Bradford & Bingley. The priority of the UK 
government during the financial crisis was to limit the costs of bank failures within the 
industry.   
The Banking Act 2009 on 21
st
 February 2009 replaced the Bank Special Provisions Act 2008 
and contains a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) to deal with distressed banks. There are five 
objectives under the Banking Act 2009. The objectives are: promoting and enhancing 
financial stability in the UK; promoting and enhancing public confidence in the UK; 
protecting depositors; protecting public funds and not to interfere with property rights which 
will contravene the European Convention of Human Rights (sections 4(4)- 4(8) Banking Act 
2009.) 
The Banking Act 2009 is divided into two parts. The first part deals with pre-insolvency 
‘stabilisation’ and the second part deals with banking insolvency and administration (Ellinger 
et al. 2011). Under the first part of ‘pre-insolvency stabilisation’, there are three stabilisation 
mechanisms. First, one can transfer all or part of a bank to a buyer in the private sector. 
Secondly, one can transfer all or part of a bank to a ‘bridge bank’. The Bank of England will 
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set up the ‘bridge bank’. Finally, a bank can be temporarily nationalised (section 1(3)(c) 
Banking Act 2009). The stabilisation mechanism applies if a bank fails to satisfy the 
‘threshold conditions’ for FSA-authorisation regarding capital adequacy and suitability 
requirements (section 7 Banking Act 2009). The aim is to rescue a bank as soon as there are 
red flags regarding its financial position. The second part of the Banking Act 2009 includes a 
special banking insolvency procedure and a bank administration procedure. The former 
enables depositors to access their savings guaranteed under the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme swiftly. The latter enables the ‘good’ part of the insolvent bank to 
carry on with its business activities. This is a new provision which was not possible under the 
corporate insolvency regime. 
Northern Rock was nationalised in February 2008. The stabilisation mechanism applied 
because the Treasury wanted to reduce the threat of financial instability (section 9(2) Banking 
Act 2009) and it was in the public’s interest for the Treasury to exercise the power of 
stabilisation (section 9(3) Banking Act 2009). Depositors of Northern Rock were given 100% 
guarantee from the Treasury (Singh 2011). Bradford & Bingley was partly nationalised: 
Santander bought the ‘good’ part of the bank, comprising of savings and branch network. The 
‘bad’ part of Bradford & Bingley, comprising of loans and mortgages, was placed in public 
ownership. The positive consequence of this partial nationalisation means that customers of 
Bradford & Bingley continued to have access to their accounts. However, the problem with 
the partial nationalisation is that the ‘bad’ debts are in public ownership, creating a financial 
burden to the state (Singh 2011). The government’s interests in Northern Rock and Bradford 
& Bingley were managed by UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) until 2010. UKFI 
was responsible for managing the Government’s entire shareholding and loans in UK Asset 
Resolution Ltd (“UKAR”) and its subsidiaries. UKAR was established  in November 2010 to 
combine the activities of Northern Rock (Asset Management) Plc and Bradford & Bingley 
Plc. UKFI managed the government’s entire shareholding in Northern Rock Plc until its sale 
to Virgin Money on 1 January 2012. The creation of UKFI and subsequently UKAR has the 
aim of separating the public interest from the private interest of the relevant banks. Operation 
at arm’s length is important to avoid regulatory capture and conflict of interest. UKFI and 
UKAR should not be influenced by the private interests of banks which needed financial 
assistance from the government.  
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4.6 Legal framework of Australian banking regulation 
It is clear from the tables in this chapter that Australian banks were more conservative and 
performed better than UK banks in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The legal framework of 
Australian banking regulation plays a role to its banking philosophy. The Banking Act 1945 
refers only to ‘banks’ so the Commonwealth Bank, the Australian Central Bank at the time, 
only had regulatory powers to ‘banks’. This was the first legislative support for prudential 
supervision of banks (Thomson and Abbott 2000). Section 11 in Division 2 of the 1945 Act 
sets out that the protection of depositors is in the public’s interest and the Commonwealth 
Bank should rescue any failing bank. This shows that depositor protection and financial 
stability are key aims of the Australian legislature. Indeed, the strong emphasis on depositor 
protection and division between banks and non-bank financial institutions explains the 
prevailing dominance of the institutional approach to regulatory structure in Australia. Under 
the 1945 Act, only one bank failed in 1979 so the period of 1945-1981 was one of relative 
calm and stability. The Bank of Adelaide failed because its wholly owned subsidiary made 
substantial losses by lending too much money without appropriate securities (Thomson and 
Abbott 2000). The Banking Act 1959 continues to enshrine the principle of depositor 
protection. The 1959 Act governs how authorised deposit-taking institutions in Australia 
operate (Bhati 2009). Sections 7-9 of the 1959 Act set out who can carry out banking 
businesses and conditions attached to the banking licences. The 1959 Act introduces 
competition amongst banks, so it has provisions concerning the way subsidiaries and 
branches of foreign authorised deposit institutions are governed. Finally, Part II Division 2 of 
the 1959 Act sets out the provisions on depositor protection and gives the regulator, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, several powers. These powers are found in sections 13-16 and 
include: the power to obtain information from the authorised deposit institutions; the power 
to appoint an investigator or administrator to run the authorised deposit institution; the power 
to receive information from the auditors of the authorised deposit institutions. The auditors 
are under a duty to inform the Reserve Bank of Australia if they suspect that an authorised 
deposit institution is insolvent or if it failed to comply with any regulations or conditions of 
the regulator (Bhati 2009).  
Deregulation in the 1980s enabled the consolidation of banks in Australia. Regulations 
imposed on non-bank financial institutions were more onerous than banks, so a number of 
building societies converted to banks. In the 1990s, several pieces of legislation in banking 
regulation were passed. First, the Reserve Bank Act was amended to create a new Payments 
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System Board. This promoted the safety and efficiency of the Australian payments system. 
The Reserve Bank’s obligations regarding the formulation and implementation of monetary 
policy are found in the Reserve Bank Act 1959. Section 10(2) of the 1959 Act is often 
referred to as the regulator's 'charter'. It states that:  
‘It is the duty of the Reserve Bank Board, within the limits of its powers, to ensure that the 
monetary and banking policy of the Bank is directed to the greatest advantage of the people 
of Australia and that the powers of the Bank ... are exercised in such a manner as, in the 
opinion of the Reserve Bank Board, will best contribute to:  
(a) the stability of the currency of Australia;  
(b) the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and  
(c) the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia.’ 
Financial stability and economic growth are thus pursued as twin goals. Further pieces of 
legislation such as the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 and the Payment Systems and 
Netting Act 1998 gave the Reserve Bank of Australia relevant powers in controlling payment 
systems. Finally, the Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998 promoted competition 
further. It also tried to prevent abuse of power by majority shareholders. Therefore, section 
10(A) of the 1998 Act prevents anyone holding more than 15% shares in a financial 
institution either on their own or with associates unless the Australian treasurer approves. 
Approval is given if the treasurer believes that a shareholding of more than 15% is in the 
public’s interest.  
Apart from statutory authority, Australia has several soft codes and self-regulatory schemes 
on banking regulation. First, there is the Code of Banking Practice 2013 which sets out good 
practice and standards for banks when dealing with customers and their guarantors. These 
include giving information to customers about their rights, changes in terms and conditions 
and other issues in plain language (Australian Bankers' Association 2013). It has a specific 
provision for customers living in remote indigenous areas. The Code is thus a tailored 
guidance for bankers on how to deal with a range of customers. Secondly, the National Credit 
Code standardises the credit practice in Australia. The National Consumer Credit Protection 
Act 2009 combined the Consumer Credit Code and Uniform Consumer Credit Code so that 
there is only one code for consumer credit. The National Credit Code applies to credit 
contracts entered into on or after 1 July 2010 where: the lender is in the business of providing 
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credit; a charge is made for providing the credit; the debtor is a natural person or  
corporation; the credit is provided for personal, domestic or household purposes, or to 
purchase, renovate or improve residential property for investment purposes, or to refinance 
credit previously provided for this purpose (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2013a). Criticisms against the former Uniform Consumer Credit Code have 
been raised by Bhati (2009). In his view, the enforcement of the Universal Consumer Credit 
Code was weak. Further, the remedy of compensation under section 114 of the Universal 
Consumer Credit Code was neither an effective remedy for consumers nor a sufficient 
deterrent for the offenders (Bhati 2009). The National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 
tries to rectify these issues. Under the 2009 Act, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) have enhanced enforcement powers under Part 4 of the Act.  These 
enhanced powers have been achieved by extending the range of penalties and sanctions 
available to ASIC that can be responsive to the gravity of a contravention. Sanctions now 
include criminal and civil. Criminal sanctions are aimed at offences which are serious and 
morally culpable actions regarding consumer credit. The maximum civil penalty is 
$1,100,000 for corporations and $220,000 for individuals. It is hoped that the enhanced 
enforcement powers will lead to better enforcement of breaches of the National Consumer 
Credit Code.  Finally, the Financial Ombudsman Service provides dispute resolution services 
between banks (which are members of the Financial Ombudsman Service) and customers. 
Customers are encouraged to solve disputes internally with banks first before lodging a 
complaint with the Financial Ombudsman Service. Depositor protection is a fundamental 
concept in the jurisprudence of Australian banking. Soft law in the form of banking codes 
supplement the statutory provisions to protect consumers. 
 
4.7 The ‘twin-peaks’ model 
The strong emphasis on ‘banks’ and protecting depositors in Australian legislation has 
influenced the regulatory structure in Australia. The Wallis Committee’s Financial System 
Inquiry (‘Wallis Report’) of 1998 introduced the ‘twin-peaks’ model in Australia. Prior to the 
Wallis Report, the structure of the Australian regulator was ‘complex, segmented and 
institutionally based’ (Hill 2012). Since Australia operates a federal legal system, there was 
an overlap of federal and state regulators trying to regulate an increasingly complex and 
deregulated financial market. The Wallis Report was therefore guided by the principles of 
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regulation of ‘competitive neutrality, cost effectiveness, transparency, flexibility and 
accountability’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997). Usually, governments call for an inquiry 
after a major crisis or scandal. In Australia, the Wallis Inquiry was not called as a result of a 
major financial crisis. The Inquiry took place in the middle of the deregulatory period and 
before the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Therefore, the Wallis Inquiry was not influenced by 
any political party or agenda (Cooper 2006). The Wallis Inquiry was aware of the opposing 
financial regulatory aims of promoting competition and maintaining financial integrity. It 
knew that there are multiple layers of integration in the global market. It also realised the 
importance of preventing market failure due to information asymmetry and moral hazard at 
the same time (Hill 2012). After balancing these opposing financial regulatory aims, the 
Wallis Inquiry decided that it was best to have a single agency for regulation, despite the 
blurring of financial services and products. A ‘twin-peaks’ model would be more consistent 
with the developing market structure and would avoid regulatory inefficiencies.  
The ‘twin-peaks’ model was born in Australia in July 1998. The Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) is responsible for prudential regulation of banks and aims to 
reduce the risk of institutional failure. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) has responsibility for conduct of business regulation. It promotes consumer 
confidence, ensures that standards for market conduct and disclosure are complied by the 
banks. The central bank, Reserve Bank of Australia is responsible for the soundness and 
stability of the financial sector as a whole. The final regulatory agency is the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, which protects competition in the financial system. 
Diagram 7 below illustrates the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model. 
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Diagram 7: ‘Twin-peaks’ model in Australia 
Source: Group of Thirty (2008) 
 
After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, both the US and the UK looked towards the ‘twin-
peaks’ model to see if improvements could be made to their fragile regulatory regimes. The 
‘twin-peaks’ model focuses on the pursuance of regulatory objectives. As seen above, the 
twin objectives under this model are prudential supervision with the enhancement of safety 
and soundness whilst balancing the conduct of business regulation with consumer protection 
issues. Naturally, there will be the possibility that there is a conflict between these opposing 
objectives. Deciding which one prevails is ultimately a subjective matter depending on the 
institutional position of the regulatory agencies (Group of Thirty 2008).  
Is the ‘twin-peaks’ model better than the single regulatory regime? The success of a regulator 
will depend on whether it has achieved its regulatory objectives. If one focuses on the 
Australian regulatory objectives of prudential regulation and conduct of business, the author 
submits that APRA and ASIC were successful in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 in 
achieving these objectives. APRA initiates supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions. APRA is a regulator with policy-making powers. It decides its regulatory 
policies. However, it must comply with government policy and objectives. Therefore, 
although APRA has specific powers under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies 
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Act 1997, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998, the Insurance Act 1973 
and the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 over reporting and accountability of 
officers, its powers are fettered. The government can question the APRA’s actions and render 
them void. Therefore, APRA’s powers are under supervision and the possibility of a super 
regulator is minimised. Secondly, APRA is under a duty to collect and publish financial 
information about the financial institutions under its regulation. Further, it monitors the 
capital adequacy and financial management of financial institutions. The aim of such 
monitoring is to protect depositors. Although the capital ratios of the four UK banks were 
slightly better than the four Australian banks, it is evident that the other financial ratios are 
better in the Australian banks than UK banks. Macro and micro prudential successes can 
contribute to this. Charles Littrell, Executive General Manager of APRA said that APRA was 
well-prepared for the financial crisis of 2007-2009: 
 ‘When the crisis became most acute during 2008, neither APRA nor anyone else 
 could predict where it was going. We could say to the Government and other 
 interested parties, however, that Australian prudentially regulated entities were 
 generally well capitalised, well managed, and understood the risks they were taking. 
 This was not completely the case for every single entity, but was close enough to 
 complete to give confidence that the Australian financial system would survive the 
 global financial crisis in reasonably good shape’ (Littrell 2011). 
APRA monitored Australian banks well in general and most importantly, it was confident 
about their financial positions. It is this confidence which is vital in maintaining public 
confidence and financial stability. Meanwhile, the other branch of the ‘twin-peaks’ model 
also proved to be successful. Tony D’Alonsio, Chairman of ASIC, explained that the 
objective of conduct of business regulation worked for four reasons. First, the Financial 
Services Reform Act 2001 provided a strong regulatory and licensing framework for financial 
sales and advice. Market integrity was thus possible under the 2001 Act. Secondly, the 
Product Disclosure Statement provided useful information to consumers about risky products. 
Better disclosure and transparency led to more informed decisions by customers. Thirdly, 
Ponzi-type schemes had to be registered and faced more risk management hurdles before they 
were offered to consumers. Finally, regulatory oversight for auditors protected important 
protection (D'Alonsio 2010). During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, ASIC responded 
efficiently and made good judgements. This was made possible by recruiting senior positions 
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at leadership level; better resources; better disclosure and better research ability to assess 
industry impact by the creation of the Office of the Chief Economist (D'Alonsio 2010). 
It is clear that both the APRA and ASIC developed good strategies prior and during the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 to cope with an unexpected financial crisis of huge magnitude. 
Chapter six of this thesis contains a more detailed analysis of the Australian legal framework 
for prudential regulation of banks and a comparison of the ‘twin-peaks’ model between 
Australia and the UK. The author will discuss potential issues arising from the ‘twin-peaks’ 
model in the UK. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In comparison to the big four Australian banks, this chapter has revealed that the big four UK 
banks had on average, higher cash ratio, higher leverage ratio, higher loan to deposit ratio, 
higher capital ratio, lower asset quality, lower ROA but higher ROE than the big four 
Australian banks. Interestingly, the core 1 capital ratio was slightly higher amongst UK banks 
than Australian banks although the difference is slight. Australian banks did not require any 
government assistance during the financial crisis. Four UK banks required significant 
financial assistance from the UK government during the financial crisis. Macro-prudential 
regulatory changes are inevitable for the UK financial sector. UK financial institutions should 
rely less on short-term wholesale funding and more on cash, deposits and equity. Solvency 
and good quality assets are important. One must balance financial innovation with financial 
stability. Whilst forecast growth by the International Monetary Fund for the UK economy is 
positive, the UK cannot afford to continue with the insatiable quest for innovation and profits.  
The pendulum should shift towards financial stability but without jeopardising economic 
growth. Better regulation and risk management are required. A leverage ratio and minimum 
liquidity requirements are welcomed. Good quality capital is necessary to absorb 
externalities. Basel III has laid down suitable recommendations but they are insufficient. In 
particular, the shadow banking sector should be subject to the same rules and regulations as 
the banking sector to create a level playing field. Flavius Vegetius Renatus (375AD) once 
said: ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’. A counter-cyclical buffer of 0-2.5% should thus 
prepare banks for unexpected losses in the next financial crisis.  
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Reforms in UK corporate insolvency law took place when Northern Rock and Bradford & 
Bingley had to be nationalised. The Special Resolution Regime contained in the Banking Act 
2009 provided swift rescue measures for banks. This is important to minimise systemic risks 
in the banking sector. On the other side of the world, Australia did not have any bank failures 
in the financial crisis of 2007. No Australian bank required financial assistance from the 
government. Financial stability was achieved through prudential regulation and conduct of 
business regulation. Both the APRA and ASIC prepared well before the financial crisis and 
made sound judgements during the financial crisis. The ‘twin-peaks’ model worked well in 
Australia where the objectives of transparency, financial stability and consumer protection 
were achieved. In comparison, the UK regulator failed in regulating and supervising a 
number of banks such as Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, the Royal Bank of Scotland 
and HBOS. In the next chapter, the author will discuss the regulator’s failures in Northern 
Rock and HBOS, the weaknesses revealed in the FSA Handbook and FSMA 2000 and link 
them to the ‘twin-peaks’ model. 
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Chapter Five 
Single or twin? The UK financial regulatory landscape after the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 
5.1 Introduction 
The author aims to analyse the weaknesses of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the 
Bank of England during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. An evaluation of the FSMA 2000 
and FSA Handbook will be conducted to see what weaknesses there are to the legal 
framework of UK banking regulation and supervision.   The focus of this chapter is on micro-
prudential regulatory failures in the UK. A comparison will be made with the twin-peaks 
regulatory model in Australia where there were no bank failures. This chapter is based upon 
an analysis of recent papers and reports. Descriptive statistics are used to provide an insight 
into the financial ratios of the biggest independent retail banks in the UK and Australia. A 
comparative legal analysis between the UK and Australia is used to reflect the common law 
system used by both. 
The main regulatory and supervisory failures of the FSA are due to organisational and 
management problems. There needs to be better information flow, co-ordination, co-
operation, engagement with banks and stricter internal controls. The new UK regulator also 
needs to be prepared for the changes on the European dimension, following the de Larosière 
report. With regards to the statutory provisions on banking regulation, the FSMA 2000 is 
complicated, with standards and principles underpinning the FSA’s statutory core objectives. 
The FSA’s remit is too wide. It is responsible for regulating banks, deposit-taking institutions 
and insurance companies. With the development of complex products, increased use of 
securitisation and merging of financial services offered to customers, the tripartite system 
increasingly found it difficult to delineate their scope and responsibility. Overall, the FSA’s 
passive, non-interventionist and laissez-faire regulatory approach led to criticisms that its 
measures were too late and too little. 
This chapter will have policy implications for practitioners and policy makers on national, 
European and international dimensions. Changes in the European regulatory structure will see 
an emphasis on vertical regulatory co-operation. By first reviewing the weaknesses of the 
FSA in light of Northern Rock and HBOS and then comparing the FSA with the Australian 
regulatory model, this chapter provides a new insight into financial regulation. 
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The UK was ranked third in the overall Financial Development Index of the World Economic 
Forum 2011. However, it was ranked 41
st
 in financial stability. The World Economic Forum 
has recommended improvements in regulation and oversight, including official supervisory 
power in the UK (World Economic Forum 2011). The regulatory and supervisory framework 
of the UK financial regulator is thus of importance. Regulation refers to the rules which 
govern the behaviour of banks. Supervision focuses on the oversight by the regulator to 
ensure that banks adhere to the rules (Barth et al. 2006). Regulation can be divided into 
macro and micro-prudential regulation. Macro-prudential regulation concerns the stability of 
the entire financial system. Micro-prudential regulation focuses on the regulation of 
individual organisations. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is responsible for 
macro-prudential regulation from 1997 till April 2013. Responsibility for micro-prudential 
regulation is primarily the responsibility of the Financial Services Authority but individual 
organisations are also responsible for implementing the rules. In practice, regulation and 
supervision are often intertwined. Therefore, although this author tries to separate the two in 
the chapter it is necessary to assess them together at times. Whilst this chapter will include a 
discussion on the Bank of England as the macro-prudential regulator, the focus is on the 
FSA’s role as the micro-prudential regulator and supervisor.  
Ineffective micro-prudential regulation could lead to problems such as poor risk management, 
regulation and supervision; high leverage; insufficient liquidity and capital within banks. 
Liquidity, leverage and capital are all connected. Adrian and Shin submit that ‘aggregate 
liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the financial intermediaries search for borrowers’ 
(Adrian and Shin 2010). In the sub-prime crisis, banks lent money to customers who had no 
realistic chance of repaying it. This is because banks had surplus capital which is costly to 
retain. During a boom, asset prices increase and balance sheets are stronger. Banks have to 
find ways to use their capital to increase leverage. According to Brunnermeier, there were 
two “liquidity spirals” during the financial crisis (Brunnermeier 2009). When ‘asset prices 
drop, financial institutions capital erodes and, at the same time, lending standards and 
margins tighten. Both effects cause fire-sales, pushing down prices and tightening funding 
even further’ (Brunnermeier 2009). These liquidity spirals lead to banks protecting their 
funds so inter-bank lending decreases. Bank runs then follow and capital levels deplete. 
Northern Rock is a prime example. 
Much has been written on the demise of Northern Rock (Yorulmazer 2008, Bruni and 
Llewellyn 2009, Milne and Wood 2008). There is a gap in the literature in that little has been 
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written on HBOS. The author will review the roles of the Bank of England and the FSA in 
section 5.2.  Section 5.3 consists of an analysis of HBOS. In section 5.4, the author will 
analyse whether the twin-peaks model will address problems such as regulatory co-
ordination; information sharing and conflict of interests. The chapter will draw comparison 
from the Australian experience.  Section 5.5 is a discussion on what changes the FSA has 
made since the financial crisis. Section 5.6 evaluates the ‘twin-peaks’ model in Australia. 
Section 5.7 discusses the results and makes recommendations. Section 5.8 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
5.2 Northern Rock  
 
The UK labour government adopted the tripartite system in 1997. Under the tripartite system, 
the FSA supervised financial institutions; the Treasury was responsible for legislation and the 
Bank of England for financial stability. The justification for a tripartite system was that the 
boundaries between financial institutions have blurred. Banking, insurance and securities 
overlap. Complex group structures, innovative financial products and processes such as 
securitisation have led to the phenomenon of ‘functional despecialisation’ (Taylor 2009a). 
Traditional banks adopted the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model in the late 1980s and boundaries 
between banks, insurance and securities companies have blurred. Banks and the shadow 
banking organisations have thus become increasingly interwoven. A single regulator would 
be better positioned to monitor modern financial institutions.  
 
Northern Rock is an example of ‘functional despecialisation’ and the tripartite system has 
revealed weaknesses of the FSA and the relationship between the FSA and the Bank of 
England. Northern Rock was formerly a building society. In 1997, it became a bank when it 
was listed on the London Stock Exchange. However, Northern Rock had a very unusual 
business model. It combined a traditional reliance on illiquid long-term mortgage assets with 
a reliance on innovative sources such as securitisation and the wholesale market (Milne and 
Wood 2008). Mortgages constituted 77% of Northern Rock’s assets. At the end of 2006, 
Northern Rock issued asset-backed securities through its ‘Granite’ securitisation vehicles and 
obtained 40% of funding (Milne and Wood 2008). Wholesale funding constituted 68% of 
Northern Rock’s liabilities whilst deposits only made up 27% of its liabilities (Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Yorulmazer 2009).  
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Poor financial ratios at Northern Rock between 2003-2009 should have alerted the FSA. 
Table 7 below reveals the liquidity, debt, capital and profitability ratios amongst the biggest 
independent retail UK and Australian banks by asset size. The list is taken from Global 
Finance magazine 2009 (Keeler 2009). The author has also added Northern Rock because she 
discusses the FSA’s supervisory role in Northern Rock. She included Bradford & Bingley, 
Alliance & Leicester and Nationwide Building Society because they act as useful 
comparators to Northern Rock, where they share similar business models. The ratios in Table 
8 are a five year average between the years of 2004-2009. Northern Rock had the highest 
loans to deposits ratio; second highest debt to equity ratio, a poor capital ratio and negative 
profitability ratios. 
 
Name of bank Country Cash 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Debt-to-
Equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Loans to 
deposits 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Tier 1 
Capital 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Return 
on 
equity 
ratio 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Return 
on 
assets 5 
year 
average 
(%) 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
United 
Kingdom 
16.68 21.10 115.22 8 9.26 -0.30 
HSBC United 
Kingdom 
44.67 16.07 96.64 8.8 7.26 0.66 
Barclays United 
Kingdom 
55.72 25.90 93.28 8.8 20.96 0.35 
Lloyds TSB United 
Kingdom 
27.14 29.85 113.86 8.5 19.15 0.60 
HBOS United 
Kingdom 
5.10 38.98 179.24 7.2 0.23 0.04 
Standard 
Chartered 
United 
Kingdom 
17.27 10.79 89.80 9.2 14.51 0.92 
Northern Rock United 8.14 76.54 242.86 -18.7 -75.46 -0.60 
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Kingdom 
Bradford & 
Bingley 
United 
Kingdom 
6.07 85.52 132.56 8.3 25.12 0.14 
Alliance & 
Leicester 
United 
Kingdom 
6.93 38.42 145.90 7.6 14.25 0.94 
Nationwide 
Building 
Society 
United 
Kingdom 
4.52 32.02 115.72 10.0 7.42 0.22 
Westpac 
Banking 
Corporation 
Australia 22.68 20.02 135.00 7.3 19.57 0.95 
Commonwealth 
Bank of 
Australia 
Australia 24.12 16.80 134.22 7.68 17.64 0.98 
ANZ Australia 26.49 15.09 124.34 7.74 14.54 0.89 
National 
Australia Bank 
Australia 43.92 17.24 116.92 7.65 12.26 0.75 
 
Table 8: Liquidity, Debt, Capital and Profitability Ratios of UK and Australian Banks 
between 2004-2009 
Source: Annual reports and author’s calculations 
 
The poor financial ratios are a reflection of weak corporate governance by Northern Rock and 
regulation/supervision by the FSA. They ultimately led to a liquidity problem and bank run at 
Northern Rock.  
 
The House of Commons Treasury Committee was critical of the FSA in both its roles as 
regulator and supervisor (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008). As a supervisor, 
the FSA failed to allocate sufficient resources to monitor Northern Rock where its business 
model was unusual. It failed to supervise Northern Rock properly when it adopted an 
ambitious expansion policy and when its share price fell sharply in late 2007. With regards to 
human resources, the FSA should not have approved the Chairman and CEO of Northern 
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Rock, as they were not qualified bankers. They have significant experience but running a big 
bank without suitable qualifications is a hazard. 
 
The FSA labelled Northern Rock as a ‘high impact bank, under close and continuous 
supervision’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008). However, the FSA only 
carried out an ARROW risk (Advanced Risk Responsive Operating Framework) assessment 
every three years. It acknowledged that the interval between assessments was ‘inadequate’ 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008). The FSA defended its position by stating 
that it maintained a close relationship with Northern Rock through ‘very regular 
dialogues...on a full range of supervisory issues’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee 
2008). 
 
Although the main problem at Northern Rock was one of liquidity, the FSA weakened 
Northern Rock’s capital position by approving the Basel II waiver. This meant that Northern 
Rock was able to increase its dividends and so its balance sheet was weakened. Before the 
FSA approved the Basel II waiver, FSA reviewed Northern Rock’s stress-testing scenarios. 
The FSA was unhappy with the scenarios but it failed to relay that message to the directors of 
Northern Rock. It also failed to rectify the scenarios. 
 
The House of Commons Treasury Committee concluded that the tripartite system (Bank of 
England, FSA and HM Treasury) failed to work well. Northern Rock had to ask the Bank of 
England for emergency relief, since it was the lender of last resort. By separating the roles of 
banking supervision/regulation from lender of last resort, decision-making was slow and 
inefficient. The Bank of England was criticised for taking a reactive approach in the Northern 
Rock episode (Buiter (2008) cited in House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008). In 
comparison to the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of 
England was slow to act, arguing that injecting liquidity would create a risk of moral hazard 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee). Several banks asked the Bank of England for 
additional liquidity at no penalty rate in August 2007. The Bank of England was reluctant to 
provide more liquidity at different maturity dates against weaker collateral (House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2008). It refused to engage in liquidity transformation. It was 
in mid-September 2007 when the Bank of England created a Liquidity Lending Facility for 
Northern Rock. Wood ((2008) cited in House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008) 
supports the Bank of England’s approach. In his view, the ECB and the Federal Reserve were 
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wrong to adopt such a proactive policy and that it would lead to problems in the future. The 
House of Commons Treasury Committee concluded that whilst it was hard to tell whether the 
liquidity facility could have saved Northern Rock, the Bank of England should have 
broadened its range of collateral earlier in the crisis. The Bank of England did not take any 
contingency measures when the ECB and the Federal Reserve did. Overall, its conclusion 
was that rather than restructuring the tripartite system, the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee wanted to keep it but with clearer leadership and stronger powers. 
 
The FSA published its own review on Northern Rock in March 2008. According to the 
report, the extent of the problems at Northern Rock was a surprise to them. In the FSA’s 
view, Northern Rock was ‘at the extreme end of the spectrum’ that they observed. In terms of 
supervision, there was a lack of resources and experience in monitoring Northern Rock. 
Northern Rock was supervised by the insurance group of the Major Retail Groups Division 
until 2006. Three Heads of Departments were responsible for Northern Rock, although one of 
them was in practice for only three months (Financial Services Authority 2008). There was 
however, continuity in the manager and lead associate for supervising Northern Rock. The 
lead associate’s account clearly revealed that staff at the FSA were stretched during a busy 
period of takeovers, bids and demutualisation. The FSA pursued a policy of ‘fewer and better 
staff’ (Financial Services Authority 2008). It reduced its staff by about 20 between 2004 - 
2008. As a result, Northern Rock was poorly supervised. The specific supervisory failures 
include: failure to update the internal risk database; no Risk Mitigation Plan for Northern 
Rock; insufficient engagement with the bank and long gaps between meetings. 
 
Regulatory failures at Northern Rock are revealed in capital, liquidity and stress testing. 
When Northern Rock breached its capital position in March 2007, FSA took action to rectify 
the problem. However, there was no written record of a meeting between the FSA and 
Northern Rock representatives on the reasons of the breach. Lack of rigour and internal 
controls appear to have affected the FSA’s performance. These problems are manifested in 
regulating liquidity as well. When the FSA made an Advanced, Risk-Responsive Operating 
Framework (ARROW) visit to Northern Rock in February 2006, they did not carry out a 
stress test even though liquidity was included on the agenda. Although there were no material 
weaknesses in the liquidity management framework, the FSA admitted that more frequent 
checks on the data are required. The FSA has drawn up 39 lessons it had learnt from the 
Northern Rock episode. The seven high level recommendations include improvements to the 
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rigour of day-to-day supervision; senior management to increase engagement with high 
impact firms; increase its focus on prudential supervision (including liquidity and stress 
testing); improve resources; improve the quality and resources of its financial and sectoral 
analysis and senior managers should increase their oversight of supervision. No dates have 
been set for these recommendations but the FSA will implement them as part of a wider 
programme. 
 
5.3 HBOS 
 
HBOS was formed in 2001 when Halifax Plc. and the Governor and Company of the Bank of 
Scotland merged. At the end of 2006, HBOS was the fourth largest UK bank in terms of 
assets (Milne & Wood, 2009). According to the 2007 HBOS Annual Report, HBOS held 
20% of the mortgage market and 16% of the savings market (HBOS Plc 2007). Like many 
other banks, HBOS experienced rapid growth between 2003-2008. Debt increased from £112 
billion in 2003 to £231 billion in 2007 and total assets increased from £408 billion in 2003 to 
£667 billion in 2007 (HBOS Plc 2007). HBOS experienced liquidity problems during the 
financial crisis. The Chief Executive of HBOS, Andy Hornby, admitted that ‘it is clear with 
the benefit of hindsight that, over many years of reliance on wholesale funding, that left us in 
a vulnerable position’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2007). The poor liquidity 
ratios revealed in Table 1 further corroborates the liquidity problem at HBOS. HBOS’s share 
price fell sharply in March 2008 after rumours of short-selling in the bank. FSA carried out a 
market rumours investigation. In August 2008, it confirmed that it did not find any evidence 
that rumours was spread as part of a concerted attempt by individuals to profit by 
manipulating the HBOS share price. It is commendable that the FSA took action as soon as 
possible.  
 
Despite the false allegation of short-selling, HBOS’s share price fell a further 18% on 15th 
September 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Despite reassurance from 
HBOS that it has a strong capital base by Shane O’Riordain, the Group Communications 
Director of HBOS, the shareholders were not convinced and share price fell a further 22%. 
Emergency talks took place on 17
th
 September 2008 between HBOS and Lloyds TSB. The 
Labour government was keen to avoid another Northern Rock scenario. It therefore relied on 
the argument of public interest, waived European competition law rules and approved the 
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deal between Lloyds TSB and HBOS. On 18
th
 September 2008, Lloyds TSB and HBOS 
announced that the latter would be takeover by Lloyds for £12.2 billion. 
 
HBOS failed due to a combination of weak corporate governance and poor regulation. The 
FSA first raised its concerns about HBOS back in 2003. They carried out a full ARROW risk 
of HBOS’s Retail, Corporate, Treasury and Group Functions. Due to limited resources at the 
FSA, they could only carry out a limited risk review in each division. They would then 
produce a ‘Risk Mitigation Plan’ for HBOS to follow (Moore 2009a). Moore explained that if 
the FSA suspects that there are key risks, they would ask HBOS or an external expert to carry 
out additional work and assess the risks. If the bank carries out the additional work, this will 
normally be assigned to one of the two Group Risk functions that existed at the bank, either 
Group Regulatory Risk or Group Financial and Operational Risk (Moore 2009a). In 
November 2003, the FSA’s report was published. The report contains evidence that ‘…the 
risk posed by the HBOS Group to the FSA's four regulatory objectives is higher than it was 
perceived’ (Moore 2009a). In relation to HBOS’s retail side at the Halifax, ‘there has been 
evidence that development of the control function in Retail Division has not kept pace with 
the increasingly sales driven operation…’ and ‘there is a risk that the balance of experience 
amongst senior management could lead to a culture which is overly sales focused and gives 
inadequate priority to risk issues’ (Moore 2009a).  
 
The FSA’s ARROW visit in 2003 identified the key risks. Moore believed that ‘the 
operational staff at the FSA had done a good job on the ARROW visit they had conducted 
and that they almost certainly had identified the key risks at the bank at that stage in its 
development’ (Moore 2009b). He added that ‘staff [at the FSA] at that level would not be 
accountable for what happened at HBOS’. Nevertheless, Moore (2009b) stated that the FSA 
failed to supervise properly because it adopted a ‘light-touch’ approach to regulation and 
supervision. It failed in their statutory duties, which were to maintain market confidence, 
protect retail customers, fight financial crime and ensure proper consumer education. 
According to Moore (2009b), the main failure of the FSA was that it failed to act upon the 
red flags.  
 
The FSA has not commissioned a report on HBOS. Instead, it issued a statement on 11
th
 
February 2009 in response to Moore’s allegations regarding HBOS’s regulatory failures in 
December 2004. According to the statement, the FSA conducted a full ARROW risk 
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assessment in late 2002. It subsequently asked PricewaterhouseCoopers to carry out a ‘skilled 
persons report’ in accordance with section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000. The ‘skilled persons report’ revealed that HBOS needs to improve its risk management 
system. The FSA conducted another risk assessment of the entire HBOS Group, formally 
recording the assessment in December 2004. HBOS has made improvements in addressing 
the risks highlighted in the previous assessment. Nevertheless, the FSA was of the view that 
HBOS’s group risk functions needed to ‘enhance their ability to influence the business’ 
(Financial Services Authority 2009). It continued to monitor HBOS and wrote to HBOS 
again on 29
th
 June 2006, expressing their concerns about control issues and the bank’s growth 
strategy. With regards to Moore’s allegation that the new group risk director was not ‘fit and 
proper’ for the job, HBOS commissioned KPMG to investigate. The FSA only appointed the 
new director when KPMG’s results showed that there was no evidence to suggest that the 
new group risk director was not ‘fit and proper’. The FSA also had a separate meeting with 
Moore to discuss this issue. The FSA concluded its statement by emphasising that it had 
already raised concerns about HBOS’s regulatory framework prior to Moore’s allegations. 
 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Report of 2013 shed further light on 
the failings of the FSA. It asserted that:  
 
"From 2004 until the latter part of 2007 the FSA was not so much the dog that did not 
bark as a dog barking up the wrong tree”(The Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards 2013). 
 
The FSA’s regulation of HBOS was ‘inadequate’. Although it identified that HBOS’s 
business strategy was too aggressive and risky with weak internal controls, the FSA was too 
easily reassured. The supervisory style was bottom-heavy in that too much supervision was 
done at the lower level. The supervisory approach was ‘box-ticking’ and a great deal of the 
FSA’ actions were ‘too little, too late’ (The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
2013). The FSA thus missed a number of opportunities to prevent HBOS’s demise. The FSA 
did not act as an independent source of guidance to HBOS. Instead, it proved to be a 
hindrance and interference to HBOS. The Report thus corroborates a great deal with Paul 
Moore’s evidence. 
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5. 4 Regulatory and supervisory weaknesses in the UK legislative framework 
 
The structure of the tripartite system clearly failed in the UK during the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. In particular, the FSA was passive and was poor in its regulatory and supervisory 
roles. It is now important to examine how the UK legislative framework contributed towards 
this failure. Part 10 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) gave the 
Treasury and the FSA powers to make regulations and guidance. Sections 138-147 provide 
rule making powers and section 156 gives general supplementary powers to make rules for 
specific cases. The FSA’s rules and guidance are consolidated into its Handbook of Rules and 
Guidance. It consists of several sourcebooks and manuals. Hudson (2009) submits that there 
are six tiers of regulation in the FSA Handbook. The six tiers are: high level standards; 
business standards; prudential standards; regulatory processes; redress and specialist 
sourcebooks. This chapter will demonstrate the weaknesses in the FSA Handbook and FSMA 
2000 and use Northern Rock and HBOS as examples. 
 
Under section 2(1) of the FSMA 2000, the FSA has a number of general functions which are 
subject to regulatory objectives. The functions of the FSA include making rules, preparing 
and issuing codes, give general guidance and determine general policy and principles by 
reference to its functions (section 2(4) FSMA 2000). Underpinning these functions are the 
regulatory objectives of: market confidence; public awareness (which was later moved by the 
Financial Services Act 2010 from an objective to section 2(3)(h) as a principle); consumer 
protection and reduction of financial crime (section 2(2) FSMA 2000). The Financial 
Services Act 2010 inserted a new regulatory objective of financial stability as section 
2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000. Finally, in discharging its objectives and functions, the FSA must pay 
attention to the principles stated in section 2(3) such as using its resources in the most 
efficient way; facilitating financial innovation and competition.  
 
The legal structure of the FSMA 2000 is complicated and conflicting. In pursuing a function, 
the FSA must consider its objectives and principles as well. The objective of consumer 
protection conflicts with the principles of the FSA facilitating financial innovation and 
competition. The use of innovative, securitised products combined with a risky business 
model and sales culture at Northern Rock and HBOS illustrate that customers were treated as 
products and not individuals. Bruni and Llewellyn  explained that  Northern Rock’s demise 
was due to a combination of factors such as the bank’s reliance on securitisation and 
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management of low-probability high-impact risks; the supervisory and regulatory regimes 
and insolvency resolution procedure (Bruni and Llewellyn 2009). Northern Rock’s mission 
statement up till 2006 was to deliver value for customers and shareholder through excellent 
products, efficiency and growth. From the bank run and subsequent nationalisation of the 
bank, it is clear that Northern Rock went too far in favour of financial innovation and range 
of products at the expense of maintaining checks and balances. Liquidity is the main culprit at 
Northern Rock. Although it was solvent, its assets were mainly illiquid due to the reliance on 
wholesale funding. HBOS’s customers suffered because of its prevalent sales culture. Ellis 
and Taylor provides an interesting account of the culture at HBOS from Margaret Taylor, an 
ex-employee of HBOS who is also a political activist (Ellis and Taylor 2010). Taylor has 
three reasons on why HBOS went wrong: first, the incentive structure has changed from a 
simple pay package to individualised, performance driven pay. Secondly, deregulation in the 
1980s encouraged retail organisations to expand into banking. This led to a more sales driven 
approach in banking and increased emphasis on marketing. Gardener, Howcroft et al (1999) 
concur with this view. In their paper, they conducted a case study into the evolution of retail 
banking in the UK. They found that since the mid-1970s, banks became more market-
orientated. Promotion and marketing became more important (Gardener et al. 1999). Finally, 
technological advances have replaced human labour (Ellis and Taylor 2010). Paul Moore, ex-
Head of Regulatory Risk at HBOS between 2002-2005 described that HBOS staff were 
‘being forced to sell things; sell credit; sell mortgages; sell insurance products that were 
simply not in the best interests of the customer’. The Head of Risk in the division said to Paul 
that: ‘they [HBOS directors] pay no attention to risk management here at all. The only thing 
that counts is sales and you know, they are animals around here’ (Moore 2009a). From 2004, 
there is evidence that at HBOS, ‘leadership and focus on risk matters has had no priority’; 
‘sales regarded as more important than anything else’  and "risk not seen as a core business 
imperative or competency’ (Moore 2009a). 
 
Wisskirchen,  Vater et  al  (2006) support  the argument that  HBOS pursued 
a sales policy. Their main submission is that many retail banks adopted an innovative and 
short-term sales approach since long-term growth and profitability were difficult to attract 
new customers. They mentioned in particular, the innovative approach HBOS adopted. In 
order to compete with the other major UK retail banks, HBOS advertised heavily their simple 
yet innovative products. An example is an interest-bearing current account which paid more 
interest on deposits than any other account on the market. HBOS trained all its customer 
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assistants on helping new customers to transfer their bank details and accounts. HBOS then 
rewarded its customer assistants who achieved their sales targets (Wisskirchen et al. 2006). 
HBOS managed to increase its overall share of current accounts from 9% to 14% between 
2002-2006 (Wisskirchen et al. 2006). 
 
Wisskirchen, Vater et al’s article revealed that most retail banks are aware that developing a 
strong customer relationship is very important. The authors used a study in 2004 by Bain & 
Company which showed that UK banks performed worst in customer relationships. There is 
therefore, significant area for improvement in this field. Although Wisskirchen, Vater et al 
provide a more sympathetic view of HBOS’s sales policy than Paul Moore, the fact that 
customer assistants are rewarded for hitting their sales targets correspond with Ellis and 
Taylor’s submission that individualised, performance driven pay is one of the reasons why 
HBOS failed (Ellis and Taylor 2010).  
 
It has been submitted that the true reason for the failure of HBOS was its corporate division’s 
lending on the wholesale market (Ellis and Taylor 2010). The takeover of HBOS (the weaker 
bank) by Lloyds has been described as a ‘shotgun marriage’ by Paul Moore (2009b). 
The government chose Lloyds TSB as the purchaser for two reasons. First, Lloyds was 
financially robust in comparison to other banks during the financial crisis. Secondly, merging  
with Lloyds would not have a European dimension so it is strictly subject to UK merger  
legislation (Stephan 2011). The new Lloyds Banking Group own 30% of the current account  
market and 33% of the mortgage account (Stephan 2011). Competition rules were waived in  
the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds due to the need to restore public confidence. Sir John  
Vickers, the author of the Vickers’ report on banking reforms, is of the view that the waiver  
was a ‘policy mistake’ (Vickers 2008). The takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB created a new  
public interest ground for competition rules to be waived. In normal circumstances, a merger  
of new major banks would breach competition rules. Although HBOS was solvent, it had  
severe liquidity problems. Fear and lack of confidence in the financial sector also contributed  
to the establishment of the public interest ground. On 16
th
 September 2008, the share price of  
HBOS fell by 40% after Lehman Brothers collapsed. Therefore two days later, the takeover  
was agreed. Parliament had to revise the Enterprise Act 2002 to include a new public interest  
consideration of ‘the interest of maintaining the stability of the UK financial system.’  
(Section 58(2)(D) Enterprise Act 2002). The FSMA 2000 was inadequate in this incident.  
The principles of promoting financial innovation and competition had to give way to public  
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interest. Further, a new regulatory objective of financial stability was inserted by the  
Financial Services Act 2010 as section 2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000 after it became clear that  
financial stability had to prevail over financial innovation. Finally, section 2(3)(d)-(f) FSMA  
2000 emphasise the importance of promoting financial innovation and competition. Yet, there  
is neither a provision on minimising the negative impact which competition within can  
produce nor is there a provision giving the FSA powers to act when financial institutions  
have to merge due to public interest. The FSMA 2000 once again demonstrated that it was  
not fit for purpose in maintaining its  overall purpose of market confidence. The objectives,  
functions and principles are too vague and unable to equip the FSA to act in an emergency. 
 
Was the forced merger the right decision? It is important to remember that the background to 
this forced merger was one of serious panic in the financial sector. The UK government 
nationalised Northern Rock in February 2008 and Bradford & Bingley in September 2008. In 
the US, the Federal Reserve Bank bailed out Bear Stearns but Lehman Brothers collapsed, 
sending seismic shockwaves across the financial sector. Due to the inter-connectedness of 
banks; fear of systemic risks and fear of lack of confidence in the economy, it can be argued 
that the forced merger between HBOS and Lloyds TSB was necessary and in the public’s 
interest. On the other hand, Sir John Vickers argued that the forced merger was a policy 
mistake (Vickers 2008). His submission is that the merger only temporarily restored public 
confidence. Lloyds Banking Group announced a pre-tax loss of £10.8 billion for HBOS. In 
August 2009, it announced a further £4 million loss. The UK government had to inject £21 
billion to bail out HBOS (Jenkins and Jones 2011). In light of the costs, Sir John argued that 
the government should have nationalised HBOS. In short, the forced merger was short-
sighted. Nationalisation was not possible under the existing legal framework in 2007 since 
the corporate rescue mechanism was not aimed at banks. When banks are in financial 
distress, time is of the essence to minimise externalities. Government authorities need powers 
to rescue banks immediately to avoid widespread panic. These powers were lacking under the 
UK corporate insolvency regime. The FSA were thus unable to take control of Northern Rock 
quickly when the latter was technically still solvent. This made it difficult for the FSA to sell 
Northern Rock since it had already lost franchise value (Bank of England 2011). The 
nationalisation of Northern Rock under the Banking Act 2009 and the forced merger of 
Lloyds TSB and HBOS demonstrated the inadequacy and problems of the UK legislative 
framework. 
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The author opines that it is a mistake to move the regulatory objective of public awareness to 
a guiding principle under section 2(3)(h) FSMA 2000. First, with workers retiring later and 
the range and amount of welfare benefits being cut, the public are more reliant on private 
pensions and other financial products for their retirement (Hudson 2009).  Financial products 
have become more complicated through the process of securitisation. Complex structures and 
products meant that few understood who owned what assets or risks. The process of 
securitisation resembles a cooking recipe: it involves slicing, dicing, tranching, bundling and 
re-packaging. Bank assets are often intangible and stakeholders do not realise there is a 
problem until late in the transaction. The public need to be educated about the financial 
system, financial products and how they can protect themselves from risks. It is also 
beneficial for the UK economy when more people purchase financial investments. Secondly, 
taxpayers still own 40% of shares in Lloyds Banking Group and 100% in Northern Rock 
through UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI Limited) and UK Asset Resolution 
Limited. The primary objective of UKFI Limited is to protect share value for taxpayers, while 
considering financial stability and competition at the same time. HM Treasury is the sole 
shareholder of UKFI Limited so decisions are made on behalf of taxpayers. However, UKFI 
Limited is keen to engage with other investors and market players and obtain their views. In 
order to have a meaningful dialogue, the author believes that the public need to be educated 
and can make informed decisions. Otherwise, there is the danger of democracy deficit, as 
identified by Peston (2010). In a democratic society, taxpayers should have a voice in how 
society should be run. The government rescued banks without consulting the public. 
Arguably, this was necessary because of the urgency and complexity of the matter. However, 
it was the players in the financial industry who made the mistakes and wreaked havoc to the 
economy. They are now rebuilding the banking system through the public’s unconscious 
delegation. The public elect members of parliament to voice their opinions in democratic 
societies. However, members of parliament are not financial or banking experts. Hence, there 
is a limit as to how much they can help in the redesign of the banking system. 
 
After analysing the weaknesses with FSA’s statutory objectives and functions, it is necessary 
to examine its rule-making powers and the content in the FSA Handbook. In particular, this 
chapter will focus on the high-level standards, business standards, prudential standards and 
supervisory rules during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Principle 3 of the Principles for 
Businesses under high level standards says that: ‘A firm must take reasonable care to 
organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management 
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systems’. In March 2012, the FSA has taken enforcement action and censured HBOS’s 
corporate division for ‘very serious misconduct’ during 2006-2008 (Financial Services 
Authority 2012). This is because HBOS failed to comply with Principle 3 of the FSA’s 
Principles for Businesses. HBOS pursued an aggressive growth strategy even in the period of 
2006-2008 when the other UK banks scaled back their lending to corporate borrowers. More 
importantly, the FSA held that HBOS had a culture of focusing on profit at the expense of 
assessing risks properly. The FSA’s censure of HBOS is a public one. It wanted to ‘name and 
shame’ the bank and act as a lesson on risk management failures. In 2013, Lloyds Banking 
Group was fined £28,038,800 for serious failures in their incentive schemes. Sales advisors at 
Lloyds were selling products to customers that they did not require or want because advisors 
were under pressure to hit targets (Financial Conduct Authority 2013). The Financial 
Conduct Authority increased the fine bv 10% because the Financial Services Authority had 
given several warnings to Lloyds Banking Group in the past of poorly managed incentive 
schemes. Lloyds also had a previous fine from the FSA for unsuitable sale of bonds in 2003 
which was caused partly by the sales targets. It appears that Lloyds Banking Group has not 
learnt from its previous mistakes and therefore the hefty fine in 2013 would hopefully act as a 
deterrent. Credit goes to both the FSA and FCA for taking enforcement action against Lloyds 
for breach of the FSMA’s objective of consumer protection and Principle 3 of the Principles 
of Businesses. 
 
Another major UK bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) was fined £87.5 million in 
February 2013 for breaching section 206 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in 
the LIBOR scandal (Financial Services Authority 2013). LIBOR is the London inter-bank 
lending rate. It is a benchmark rate at which banks lend to each other in the overnight market. 
The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) also breached Principle 3 of the FSA’s Principles for 
Business by failing to have adequate risk management systems and controls in place in 
relation to its LIBOR submissions process.  RBS committed a number of breaches. Individual 
traders colluded with other firms and panels in manipulating the Japanese and Swiss franc 
LIBOR submissions between 2006-2010 (Financial Services Authority 2013). At company 
level, RBS did not have adequate internal controls and processes to monitor risks associated 
with derivatives trading. Further, RBS attested in 2011 that they had adequate systems in 
place when they did not. RBS also breached Principle 5 of the Principles for Businesses by 
failing to observe proper standards of market conduct between October 2006 and November 
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2010. RBS manipulated the interest rate by taking the trading positions of its interest rate 
when making Swiss and Japanese LIBOR submissions. 
 
Lord Turner (2009) is of the opinion that the FSA paid too much attention on conduct of 
business regulation than prudential regulation during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The 
FSA spent a great deal of time on conduct of business initiatives such as the Retail 
Distribution Review and the Treating Customers Fairly Initiative (MacNeil 2010). The Retail 
Distribution Review raises professional standards in the financial advisory industry and 
provides clearer information to clients about costs and services. The Treating Customers 
Fairly Initiative protects consumers by highlighting the benefits and risks of the products that 
they are buying. These are both attempts to uphold the principle of acting in the clients’ best 
interests in COBS 2.1 of the Conduct of Business Obligations.  Although no amount of 
regulation can fully protect consumers, MacNeil disagrees with Lord Turner and argues that 
it is right to focus on conduct of business regulation. This is because with increased pressure 
on banks to raise capital and boost profits, this may lead to unfair treatment of customers. If 
such logic applies, customers are always in a vulnerable situation. In the deregulatory, 
laissez-faire period, banks pursued high-risk, aggressive models to maximise profits. The 
combination of greed, recklessness and manipulation of the LIBOR scandal demonstrated in 
the financial crisis left customers very vulnerable. After the financial crisis, financial stability 
is the key aim of the regulator. Banks are under pressure to increase their capital positions 
and profits. Will this lead to inferior treatment of customers? If banks implement the counter-
cyclical buffer of 0-2.5% as recommended under the Basel III Accord and the regulator 
supervises accordingly, then banks should be financially sound and robust to withstand any 
externalities. This should not come at the cost of inferior consumer protection.  
 
The second reason why MacNeil thinks that consumer protection should continue to be 
important is because since the FSA’s Retail Distribution Review is implemented, financial 
advisers have to charge upfront and not by commission (MacNeil 2010). This may deter 
some customers from seeking investment advice (Collinson 2012). Another concern is that 
financial advisers will circumvent this ban on commission by selling medical and life 
insurance policies, since they are not caught under the Retail Distribution Review (Collinson 
2012). Consumers of financial products need protection because of information asymmetry 
and moral hazard. Markets alone will not protect consumers and therefore the regulator 
should pursue the objective of consumer protection. Nevertheless, this pursuance should not 
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come at the cost of poor prudential regulation and supervision. The financial crisis of 2007-
2009 revealed some serious prudential regulatory and supervisory failures of the FSA.  
 
The Prudential Standards contained in the General Prudential Sourcebook set out regulations 
on the financial robustness of regulated firms. Solvency, liquidity and capital positions are 
regulated via risk models. The supervision manual in the FSA Handbook sets out how the 
risk models are formed. Under section 1.3 of the supervision manual, the FSA uses a ‘risk 
based approach’. The risk models are based on an ‘impact and probability’ risk assessment. 
The models consider how each firm’s strategy and risks will contravene the FSA’s core 
regulatory objectives. The FSA will then grade the bank from high risk to low risk. This risk 
assessment approach is dependent on assumptions, reactions and the willingness of the FSA 
to rely upon the regulated bank’s provision of information (Hudson 2009). Hudson provided 
the example of Northern Rock. In this scenario, the FSA admitted that it did not ‘stress test’ 
the bank properly. As a result of this omission, it did not reflect the change in Northern 
Rock’s business model and anticipate the increased risk in securitisation and the sub-prime 
market. Together with a light-touch regulatory approach, the FSA relied too much on 
Northern Rock providing information, rather than challenging the information given to the 
FSA. Hudson (2009) opines that FSA was not proactive enough in supervising Northern 
Rock. Therefore, the FSA could not accurately predict the risks that Northern Rock would 
face. The FSA’s approach to supervision of banking is ‘not fit for purpose’ (Hudson 2009). 
 
A similar trend can be found in the FSA’s regulation and supervision of HBOS. Initially, the 
FSA regulated HBOS well between 2002-2004. It identified a number of serious concerns 
about the control functions at HBOS including its over-reliance on wholesale funding. 
Several reviews were carried out consequently and the turning point of the FSA’s regulatory 
approach was the ‘skilled persons review’ under section 166 of the FSMA 2000 on HBOS’s 
control framework and risk management processes. Although the first report made some 
suggestions for change, the second report reported everything was fine. The FSA was more 
relaxed from regulating HBOS after this review and reversed the increase in the capital 
requirement in December 2004 (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 2013). 
Further, the FSA’s emphasis switched from prudential regulation to conduct of business 
regulation. It spent a great deal of time on implementing Basel II and the FSA’s Treating 
Customers Fairly scheme. The FSA was comfortable for senior management at HBOS to 
identify and mitigate business and control risks (Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
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Standards 2013). The period of 2004-2007 showed that the FSA adopted the wrong 
regulatory approach to HBOS. When the FSA gave the Basel II waiver to HBOS, the latter 
was able to calculate its own risk-weightings. This also distracted the supervisors from 
regulating and supervising the liquidity and credit positions. Few members of senior 
management at FSA supervised HBOS and when a stress test took place, challenges would be 
passed down (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 2013). According to a FSA 
official, the FSA were more interested in the composition of HBOS’s wholesale funding 
portfolio rather than setting prescriptive levels or amounts. Ultimately, the biggest failure of 
the FSA was on neglecting HBOS’s liquidity status, since liquidity ‘kills a firm first’ 
(Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 2013).  
 
To improve financial stability, under Part 1 of the Financial Services Banking Reform Act 
2013 (‘the 2013 Act’), retail banks are separated from investment banks through the use of 
subsidiaries. The 2013 Act does not ban proprietary trading so it does not go as far as the 
Volcker rule in the United States where proprietary trading is banned. Section 11(2) of the 
2013 Act defines proprietary trading as ‘trading in commodities or financial instruments as 
principal’. Under section 9 of the 2013 Act, the PRA will conduct a review of proprietary 
trading within five years of the 2013 Act coming into force. It will then pass its findings to 
HM Treasury to see if any change needs to be made. The most important implication of the 
2013 Act is that both the PRA and FCA have a continuity objective of maintaining financial 
stability under clauses 1 and 2 of the 2013 Act. They do so by monitoring the risks which the 
ring-fenced banks are taking and minimise any adverse effects of the failure of a ring-fenced 
bank. The scope of ‘financial stability’ in section 2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000 has thus been 
broadened. Another implication of the 2013 Act is that the PRA and FCA have more powers 
to make rules for ring-fenced banks. For example, under the new section 142H FSMA 2000, 
the PRA and FCA must make rules to ensure that the ring-fenced banks have restricted 
powers to enter into contracts with other members of its groups otherwise than on arm’s 
length; they must provide information to the regulators of transactions between a ring-fenced 
bank and other members of its group and that the board of directors of a ring-fenced bank is 
independent from other members of the group. The board will also need non-executive 
directors. 
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5.5 Changes on the horizon since the financial crisis 
The previous sections highlighted the weaknesses and failures of the tripartite system, in 
particular the FSA, the FSMA 2000 and FSA Handbook. Hector Sants, Chief Executive of 
the FSA, admitted that the FSA failed in both roles as regulator and supervisor. In his speech 
at the Annual Lubbock Lecture in Management Studies, Sants announced the changes that the 
FSA has made since the financial crisis (Sants 2010). He stressed that the FSA is an 
‘influencer’ of prudential roles, not a decision-maker. The majority of decision-making is set 
at the European and international levels, so he appealed that the FSA should be judged 
according to the effectiveness of its supervision rather than the quality of the prudential 
regulations. On capital and liquidity, the FSA has put in place a liquidity and ‘interim’ capital 
regime.  This is consistent with the Basel Committee. On supervision, the FSA has shifted 
from a reactive ‘principles-based’ approach to a proactive ‘outcomes-based’ approach. The 
new approach is more intensive. It focuses on stress-testing and on the future. Hence the 
forward-looking approach to capital for banks recently adopted by the FSA improved the 
capital positions of banks because a challenging stress test was used. The FSA will conduct 
annual stress test with all major financial institutions. This would involve reviews of their 
portfolios, projections and strategies. The UK regulator’s role in regulation will be restricted 
in the future since future regulatory policy and rules will be decided on the European level 
under the new European regulatory framework. This is an interesting point which deserves 
closer examination. 
 
On 1 January 2011, the European financial supervisory framework came into force. The key 
features of the reform are the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) and 
three European Supervisory Authorities (‘ESAs’), the European Banking Authority (‘EBA’), 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’). The ESRB is in charge of macro-prudential 
supervision. The ESRB will work with national authorities such as the Financial Policy 
Committee in the UK, which is the proposed new institution responsible for macro-prudential 
regulation. The three ESAs will work under the European System of Financial Supervision 
(‘ESFS’) together with the existing national supervisory authorities. They are responsible for 
micro-prudential supervision. The Prudential Regulatory Authority (‘PRA’) will represent the 
UK in the new ESAs for banking and insurance, whilst the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) will represent the UK in the ESMA. The ESAs have wide-ranging powers which 
include: drafting specific rules and guidelines for national authorities and financial 
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institutions in the form of technical standards, guidelines and recommendations; and monitor 
how rules are being enforced by national regulators (they will in some circumstances be able 
to give binding instructions to national regulators and financial institutions); take action in 
emergencies, including the banning of certain products; mediate and settle disputes between 
national supervisors. 
 
Member states can decline to comply with a recommendation or guideline but technical 
standards will be binding as an EU regulation or decision. The regulatory paradigm will shift 
from the national to European level. The theoretical paradigm will become increasingly 
focused on vertical rather than horizontal regulatory co-operation. Horizontal regulatory co-
operation between the tripartite authorities failed under the UK single regulator. The first step 
that the UK government should take is to rectify the problems mentioned earlier in the 
chapter before considering the overall structure of the regulator. Structure alone will not solve 
everything. The second step is to consider whether the Australian twin-peaks model is better 
for the UK. The European regulatory changes call for more vertical regulatory co-operation 
between the national and European regulatory bodies. With the Bank of England and PRA 
reporting to the ESRB and ESFS, the twin-peaks model should in theory, be more aligned to 
the European level. 
 
5.6 The ‘twin-peaks’ model in Australia 
Australia adopted the twin-peaks model in 1998 following the Wallis Inquiry of 1997 
(Financial System Inquiry Final Report 1997). The Wallis Inquiry was not a consequence of a 
scandal or crisis. Therefore, it can be argued that the Wallis Inquiry was free from political 
pressure when reviewing the regulatory structure (Cooper 2006). Australia withstood the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 better than the UK. No Australian bank failed. There were no 
mergers or acquisitions of weaker banks. The G30 Report on the Structure of Financial 
Supervision of 2008 revealed that both Australia and the Netherlands are amongst the best 
and most effectively regulated regimes in the world (Group 30 2008). It would appear that the 
twin-peaks model works very well in Australia. However, the failure of HIH Insurance 
Limited in 2001 illustrates the failures and weaknesses of the Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (APRA). HIH Insurance Limited was the second largest general 
insurance company in Australia. It collapsed with a debt in the region of $3.6 - $5.3 billion 
(Clark 2007). The Royal Commission into HIH’s collapse found that the APRA was reluctant 
to intervene in HIH when the latter was in trouble. APRA was formed on 1
st
 July 1998 and it 
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was inexperienced in understanding the extent of HIH’s problems (Clark 2007). The 
fundamental problem with HIH Insurance Limited offered insurance too cheaply without 
enough capital to absorb any potential losses. This was exacerbated by corporate governance 
and management failures at HIH Insurance Limited leading to HIH Insurance Limited buying 
troubled insurance business at too high a cost (Wilkins 2011).  
 
Justice Owen of the Royal Commission held that APRA ‘did not cause or contribute to the 
collapse of HIH’ (HIH Royal Commission 2003). However, APRA ‘missed many warning 
signs, was slow to act, and made misjudgements about some vital matters’ (HIH Royal 
Commission 2003) Justice Owen said that APRA was weak in a number of areas. First, 
APRA did not have staff with the relevant skills or experience. Resources were inadequate. 
Secondly, there was a lack of information flow upwards to APRA's board and managers. 
They were not properly informed on lack of resources or on HIH’s financial performance.  
Thirdly, like the FSA, APRA adopted a ‘laissez-faire’ approach to regulation. Although 
HIH’s collapse was ultimately due to corporate governance failures, this episode reveals that 
APRA could have dealt with the problem better.  
 
To rectify the weaknesses, Justice Owen made three recommendations. First, he 
recommended that the CEO and executive commissioners should replace the non-executive 
board of APRA. This should improve the information flow to the senior level. Secondly, he 
called for a restructuring of the APRA. Reorganisation is required to improve accountability. 
He also urged the creation of a specialist team of staff to supervise insurers. Finally, the 
APRA should be more firm and aggressive in its style of prudential regulation and 
supervision.  
 
APRA learnt from the experience and in October 2002, it introduced new risk assessment and 
supervisory response tools known as the Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) and 
the Supervisory Oversight and Response System (SOARS). The HIH Insurance scenario 
illustrates that the APRA experienced teething problems in both regulation and supervision. 
Nevertheless, it has learnt from its experience and made the necessary changes. With no bank 
failure during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, it seems that the problems of regulatory co-
ordination, information sharing and conflict of interests have not troubled the APRA again. 
The UK government could learn from this episode. The PRA needs to be well-organised and 
has skilled experts. There must be clear co-ordination and co-operation both within the 
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regulatory bodies and outside. Transparency and accountability should be encouraged with 
good information flow upwards and downwards. It is encouraging to note that the coalition 
government will give the Treasury power to set out in secondary legislation the exact macro-
prudential tools available to the Financial Policy Committee (HM Treasury 2010). These 
tools are vital to detect risks and improve regulation and supervision. 
 
5.7 Findings and recommendations 
 
This chapter has extended the literature on financial regulation by examining the macro and 
micro-prudential failures of the tripartite authorities, especially the FSA during the financial 
crisis of 2007. It also examined the weaknesses of the FSMA 2000 and FSA Handbook. It is 
important to emphasise that Northern Rock and HBOS failed due to a combination of 
corporate governance and regulatory failures. However, this chapter focuses on the latter, 
especially the micro-prudential failures and weaknesses of the FSA. The purpose of this 
approach is to identify whether the weaknesses and failures are due to the structure of the 
FSA or other reasons. This will have important implications for the future of UK financial 
regulation. The author has found that there are weaknesses with the tripartite authorities.  
 
The Northern Rock demise has revealed that FSA failed in both regulating and supervising 
the bank. By waiving Basel II regulations on capital, Northern Rock was able to pay 
dividends to its shareholders and further weakening its capital position. The FSA was aware 
of the capital situation before it waived the Basel II requirements. However, it failed to 
channel that information to the board of Northern Rock and did not rectify the problem. It did 
not regulate the bank’s liquidity well. As a supervisor, it failed to monitor the bank properly 
when it was evident that Northern Rock’s business model was unusual. It carried out 
ARROW risk assessments every three years when it identified the bank as ‘a high impact 
bank, under close and continuous supervision’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee 
2008). The admission by the FSA that Northern Rock was ‘at the extreme end of the 
spectrum’ is a clear indication that there were serious failures in both regulation and 
supervision by the FSA.  
 
Moore’s evidence from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards revealed that 
the operational staff at the FSA performed well (Moore 2009a, Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards 2013). They had identified the major risks at HBOS. It was at the senior 
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management level where problems emerged. The FSA failed to notice the warning signals 
and became too reliant on the senior management at HBOS to assess its risks. Ultimately, the 
biggest failure of the FSA was on neglecting HBOS’s liquidity status. Arguably, the FSA 
could and should have focused more on prudential regulation than on conduct of business 
regulation.  
 
The studies into the role of FSA in both Northern Rock and HBOS revealed similar 
weaknesses and failures. It is apparent that common supervisory weaknesses include: 
insufficient engagement with the banks; lax information recording systems; failure at the 
senior management level and poor monitoring of the banks. Lack of resources and poor 
information flow were noticeable in both banks. Regulatory and supervisory failures include 
capital, liquidity and stress testing. The FSA has been perceived as focusing more on capital 
and solvency rather than liquidity (Buiter (2008) cited in House of Commons Treasury 
Committee 2008). Both Northern Rock and HBOS ultimately needed government assistance 
because of liquidity problems. Therefore, the primary regulatory failure is in liquidity and 
stress testing.  
 
The FSA’s regulatory and supervisory powers derive from the FSMA 2000 and FSA 
Handbook. There are three problems with the current legal framework in banking regulation. 
First, the legal structure of the FSMA 2000 is complicated and conflicting. In pursuing a 
function, the FSA must consider its objectives and principles as well. The objective of 
consumer protection conflicts with the principles of the FSA facilitating financial innovation 
and competition. Customers of Northern Rock and HBOS suffered in the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 since the banks pursued high-risk, aggressive growth models at the expense of 
consumer protection. The FSA as a single regulator was unable to decide which principle had 
priority. Secondly, the principles-based regulatory approach combined with the supervisory 
powers under the Regulatory Processes of the FSA Handbook proved to be disastrous. In 
theory, the risk-based supervisory approach using individual bank business models and 
strategies to predict tailored risks for each bank sound admirable. In practice, the use of 
assumptions, light-touch regulatory approach and the FSA’s over-reliance on the regulated 
banks’ supply of information meant that the risk model failed. Gray (2009) argues that this 
combination is unable to deal with unexpected shocks and externalities in the banking 
system. The FSA does not have policy-making powers and cannot shape the financial system. 
This is in contrast to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority where it has policy-
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making powers and can combine prudential regulation with policy making. Thirdly, the 
FSA’s remit is simply too wide. It is a super-regulator which oversees banks, licensed 
deposit-taking institutions, insurance and investments firms. The FSA had more powers than 
the powers given to any single Australian financial regulatory body (Primikiris 2004). It 
performed functions equivalent to three out of four regulatory agencies in Australia. With 
‘functional despecialisation’ of products, the boundaries of financial services blurred and the 
FSA was overwhelmed by changes in the financial market and technology. Financial 
innovation gave way to financial stability at a serious cost to the UK financial system. The 
FSA was a watchdog which failed to detect risks prior to the financial crisis and was too slow 
to deal with the financial crisis. 
 
The demise of HIH Insurance Limited exposed initial problems of the twin peaks model in 
Australia. The APRA lacked skilled staff and resources. It failed to notice warning signals 
and was slow to act. There was poor communication and information flow. The APRA 
adopted a ‘light-touch’ approach to regulation. These weaknesses are similar to the FSA. 
Therefore, the structural difference between the two regulators is not a key factor to their 
regulatory and supervisory failures. Rather, the regulators failed in both countries due to 
organisational and management weaknesses, especially at the senior management level. 
Proximity between the Bank of England and the PRA should assist with preventative 
measures. When macro and micro-prudential regulation/supervision is vested within one 
umbrella organisation, the PRA can in theory, react quicker to market volatility and provide 
liquidity where necessary. Macro and micro-prudential regulation/supervision are closely 
connected: ‘Macro-prudential supervision cannot be meaningful unless it can somehow 
impact on supervision at the micro-level; whilst micro-prudential supervision cannot 
effectively safeguard financial stability without adequately taking account of macro-level 
developments’ (De Larosiere 2009). Further, the PRA is investing in more senior and 
experienced staff in banking supervision (Bank of England 2013b). It is recruiting internally 
and externally to ensure that the mistakes made in the financial crisis will not be repeated. To 
avoid the criticism that the FSA was too slow to detect risks and deal with the crisis, the PRA 
is under a statutory duty to avoid significant disruption to ‘the continuity of the supply of 
financial services’ (Chapter 2, section 2B(3) and (4) Financial Services Act 2012). It operates 
a Proactive Intervention Framework in regulation and supervision of banks. Essentially, the 
PRA aims to identify risks early and requires firms to tackle the problems. The PRA’s 
supervisory powers are enhanced under the Financial Services Act 2012 since it has legal 
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powers to require information from firms and commission a report by a third party into 
particular areas of interest (Part XI of FSMA 2000). The PRA also has disciplinary powers to 
impose sanctions and ‘name and shame’ banks. If used early to detect risks, these powers 
should reduce the reliance on enforcement actions (Part XIV of FSMA 2000). Meanwhile, 
there is evidence already that the FCA is taking a more interventionist style to regulating 
conduct of business matters. In 2013, the FCA has imposed £472 million of fines against 
several UK banks who were involved in the LIBOR scandal (Binham 2013). Communication 
and co-operation between the regulatory bodies should be improved under the ‘twin-peaks 
model’ since there are extensive provisions in Part 2 section 3 of the Financial Services Act 
2012 governing this area. The sections set out the boundaries of each regulatory body and 
when the PRA can require the FCA to refrain from acting. 
 
The PRA, FCA. HM Treasury and the Bank of England will enter into a memorandum of 
understanding to co-ordinate its relationships with the European regulators (Part 2, section 
3E(3)(a) Financial Services Act 2012). The proposed changes to the European regulatory 
framework suggest a regulatory emphasis on vertical co-operation. Lord Turner and de 
Larosière both stressed the importance of good regulation on a global scale in their reports 
(Turner 2009, De Larosiere 2009). After all, Mervyn King said that global banks are ‘global 
in life but national in death’ (King (2009) cited in Turner 2009). Effective global financial 
regulation starts at home. Until the UK government has fully learnt and implemented the 
changes, the question of the structure of the regulator is of secondary importance. The 
structure only provides the outer shell of an organisation. It requires the necessary tools, 
equipment, resources, information and co-ordination to perform properly. It is evident from 
this chapter that it is exactly these concerns that the UK regulator should address.  The 
Australian experience further supports the fact that the twin-peaks model does not resolve all 
the problems.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
“New structures do not guarantee better regulation...Any country that thinks that 
tinkering with the structure of agencies will, by itself, fix past shortcomings is doomed to 
relive its past crises” (Carmichael 2003). 
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Moving to the twin-peaks model per se will not solve the failures and weaknesses of the FSA 
and the Bank of England. Rather, the UK government must learn from the experiences of 
Northern Rock, HBOS and Australia. It needs to rectify the problems revealed in the financial 
crisis. The proximity of the Bank of England and the PRA and FPC under the twin-peaks 
model is attractive, this is of no benefit if the bodies differ in their opinions on rescuing 
banks. We do not know whether the FSA supported additional liquidity in the Northern Rock 
episode since they relied on the principle of confidentiality (House of Commons Treasury 
Committee 2008). The delay in granting liquidity support to Northern Rock seems to suggest 
that there were differences in opinion between the tripartite authorities. The new ‘twin-peaks’ 
model in the UK and the measures taken by both the PRA and FCA to date offer a glimmer 
of hope towards better regulation and supervision. The legislative framework sets out better 
communication and co-operation between the regulatory bodies. The ‘twin-peaks’ model and 
new legislation should provide better regulatory co-ordination; information sharing and avoid 
potential conflict of interests. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory structure and 
framework will work in times of crises.  
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Chapter 6- APRA v PRA: Divergence or convergence in banking supervision? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
From chapters four and five, the author demonstrated that the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) failed in its roles of prudential supervision of banks and consumer protection during 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. In this chapter, the author will focus on the development of 
the Australian regulatory and supervisory framework, then move on to analyse the risk-based 
regulatory approach adopted by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). 
Various academics (Gray 2009, Hudson 2009) have been critical about the risk-based model 
used by the FSA during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and it seems therefore appropriate 
to study the Australian model in this chapter to draw out points of interest. The chapter will 
then discuss whether there is convergence or divergence between the Australian and United 
Kingdom (UK) prudential supervisory models. 
 
6.2 Development of the Australian prudential regulatory and supervisory framework 
Section 8 of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998 sets out the statutory 
objectives of the Australian prudential supervisory system. These are: ‘financial safety and 
efficiency, competition, contestability and competitive neutrality’. These objectives are in 
relation to prudential soundness and are relatively simple in comparison to the FSA’s 
statutory objectives in the UK. The legal framework of the Financial Services Markets Act 
(FSMA ) 2000 is complicated and conflicting. In pursuing a function, the FSA must consider 
its objectives and principles as well. Under section 2(1) of the FSMA 2000, the FSA had a 
number of general functions which are subject to regulatory objectives. The Financial 
Services Act 2012 replaced the FSA with the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Bank of England. The UK regulatory structure 
has changed from a single regulator to a ‘twin-peaks’ model, where the PRA is responsible 
for micro-prudential regulation and the Bank of England (together with the Financial Policy 
Committee, are responsible for macro-prudential regulation. The FCA is responsible for 
conduct regulation as well as being the micro-prudential regulator for other financial services 
firms. The functions of the FSA include making rules, preparing and issuing codes, give 
general guidance and determine general policy and principles by reference to its functions 
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(section 2(4) FSMA 2000). Underpinning these functions are the regulatory objectives of: 
market confidence; public awareness (which was later moved by the Financial Services Act 
2010 from an objective to section 2(3)(h) as a principle); consumer protection and reduction 
of financial crime (section 2(2) FSMA 2000). The Financial Services Act 2010 inserted a 
new regulatory objective of financial stability as section 2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000. Finally, in 
discharging its objectives and functions, the FSA must pay attention to the principles stated in 
section 2(3) such as using its resources in the most efficient way; facilitating financial 
innovation and competition. The APRA hasthree main types of powers: authorisation or 
licensing powers; supervision and monitoring powers and powers to help financial distressed 
banks to protect depositors (Cooper 2006) . The FSA on the other hand, has greater powers 
under sections 138-176 FSMA 2000. In particular, the FSA has rule-making and investigative 
powers. Such powers include the ability to make rules regarding price stability, money-
laundering and financial promotion (sections 144-147 FSMA 2000). The FSA can ask 
authorised bodies for information which might be relevant to the financial stability of the UK 
system and appoint investigators to carry out relevant investigations (sections 165-168 FSMA 
2000). The statutory objectives in the FSMA 2000 are also wider. The legal framework in the 
UK is used to ‘set the strategic direction of the regulator, not just to allocate supervisory 
resources’ (Black 2004). In comparison, the Australian legal framework is restricted to 
allocating supervisory resources and limited degrees of formulating a supervisory strategy. 
The Banking Act 1945  is the first piece of legislation to support prudential supervision of 
banks in Australia and restrictss Australian central bank’s regulation to banks only (Thomson 
and Abbott 2000). Division 2 section 11 of the 1945 Banking Act states that the Australian 
central bank should take control of any bank which could not meet its obligations, thus 
protecting depositors (Thomson and Abbott 2000). Section 12 of the 1945 Banking Act also 
gave the central bank the power to obtain the requisite information from banks that they can 
meet the claims of depositors. If a bank is unable to meet such claims, the Australian central 
bank could, under section 13 of the 1945 Banking Act, appoint an officer to run the bank. The 
Banking Act of 1959 further consolidated the importance of protecting depositors. Financial 
stability and the aim of protecting depositors are clearly outlined in section 12 of the 1959 
Banking Act. Sections 13A of the 1959 Banking Act imposes penalties on banks if they 
cannot meet their obligations such as providing information to the central bank. The period of 
1945-1981 was one of relative financial stability as there was only one bank failure in 
Australia. The Bank of Adelaide’s demise in 1979 was due to the insolvency of its wholly 
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owned subsidiary, the Finance Corporation of Australia. The Finance Corporation of 
Australia managed to amass debts greater than the entire capital of the Bank of Adelaide 
(Thomson and Abbott 2000, Sykes 1998). In the end, the Bank of Adelaide took over ANZ 
Bank.  
Prior to World War Two, Australia’s banking system was largely unregulated (Thomson and 
Abbott 2000). Deregulation prevailed in the period of 1950-1980s. Australia witnessed rapid 
economic growth and its financial sector metamorphosed into a multi-faceted and more 
complicated sector. In light of these developments, Hogan and Sharpe (1990) submit that 
financial stability, rather than depositor protection, should be the primary aim of prudential 
regulation and supervision especially when the market became more competitive. It can be 
argued that subsequent pieces of legislation such as the Reserve Bank Act 1959, the Payment 
Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 and the Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998 promoted 
financial stability. Section 10A of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 established the Payments 
System Board within the Reserve Bank of Australia to ensure that the financial system runs 
safely and efficiently. In particular, section 10(B)(3) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959, which is 
known as the ‘Charter’ of the Payments System Board states that: 
 ‘It is the duty of the Payments System Board to ensure, within the limits of its powers, that:  
the Bank’s payments system policy is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of 
Australia; and the powers of the Bank under the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 and 
the Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998 are exercised in a way that, in the Board's 
opinion, will best contribute to:  
controlling risk in the financial system;  
promoting the efficiency of payments system; and  
promoting competition in the market for payment services, consistent with the overall 
stability of the financial system; and the powers and functions of the Bank under Part 7.3 of 
the Corporations Act 2001 are exercised in a way that, in the Board's opinion, will best 
contribute to the overall stability of the financial system.’ 
It is thus clear from section 10(B)(3) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 gives the Payments 
System Board powers which should be exercised to promote financial stability. The Payment 
Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 and the Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998 n 1998 gave 
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the Reserve Bank further powers in payment systems (Group 30 2008). The twin-peaks 
model was established on 1 July 1998 under the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
Act 1998 after the recommendation of the Wallis Inquiry in 1997 (Financial System Inquiry 
Final Report 1997). Under the ‘twin-peaks’ model, the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) is the micro-prudential regulator of financial institutions. The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is the regulator for consumer protection (Hill 
2012). Chapter five of the Wallis Inquiry provides the regulatory principles which guide the 
Australian prudential supervisory regime. The principles are: competitive neutrality; cost 
effectiveness; transparency; flexibility and accountability. Competitive neutrality means that 
no financial institution in Australia is at an advantage or disadvantage. It has been argued that 
prudential supervision based on the financial products rather than the institutions is more 
effective, efficient and provides a level-playing field (Hogan and Sharpe 1990). Cost 
effectiveness requires minimal state intervention unless there is a reason for increased 
participation from the state. It also tries to avoid duplicates and overlaps of responsibilities 
amongst the regulators. Under the principle of transparency, it is important that all 
communication, promises and duties of the regulators, the regulated and buyers of financial 
products and services. Since the financial market evolves with time and technological 
developments, flexibility is key to the Australian financial regulatory regime. Finally, the 
principle of accountability demands that the Australian regulators to be appropriately 
equipped with skilled staff; that the regulators are answerable to stakeholders and subject to 
regular reviews.  
The five regulatory principles are important in shaping the Australian regulatory model. The 
Wallis Inquiry decided that the main purpose of financial regulation is to counteract market 
failure. Markets become inefficient for four main reasons: anti-competitive behaviour; market 
misconduct; information asymmetry and systemic instability (Carmichael 2004). Having 
carefully considered these reasons, the Wallis Inquiry decided that having four separate 
regulatory agencies is most suitable for Australian banking regulation. Each of these four 
regulators is responsible for dealing with one source of market failure. The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is responsible for competition (Hill 2012). 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is responsible for overseeing systemic stability (Hill 
2012).  APRA became the sole prudential regulator of financial institutions, having taken 
control from eleven state regulators (Thomson and Abbott 2000). Other pieces of legislation 
governing APRA include the Insurance Act 1973 and the Life Insurance Act 1995 conferred 
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the duty on APRA to protect insurance policyholders. The Insurance Act 1973 was later 
amended by the General Insurance Reform Act 2001, which provided more flexibility in 
setting tougher standards on capital adequacy and risk management. APRA also became 
responsible for registering financial corporations under the Financial Sector (Collection of 
Data) Act 2001. Financial corporations encompass a wide group of organisations such as 
finance companies and money market corporations (Group 30 2008). However, the APRA 
does not have the power to supervise the activities of the financial corporations. The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC), which is the fourth regulatory agency. It looks after 
business conduct and consumer protection and regulation of financial products. Provision of 
financial services was consolidated under the Financial Services Reform Act 2001. The 2001 
Act also provided ASIC and APRA to issue standards and guidance. APRA can issue 
Prudential Standards and Prudential Practice Guides. The former sets out regulatory standards 
for the regulated and the latter provides guidance for the relevant organisations. APRA can 
also issue a ‘direction’ to licensed institutions demanding them to comply with Prudential 
Standards and/or Prudential Practice Guides. Meanwhile, ASIC produces guidance notes, 
approves codes of conduct and interprets the laws (Thomson and Abbott 2000, Thomson and 
Abbott 2001).  
Australian banks are subject to money-laundering and financial crime legislation as well. The 
Financial Transaction Reports Act 1998 set up the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre, which had responsibility for preventing money-laundering and other 
financial crimes. The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 
repealed the 1998 Act and adopted a risk- based regulatory style (Sathye and Islam 2011, 
Ross and Hannan 2007, Geary 2009). This means that banks will conduct a risk analysis of 
the probability of the client committing a financial crime and adjust their services 
accordingly. Risk-based regulation has been criticised in the UK by various academics (Gray 
2009, Hudson 2009, Morris and Shin 2008) so it is pertinent to consider the risk-based 
regulatory style in Australia. 
 
6.3 Risk-based financial regulation in Australia 
Risk-based financial regulation involves developing a regulatory framework which deals with  
regulatory or institutional risks contravening the regulator’s objectives (Black 2004). The 
131 
 
Australian experience and use of risk-based financial regulation offer an interesting case 
study to the UK. It is somewhat ironic that the UK are now learning from the success of the 
Australian’s response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 when the Australians studied and 
adopted parts of the UK financial regulatory framework in 2001. The aim of this section is to 
examine in depth the Australian prudential regulatory structure and methodology. The twin-
peaks model in Australia was not an initial success. It had its own teething problems. 
However, the important lesson is that the Australians learnt from previous mistakes, made 
changes and learnt from other common law jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States 
and the United Kingdom. The Australian regulatory framework is by no means perfect. 
Nevertheless, the aim of prudential regulation is not to prevent total financial disasters since 
this is impossible. ‘Zero-failure’ regulatory policy is not part of the Australian regulatory 
philosophy (Black 2006, Cooper 2006). Regulating human behaviour is an extremely difficult 
task and no amount of legislation or regulation will provide an absolute water-tight system 
due to regulatory arbitrage by the perpetrator. Rather, the rationale of the Australian 
regulatory regime is to minimise the impact of any potential financial crisis. Initially, the risk 
management model did not work well. APRA was divided into three sections in 1999: the 
Diversified Institutions Division (DID), which was responsible for complicated groups; the 
Specialised Institutions Division (SID), which was responsible for the remaining firms and 
the Policy, Research and Consulting Division (PRC), which was in charge of developing 
policy and providing specialist consulting services to the DID and SID supervisory teams 
(Black 2004).  In the same year, the DID and SID both developed their own risk-based 
supervisory frameworks (Black 2006). The rationale for this integrated risk model is to have 
a consistent, functional regulatory framework within APRA which could deal with the 
increasingly complex financial world efficiently and without overlaps. Whilst this is 
commendable and well-intentioned in theory, problems surfaced in practice. The DID and 
SID pursued completely different methodologies and risk-based supervisory models. The risk 
categories and the supervisory responses used between the DID and SID were dissimilar. The 
DID used eight different headings in assessing the risk ranking of an organisation. The SID 
had fifteen separate risks, although the types of risks were similar to the DID. With the 
supervisory responses however, the DID preferred high level meetings of one or two hours 
and site visits were rare. With the SID, there was a wider range of supervisory response and 
greater use of on-site visits, as well as scrutiny of internal documents (Black 2004).  The 
divergent and inconsistent supervisory styles of the DID and SID defeated the original 
philosophy of a single integrated supervisory regime. Indeed, both the HIH Royal 
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Commission (HIH Royal Commission 2003) and the Palmer Report (Palmer 2002) criticised 
APRA’s supervisory style. The Palmer Report was written by the lawyers of APRA as part of 
the evidence they submitted to the HIH Royal Commission. The collapse of HIH Insurance in 
2001 highlighted weaknesses of APRA: ‘the manner in which APRA exercised its powers 
and discharged its responsibilities under the Insurance Act fell short of that which the 
community was entitled to expect from the prudential regulator of the insurance industry’ 
(HIH Royal Commission 2003). APRA’s failed in that it relied too much on HIH’s solvency 
position and did not conduct an independent inquiry when it realised that HIH’s annual 
returns were late. HIH engaged in improper accounting practice by allowing inter-company 
loans to be counted as assets for solvency reasons. APRA ignored warnings that HIH was in 
financial trouble in 1999 and 2000. In September 2000, APRA assessed HIH to be a ‘high 
risk’ but did not take further action (Rankin 2003). More importantly, both the HIH Royal 
Commission and the Palmer Report criticised DID’s risk-based supervisory model on several 
grounds. First, the DID placed too much faith on the regulated institutions and assumed 
(wrongly) that minimal supervision was required due to the institutions having the requisite 
internal controls and systems (Palmer 2002, HIH Royal Commission 2003). Secondly, the 
supervisory style was inadequate, too conceptual and too passive. DID was unable to give 
useful, practical, tailored advice to officers of the regulated institutions (Palmer 2002, HIH 
Royal Commission 2003).  Thirdly, the DID was sometimes careless in filing statutory 
returns and failed to provide guidance to senior members of staff (Palmer 2002, HIH Royal 
Commission 2003). Fourthly, the DID’s methodology was flawed in that it did not pay 
sufficient attention to the opinions of specialist experts in APRA and did not provide an 
internal dispute resolution mechanism (Palmer 2002, HIH Royal Commission 2003). The 
DID failed to critically analyse the information they received (Black 2004). 
 
6.4 A new Australian risk-based framework 
The above criticisms acted as triggers for change in APRA’s supervisory style. It moved 
away from a consultative and passive stance to a more interventionist and proactive 
supervisory style. It also realised that it was important to have skilled staff with the relevant 
training to deal with prudential supervision, especially those of high risk institutions. APRA 
thus adopted a single, integrated risk-based framework, having carefully considered the risk 
models of the US, Canada and the UK.  The US uses a CAMELS risk framework, which 
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stands for Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market 
risk. Each element is given a rating of 1-5 with 1 being the best. The average rating of the six 
elements is called the composite rating. Banks with an average rating of 5 are of greatest 
supervisory concern (Coleman 2008). The Supervisory Framework assesses inherent risks of 
significant activities carried out by banks in Canada. Inherent risks can be divided into six 
different types: credit risk; market risk; insurance risk; operational risk; regulatory 
compliance risk; and strategic risk. Each risk is given a level: low, moderate, above average, 
or high. The level of risk will then influence how much control and supervision the 
supervisor has over a bank (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 2010). The 
ARROW II risk framework in the UK is more detailed than the US or Canadian framework in 
that it divides risks into 52 elements and 10 risks groups. Each risk is given a level: low, 
medium low, medium high and high. Banks with medium high and high levels are visited 
regularly by the supervisor (Petch 2011). 
APRA’s new risk-based supervisory model consists of PAIRS and SOARS. PAIRS stands for 
the Probability and Impact Ratings System and SOARS stands for the Supervisory Oversight 
and Response System. PAIRS and SOARS were influenced by the Canadian financial 
regulator, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and the UK financial 
regulator, the FSA Yet, APRA created its own risk-based model and there are three main 
differences between APRA’s model and the OSFI’s model.  First, PAIRS is more radical than 
the Canadian model because the former goes further and links the concept of ‘overall risk of 
failure’ with APRA’s statutory objectives (Black 2004). Secondly, PAIRS produces an 
overall rating of risks by relying on a formal system of weighted risk assessments (Black 
2004). Finally, influenced by the UK risk-based model, APRA incorporated the requirement 
of an impact assessment (Black 2004, Laker 2007). It considers the overall economic 
consequence if a regulated institution fails. 
The overriding principle of PAIRS is to provide a rating for the likelihood of a regulated 
institution being unable to meet its financial obligations and the implications of the 
institutions’ failure on the overall economic system. The higher the rating, the more resources 
APRA needs to allocate to supervise the organisation. To arrive at a rating, the two-staged 
formula below is used: 
Inherent risk – Management and control = Net Risk 
Net risk – Capital support = Overall risk of failure 
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Inherent risks are risks to an organisation’s financial position arising from the daily operation 
of the business. There are eight inherent risks: credit risk; balance sheet and market risk; 
insurance risk; operational risk; liquidity risk; legal and regulatory risk; strategic risk and 
contagion risk (Black 2004, Coleman 2008). These risks are assessed using a range of data 
collected from site visits; rating agencies; auditors’ reports and information from whistle-
blowers. A rating of 0-4 is then given to inherent risks. The firm’s rating is then compared to 
other similar organisations in the same field. It is then weighted and aggregated to give an 
overall rating. An organisation’s management and controls are examined and rated to see how 
well they cope with inherent risks. There are six elements of management and control: 
operational management; the board of directors/trustees; senior management; management 
information systems/financial control; risk management; compliance and independent review. 
Each element is given a rating of 0-4, which is then compared to industry comparables. 
Again, each element is weighted and aggregated. Once the net risk is calculated, the 
organisation’s capital level is assessed. Capital acts as a buffer to externalities and absorbs 
financial losses. Weightings are given to three categories: 50% to current balance sheet 
amount and quality of capital; 25% to earnings strength and 25% to access to new capital 
(Black 2004, Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 2013b).  
The overall risk of failure is calculated using an exponential relationship between the risk 
score and probability rating. A risk rating of one leads to a probability rating of four that an 
organisation will fail. Similarly, a rating of four leads to a probability rating of 256 (4
4
 = 256) 
that an organisation will fail. The exponential nature reflects the underlying philosophy of 
Australian prudential supervision since the magnifying effect of this exponential relationship 
highlights the urgency of the issue and a suitable supervisory response. This in turn leads to a 
more proactive and intrusive form of supervision, which was the recommendation of the HIH 
Royal Commission (HIH Royal Commission 2003) and the Palmer Report (Palmer 2002). 
The final stage of the risk assessment is to compare APRA’s rating with external reports from 
ratings agencies and media sources. An interesting element of PAIRS is the impact 
assessment, since this originates from the FSA in the UK. The impact assessment aims to 
measure the overall financial costs on the economic system if an organisation collapses. The 
assessment considers both direct costs to consumers and indirect costs due to systemic risks 
across the financial system (Black 2004). The impact is rated one of the following: extreme, 
high, medium or low. The impact assessment is important because it shapes the supervisory 
relationship with the organisation and the amount of resources that is required to supervise 
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the risks. A potential problem with risk-based regulation is that too much emphasis is paid to 
detecting the risks than rectifying them. The impact assessment is therefore crucial to link the 
diagnosis of the problem with the supervisory response. 
SOARS constitutes a supervisory attention index and a supervisory stance. The index 
indicates how much resources an organisation needs to reduce the risks identified by PAIRS. 
The supervisory stance is APRA’s response to dealing with the overall risk of failure of an 
organisation and is divided into four levels: normal, oversight, mandated improvement and 
restructure. Organisations with a ‘normal’ SOARS stance require basic supervisory measures 
such as onsite visits and filing the requisite documents. An index of ‘oversight’ requires 
closer supervision by APRA. This involves more onsite visits, reporting requirements; 
independent auditors’ reports and possibly raising the capital level. Organisations with the 
index ‘mandated improvement’ will need to increase their capital level and respond with a 
specific list of actions within 90 days to APRA. The index label of ‘restructure’ is the most 
serious form of supervisory response. APRA will advise the organisation to merge or sell the 
business. It will also require the organisation to protect itself from further losses such as 
increasing its capital level or removing a member of senior management (Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority 2013b, Coleman 2008). 
PAIRS and SOARS have improved the organisational and cultural dimensions of Australian 
prudential regulation and supervision. From an organisational perspective, PAIRS and 
SOARS provided a more coherent and unified risk-based model. Although SID and DID still 
co-exist, there is more consistency and better resource allocation. Resources are spent more 
on larger, high impact firms which are under the watchful eye of DID. PAIRS and SOARS 
involved staff from specialist units and enabled senior management to supervise staff, thus 
improving the internal culture and support systems. Supervisors had to develop new skills to 
understand and use PAIRS and SOARS. The regulatory and supervisory style has swung 
from a co-operative, passive approach to a more proactive and interventionist style. Officials 
at APRA are there to identify risks and provide solutions, not to sit back and be nice to the 
regulated organisations. Since PAIRS and SOARS have been implemented, APRA became  
more proactive, intervened earlier and the number of onsite visits increased by 20% (Black 
2004, Parliament of Australia Department of Parliamentary Services 2005). The proactive 
supervisory style has led APRA to using a wider interpretation of its statutory powers under 
section 8 of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998. In the HIH Royal 
Commission report, APRA submitted that it felt that it could only use its formal legal powers 
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unless an organisation is on the verge of financial failure. Since PAIRS and SOARS have 
been used, APRA has adopted a more robust and wider interpretation of statutes. A senior 
official of APRA said: ‘You could have a literal reading of the legislation that says unless it’s 
more likely than not that an institution will not be able to pay beneficiaries we can’t 
intervene, but that would be ridiculous—it’s the ultimate in javelin catching. We’ve moved 
from a 50-50 risk of failure to a 97%. I cannot really see someone taking us to court as to 
whether there has been a 50-50 risk or whether it can be lower’ (Black 2004). It has acted as a 
sword to a broader style of interpreting the law. Finally, the risk-based model of PAIRS and 
SOARS provide a useful shield to the criticisms against APRA for rogue trading in National 
Australia Bank in 2004. This incident led to a loss of around $360 million Australian dollars. 
APRA was able to defend its position by explaining that it used a consistent, logical risk-
based model in deciding which organisations are high risks and therefore more resources 
were allocated to such organisations.  
 
6.5 APRA's Framework for Prudential Supervision 
Having examined the Australian risk-based model at a micro level, it is appropriate to analyse 
the wider Australian prudential supervisory framework at a macro level. APRA's mission is 
to 'establish and enforce prudential standards and practices designed to ensure that, under all 
reasonable circumstances, financial promises made by the institutions APRA supervises are 
met within a stable, efficient and competitive financial system' (Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority 2013b). This mission statement underpins the principle that the boards 
of directors of the regulated organisations are ultimately responsible for their financial 
failures. APRA uses a risk-based, principles-based and outcomes-focussed style of 
regulation. Such a combination means that APRA can allocate resources effectively to high 
risks organisations and concentrate on the end results and tailored outcomes rather than the 
processes used. The unique regulatory style is an affirmation of APRA’s values. APRA's 
Framework for Prudential Supervision contains five important values: foresight, 
accountability, collaboration, integrity and professionalism (Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority 2013b). In pursuing these values, APRA is committed to provide consistent, high-
quality supervision in a fair and balanced manner.  
There are three principal stages of prudential supervision in Australia. They are: licensing, 
ongoing supervision and enforcement (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 2013b). 
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The first stage of licensing ensures that potential organisations can meet the prudential 
standards as well as having the ability to operate in Australia. Licensing is a robust process 
where APRA’s supervisory and risk specialists review applications from potential 
organisations. APRA tries to achieve consistency in its licensing process by setting up a 
cross-divisional licensing committee. Ongoing supervision takes up most of APRA’s time 
because APRA monitors the regulated organisations in the long-term to ensure that they are 
financially viable. PAIRS and SOARS provide APRA with a good set of risk analysis and 
supervisory response. As soon as APRA identifies the risks, it will act and provide 
appropriate supervisory solutions. APRA only uses enforcement measures when a regulated 
organisation encounters serious financial problems. If APRA issues an enforcement measure, 
the regulated organisation will either try to carry on trading under the ongoing supervision of 
APRA or if the financial problems are too grave, then APRA will supervise the winding-up 
of the regulated organisation (Coleman 2008). 
APRA’s framework for prudential supervision is guided by three principles: flexibility; 
efficiency and effectiveness. APRA as the financial regulator has to adapt to changes in 
financial services and technology, so flexibility is important to the survival and reputation of 
the regulator. Flexibility is often combined with consistency when APRA decides whether it 
gives its approval to certain activities to be carried out by the regulated organisations. In 
addition, diagram 8 shows that APRA will construe legislation, prudential standards and 
guidance when conducting a risk assessment of the supervised organisation. APRA can make 
structural or prudential approvals. Structural changes can arise through a merger, a sale of 
business or internal restructuring. Structural changes can affect the staffing and the future 
financial viability of the business. Prudential approvals are given by APRA to supervised 
organisations in areas such as capital adequacy and operational risks.  
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Diagram 8: APRA’s Framework for Prudential Supervision (2013) 
 
The principle of efficiency is to avoid any overlaps, which was a problem for DID and SID 
within the APRA initially when there was no common language or consistent risk-based 
supervisory framework. Efficiency is one of the key words mentioned in APRA’s mission 
statement. It fits in with APRA’s regulatory style based on risks, principles and outcomes 
because high risks organisations are given more resources and supervision so that risks are 
better managed and contained. APRA’s supervisory style and framework received positive 
feedback in the APRA Stakeholder Survey 2013. The survey was distributed to 312 regulated 
organisations and contains 45 rated items. Respondents had to give a rating of 1-5, where 1 
means ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 means ‘strongly agree’. The response rate was 57.4% 
(Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 2013a). From the survey, 24/40 items had 75% 
or more positive responses. Diagram 9 shows that the best scores were given to staff’s 
attitude at APRA; the single supervisory team for group companies; communication methods; 
prudential framework and enforcement of prudential requirements. These high scores confirm 
that APRA has addressed the weaknesses of structure, staff, resources and prudential 
regulation highlighted in the HIH Royal Commission Report and the Palmer Report. It is 
encouraging to see that the APRA framework for prudential supervision is considered as 
effective in achieving its mission.  
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Diagram 9: Strengths of APRA 
Source: APRA Stakeholder Survey 2013 
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Diagram 10: Weaknesses of APRA 
Source: APRA Stakeholder Survey 2013 
 
Conversely, weaknesses of the APRA are highlighted in diagram 10. The main weaknesses 
are first, the lack of consistency in supervision. Consistency is important to achieve effective 
enforcement. Secondly, the respondents did not think that there was successful 
haramonisation of the prudential framework across the regulated industries. Finally, the cost 
of regulating the indusry seems to have been neglected by APRA. This does not pursue the 
principle of efficiency or the APRA’s regulatory style based on risks, principles and 
outcomes. With regards to the APRA prudential framework, the respondents in general, 
believed that PAIRS provided a good reflection of their organisation’s risk profile. This 
criterion achieved a mean average of 3.8. With supervision, the respondents provided good 
scores for the risk-based and forward-looking supervisory approach. However, some 
respondents felt that APRA was more prescriptive than relying on principles in their 
supervision. A comparison between the results of 2011 and 2013 illustrate that APRA should 
focus on the following areas: improvements to a single supervisory team for group 
companies; more on principles than on prescription; better harmonisation of prudential 
standards across the regulated industries and be cost-effective (Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority 2013a). Diagram 11 illustrates these points: 
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Diagram 11: Comparison of APRA stakeholder results between 2011 and 2013 
Source: APRA Stakeholder Survey (2013) 
 
Overall, it is submitted that APRA has made significant improvements to its regulatory and 
supervisory structure as well as framework. The generally positive results from the APRA 
Stakeholder Survey 2013 confirms that APRA is doing its job and is well-received by the 
regulated organisations. APRA is able to identify risks and its PAIRS model has been 
identified as generally accurate. APRA’s supervisory responses are well supported by its 
single supervisory team, although APRA can focus more on principles than prescription. The 
eternal conundrum of balancing costs with effective regulation and supervision remains to be 
solved by APRA. Many respondents mentioned that the implementation of Basel III created 
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additional costs on banks to comply with such regulation (Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority 2013a). Banks argue that increasing capital levels also add to additional 
compliance costs. However, Admati et al submits that bank equity is not expensive. This is 
because banks, which are better capitalised, have fewer incentives to take excessive risks and 
are less affected by distortions created by ‘debt overhang’ (Admati et al. 2010). ‘Debt 
overhang’ refers to the condition that banks have so much debt that they have to decline 
further debt even though it may be profitable enough to decrease its overall indebtedness. 
Admati et al (2010) also argued that ‘better capitalised banks suffer fewer distortions in 
lending decisions and would perform better’. Yet, looking at the UK banking scene of 2013 
provides some clues of the impact of regulation. Increasing the amount of liquidity and 
capital of banks make lending to business more expensive, since banks have to increase the 
amount of assets to hold against the loans. This is particularly difficult for smaller banks, 
where the Co-operative Bank had to stop lending to businesses and Nationwide are delaying 
business lending until 2016 (Ahmed 2013) It has been suggested that to reduce lending costs, 
banks should increase contestability and search for alternative financing models (Ahmed 
2013). Contestability involves measures such as making it easier for customers to change 
accounts whilst alternative funding models include peer-to-peer lending. This will be 
analysed in greater detail in Chapter seven. 
 
6.6 Divergence or convergence between the UK and Australian prudential supervisory 
models? 
It is argued that there is gradual convergence between the UK and Australian prudential 
supervisory models although there are still some differences between the two models. Under 
the UK twin-peaks model, the PRA is responsible for micro-prudential regulation and 
supervision of financial organisations. It derives its responsibilities and powers from section 
2 of the FSMA 2000. The Financial Services Act 2010 inserted a new regulatory objective of 
financial stability as section 2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000. European legislation such as the Capital 
Requirements Directive (Council Directive 2006/48/EC), the Financial Conglomerates 
Directive (Council Directive 2002/87/EC), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(Council Directive 2004/39/EC) and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (1994/21/EC) 
also provide powers to the PRA.  As mentioned in the introduction, in pursuing a function, 
the PRA must consider its objectives and principles as well. Under section 2(1) of the FSMA 
143 
 
2000, the FSA has a number of general functions which are subject to regulatory objectives. 
The functions of the FSA include making rules, preparing and issuing codes, give general 
guidance and determine general policy and principles by reference to its functions (section 
2(4) FSMA 2000).  
Underpinning these functions are the regulatory objectives of: market confidence; public 
awareness (which was later moved by the Financial Services Act 2010 from an objective to 
section 2(3)(h) as a principle); consumer protection and reduction of financial crime (section 
2(2) FSMA 2000). The Financial Services Act 2010 inserted a new regulatory objective of 
financial stability as section 2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000. Finally, in discharging its objectives and 
functions, the PRA must pay attention to the principles stated in section 2(3) such as using its 
resources in the most efficient way; facilitating financial innovation and competition. 
Although both the Australian and UK statutes highlight the importance of financial stability, 
Australian legislation is simpler.  
Both regulators reject a ‘zero-failure’ regulatory policy. The PRA shares the APRA’s opinion 
that it is impossible to prevent all bank failures. Therefore, with the Special Resolution 
Regime contained in the Banking Act 2009 (Campbell et al. 2009), the PRA’s role is to 
minimise the systemic effect of any bank failure. Further, there are costs attached to clearing 
up a bank failure. The PRA believes that all firms should have a minimum level of resilience 
against failure (Bank of England 2013b). Early intervention by the PRA should prevent 
potential problems aggravating. Threshold conditions are designed to impose minimum 
requirements for all firms before they can carry out regulatory activities. The threshold 
conditions include requirements on the legal status of the organisations; business conduct and 
effective supervision.  
The PRA’s supervisory style is based on judgement; risks; forward-looking and early 
intervention. This is very similar to APRA’s. PRA’s risk assessment framework and its 
supervisory responses based on the Proactive Intervention Framework deserve closer 
analysis. PRA adopts a forward-looking approach, taking into account three factors: the 
likelihood of firm failure, the impact of firm failure on the stability of the system, and the 
possibility of an orderly resolution. Diagram 12 shows the factors taken into account when 
assessing gross risks. First, the PRA considers the potential impact of firm failure on the 
overall economy both whilst the firm is trading and when it fails. External risks and factors 
surrounding a firm are also taken into account. Since the Financial Policy Committee and the 
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Bank of England are responsible for macro-prudential regulation, their views on external 
risks will be consulted. Business risks are assessed at the level of the sector or of the firm, as 
appropriate, taking into account peer analysis (Allen & Overy 2013). A firm’s risk profile 
may be mitigated by factors such as governance measures, internal controls; financial 
strenghts in capital and liquidity and an orderly resolution of the firm. 
 
Diagram 12: Prudential Regulatory Authority’s Risk Assessment Framework 
Source: Bank of England (2013) 
 
The PRA’s supervisory approach is set out in the Proactive Intervention Framework. The 
PRA aims to intervene early when an organisation is financially in trouble. It forms its own 
judgement regarding a suitable supervisory response based on which stage an organisation is 
in. The Proactive Intervention Framework has five stages. Stage 1 is a low risk and a suitable 
response would be the usual supervisory risk assessments. As the stages increase, the 
corresponding supervisory actions increase in intensity. At stage 4, there is an imminent risk 
to the financial viability of an organisation. The PRA believes that such an organisation is 
unlikely to meet the Threshold Conditions. Suitable responses include increasing capital and 
liquidity levels, as well as an asset disposal. Organisations at stage five will be wounded up. 
One significant difference between the UK and Australian supervisory frameworks is that 
plans for resolving an organisation is possible as early as stage 1 in the UK. This emphasises 
the importance of early intervention in the UK supervisory framework. The Australian 
SOARS approach does not accommodate this. It also has four stages instead of five. 
The PRA realised from the failures of the FSA that staffing is vital to the success of an 
organisation. Therefore, the PRA has recruited more staff and placed more staff on frontline 
supervision. Senior staff are supervising high risk organisations, thus reflecting its principle 
145 
 
of minimising the effect of financial failures. There is convergence in relation to staffing and 
resources for both regulators. 
Setting policies is one of PRA’s powers within its regulatory framework. It publishes policies 
in line with its objectives so that senior management at regulated organisations can use them 
as guidance. As financial safety is the overriding principle of the PRA, regulated 
organisations are expected to follow the PRA’s policy and guidance. In practice, this power 
of setting of policies and the vertical integration of regulators at European level means that it 
is unlikely that the PRA will exercise its powers to set policies very often. A great deal of 
policy is coded at European level already. Therefore, the fact that APRA does not have wide 
policy setting powers might not make a real difference in practice. 
Since the twin-peaks model has only been implemented for approximately nine months at the 
time of writing, there is no PRA survey available on its regulatory and supervisory 
performances. However, BDO and DLA Piper conducted a survey in mid 2012 amongst 350 
executive directors in the financial industry. The survey asked for their concerns and 
priorities in relation to the ‘twin-peaks’ model. 79% of the respondents believe that the ‘twin-
peaks’ model will improve the effectiveness of the UK regulatory system (BDO and DLA 
Piper 2012) This is positive news but the respondents are concerned about certain issues once 
the ‘twin-peaks’ model has been implemented. The results revealed that the top concerns of 
respondents are: consumer protection; existing legislation; clarity of objectives and overlaps 
as well as increased costs. This is understandable when changes occur and therefore the PRA 
and FCA should ensure that they provide clear and helpful guidance to the regulated 
organisations during the first 12-24 months of the new regulatory regime. Amongst banks and 
building societies, 98% of respondents are concerned about increased competition in the 
industry due to the Vickers’ Report on retail ring-fencing. 96% of respondents are worried by 
the increased focus by the PRA/FCA on a firm’s culture (BDO and DLA Piper 2012). 
Finally, 88% of respondents in the banking industry are concerned by the PRA’s use of 
judgement-based regulation. These survey results are interesting in shaping the PRA’s 
regulatory and supervisory style.  
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6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the development of legislation on Australian prudential regulation, 
where the author analysed the Australian risk-based style and methodology, PAIRS, and 
supervisory model, SOARS. This was then compared to the UK’s prudential supervisory 
framework. The author then focused on APRA’s risk framework and reviewed APRA’s 
stakeholder survey 2013. There are clear indications that the UK’s PRA is following the 
Australian’s supervisory style based on risks, judgement and principles. However, there are 
differences within the two regulatory systems. The UK legislative framework is more 
complex than the Australian framework. Further, the PRA has policy setting powers although 
the vertical integration of financial regulation at European level may suggest that the PRA is 
unlikely to exercise this power very often. APRA on the other hand, does not have such wide 
policy setting powers. The risk frameworks between the two countries are similar, although 
the author submits that the UK Risk Assessment Framework takes more mitigating factors 
into account. Its Proactive Intervention Framework has five stages and early intervention is 
clearly a priority for the PRA, since it can start planning for resolution of an organisation 
even at stage 1. This is in contrast to the Australian SOARS methodology, where there are 
only four stages and resolution of an organisation takes place in the later stages. Nevertheless, 
both countries believe that bank failures will happen in a market economy and therefore a 
‘zero-failure’ policy is not adopted. Rather, APRA and PRA are concerned with minimising 
the potential impact and systemic risks of a bank failure. Financial stability, safety and 
soundness of the banking industry are both statutory objectives of the two regulators. The 
APRA Stakeholder Survey 2013 and the UK survey conducted by BDO and DLA Piper in 
2012 regarding the concerns of respondents when the ‘twin-peaks’ model is implemented are 
interesting. Key lessons from APRA’s regulatory and supervisory approach include 
improving consistency in its supervision; focus more on principles than on prescription and 
reduce regulatory costs. Areas of potential issues raised by the implementation of the ‘twin-
peaks’ model include increased competition in the financial industry; increased focus on the 
culture of a firm; increased regulatory costs; potential overlaps in regulation, protecting 
consumers and reducing the complexity of legislation. The next chapter will examine the 
lessons from Australia’s experience of the ‘twin-peaks’ model. 
  
147 
 
Chapter Seven 
Financial stability requires hedgehogs and foxes 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Archilochus first introduced the Greek proverb of ‘the fox knows many things but the 
hedgehog knows one big thing’ (πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα). Berlin wrote a 
philosophical essay entitled ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox’. The author first encountered 
Archilochus’s proverb in intellectual property law, where Lord Hoffman in Designers Guild v 
Russell Williams [2001] 1 All ER 700 said that: ‘Originality, in the sense of contribution of 
the author’s skill and labour, tends to lie in the detail with which the basic idea is presented. 
Copyright protects foxes than hedgehogs.’ It endorses the legal principle that copyright 
protects expressions of ideas and not ideas. Archilochus’s proverb has since been interpreted 
by the legal scholar Dworkin, where he has written a book called Justice for Hedgehogs in 
2011. In financial regulation, the author believes that this proverb is suitable and applicable. 
Haldane and Madouros (2012) opined that: ‘historically, financial supervision has been long 
foxes and short hedgehogs’. Haldane’s metaphor refers to the fact that a crisis cycle lasts 
longer than the usual experiences of risk managers and bank supervisors. Therefore, foxes 
refer to the crisis cycle and hedgehogs refer to the expertise of relevant staff. It is therefore 
important to have experienced staff to supervise well and detect problems early.  
Drawing upon the Australian experience of the ‘twin-peaks’ model, the author will submit in 
this chapter that first, both hedgehogs are foxes are needed for the regulatory approach and 
structure of the United Kingdom (UK) ‘twin-peaks’ model. Regulating finance is a complex 
matter. This is particularly the case with UK banks where the reliance on securitisation and 
complex products is heavier than in Australia. The functional approach to banking regulation 
was used by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in regulating financial institutions in the 
UK. The single regulatory structure was argued to be better suited to deal with ‘functional 
despecialisation’ of financial products (Abrams and Taylor 2000, Borio and Filosa 1994). 
Conversely, Australia adopted an institutional approach to financial regulation due to its 
reliance on deposits. The ‘twin-peaks’ model has worked well in Australia since 1998 despite 
some initial teething problems. With the new ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK, there are two 
problems. First, the new institutional regulatory approach of the UK ‘twin-peaks’ model is 
unsuitable for the funding model of UK banks. Either UK banks change their funding models 
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and rely more on intermediation than securitisation or the ‘twin-peaks’ model has to change. 
Secondly, there is a danger that the Bank of England, which is responsible for macro-
prudential regulation alongside the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), may become too 
powerful. The introduction of judgement-based supervision might also provide the Bank of 
England with too much power. The author will show that the structure of the Bank of 
England, FPC and PRA is similar to the German regulatory model. The UK ‘twin-peaks’ 
model is thus a hybrid of the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model and the German regulatory 
model. Further, the issue of regulatory capture will be discussed. To avoid total dominance 
by the Bank of England, there needs to be open and clear communication between the Bank 
of England, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
HM Treasury and the general public. Good information flow (foxes in the guise of details) is 
crucial to maintain a strong regulatory model. Legislation is also a good way to reduce the 
exercise of judgement by the regulator through prescriptive measures. 
 
7.2 Hedgehogs and foxes for financial regulation 
7.2.1 Institutional approach to financial regulation and the UK ‘twin-peaks’ model 
It is submitted that there is currently a mismatch between the financial regulatory approach 
and the regulatory structure of the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK. The functional approach to 
banking regulation was used by the FSA in regulating financial institutions in the UK due to 
the reliance on securitisation by UK banks. The single regulatory structure was argued to be 
better suited to deal with ‘functional despecialisation’ of financial products (Abrams and 
Taylor 2000, Borio and Filosa 1994). As ‘functional despecialisation’ of financial products 
became more popular in the 1990s, the question was whether the Central Bank has the 
competence to supervise ‘shadow banks’ as well as commercial banks or transfer supervisory 
authority to the FSA. Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the latter was preferred as 
Central Banks had little experience in dealing with ‘shadow banks’ and increased emphasis 
on consolidated supervision (Eichengreen and Dincer 2011). Australia adopted an 
institutional approach to financial regulation due to its reliance on deposits. The institutional 
regulatory approach of the ‘twin-peaks’ model is unsuitable for the funding model of UK 
banks. Either UK banks change their funding models and rely more on intermediation than 
securitisation or the ‘twin-peaks’ model has to change. As seen in chapter four, less than 10% 
of bank funding was from securitisation between 2006-2010 (RBA, 2010). Australian banks 
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had a more conservative and controlled approach to banking because risks were better 
monitored. Furthermore, only 18% of Australia’s housing loans were securitised 
(International Monetary Fund 2008), so Australian banks suffered less direct losses.  
The new UK ‘twin-peaks’ model adopts an institutional approach and splits micro-prudential 
regulation into deposit-takers, insurers and major investments firms on the one hand and 
other financial services on the other. The PRA is responsible for the former group and the 
FCA is responsible for the latter group. The FCA however, is also responsible for conduct 
regulation. Pauli (2000) argues that it makes sense to have two separate regulatory 
organisations to deal with prudential regulation and consumer protection since these two 
regulatory purposes are so different. Yet, the adoption of an institutional approach is 
unsuitable for the UK since the boundary between commercial and ‘shadow’ banks remains 
blurred. ‘Shadow’ banking relies primarily on structured finance and securitisation is the 
principal method of structured finance (Schwarcz 2011). Northern Rock is an example where 
a former building society changed its business model and relied increasingly on 
securitisation. Securitisation allows banks to sell loans (including corporate loans) in the 
secondary loan market. Securitisation gives greater liquidity; more borrowing capacity and 
ability to transfer risks to ultimate investors. It also allowed banks to circumvent banking 
regulations such as Basel II Accord on capital requirements (Acharya et al. 2009). Northern 
Rock obtained 40% of its funding from a Structured Investment Vehicle called Granite, 
which had £50 billion worth of mortgages (Milne and Wood 2008). Mortgages are considered 
by the Basel II Accord as low risk assets. Granite was an off-shore vehicle based in the 
Channel Islands and is thus unregulated for capital purposes (Hansard 2008). Northern Rock 
was thus under the radar for 40% of its funding. Given that London is one of the world’s 
major financial centres (Nachum 2003, Short et al. 1996), it is unlikely that it will 
permanently change its funding profile to more reliance on intermediation as this will reduce 
its ability to make profits. Goodhart provides an interesting insight into regulatory 
approaches. He reinforces the advantage of the ‘twin-peaks’ framework in that it provides 
‘clarity and responsibility’ (Goodhart 2002). According to Goodhart, systemic stability 
requires mainly macro-style (top-down) approach of regulation, with some micro-prudential 
(bottom-up) whilst consumer protection is mainly micro-prudential regulation. Having the 
Central Bank which has top-down expertise and a regulator which has bottom-up experience 
will complement each other (Goodhart 2002). By having the FPC within the Bank of 
England, ‘the government is ensuring that stability does not fall by the wayside, into the gap 
150 
 
between monetary policy at one end of the spectrum and the regulation of firms at the other’ 
(Tucker 2011). In his view, financial stability can be achieved through focusing on macro and 
micro-prudential regulatory purposes rather than an institutional approach.  
The European regulatory structure endorses the institutional regulatory approach. Since 1 
January 2011, the European financial supervisory framework came into force. The key 
features of the reform are the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) and 
three European Supervisory Authorities (‘ESAs’), the European Banking Authority (‘EBA’), 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’). The ESRB is in charge of macro-prudential 
supervision. The ESRB is chaired by the European Central Bank (ECB) president and 
supported by the ECB. The ECB has been given a major macro-prudential regulatory role  
(Cukierman 2011). The European regulatory changes call for more vertical regulatory co-
operation between the national and European regulatory bodies. The FPC in the UK will 
work with the ESRB on macro-prudential regulation. The Bank of England and PRA report 
to the ESRB and ESFS. Thus, it is apparent that the European regulatory approach is one of 
institutional rather than functional. PRA and FCA will have to adapt to the institutional 
approach of regulation by ensuring that they have adequate and experienced staff to supervise 
the different institutions. A potential solution is for the FPC to issue directions and guidance 
to both the PRA and FCA on changing their regulatory style from a functional approach prior 
to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 to an institutional approach. Hedgehogs and foxes are 
thus required in both PRA and FCA. 
 
7.2.2 Is the Bank of England the new single ‘super-regulator’? 
Academics suggested that the single regulatory structure in the UK was deceptive (Pan 2009, 
Taylor 2009b). Michael Taylor is the leading expert on the ‘twin-peaks’ model. He has 
revisited the ‘twin-peaks’ model since the financial crisis. Taylor is of the view that the 
simplicity of the single regulator was deceptive and that the equal parity of the FSA and the 
Bank of England was problematic (Taylor 2009a). HM Treasury had to step in and acted as a 
lynch-pin between the three organisations. The FSMA has a number of regulatory objectives 
namely market confidence; public awareness (which was later moved by the Financial 
Services Act 2010 from an objective to section 2(3)(h) as a principle); consumer protection 
and reduction of financial crime (section 2(2) FSMA 2000). The Financial Services Act 2010 
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inserted a new regulatory objective of financial stability as section 2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000. 
The FSA tried to pack too many objectives and functions into one agency (Taylor 2009b). 
Taylor submits that it is important not to ‘introduce too much neatness and tidiness into 
regulatory structures’. Hedgehogs and foxes are both needed in the UK ‘twin-peaks model’. 
The move to a ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK is an attempt to improve prudential regulation. 
Yet, the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK as set out in the more complicated than the ‘twin-
peaks’ model in Australia. Diagram 13 illustrates the structure of the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ 
model and diagram 14 below shows the structure of the new UK ‘twin-peaks’ model. 
 
Diagram 13: Structure of the Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model 
Source: Group of Thirty (2008) 
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Diagram 14: Structure of the UK ‘twin-peaks’ model 
Source: The Bank of England (2013) 
 
As submitted in chapter five of the thesis, the author is of the opinion that structural 
differences between the FSA and the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) 
were not fundamental to regulatory and supervisory failures of both regulators, the former in 
relation to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the latter in relation to the HIH Insurance 
Limited scandal. Rather, the regulators failed in both countries due to organisational and 
management weaknesses, especially at the senior management level. Pan (2009) expresses 
the view that: ‘a single regulator may just internalize many of the problems faced by a more 
fragmented regulatory system’. He was referring to co-ordination and co-operation problems 
within the FSA as highlighted in the failure of Northern Rock. The ‘twin-peaks’ model in the 
UK has several advantages. Proximity between the Bank of England and the PRA should 
assist with preventive measures such as the use of PRA’s Threshold Conditions and 
judgement-based regulatory style. The Threshold Conditions set out the absolute minimum 
requirements which financial institutions must meet before they can carry out regulated 
activities (Bank of England 2013b). The PRA uses a forward-looking, judgement-based 
regulatory style which aims to detect present and potential risks which might affect financial 
institutions. When macro and micro-prudential regulation/supervision is vested within one 
umbrella organisation, the PRA can in theory, react quicker to market volatility and provide 
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liquidity where necessary. The success of a regulator is measured by its ability to achieve its 
objectives. Communication and co-operation between the regulatory bodies should be 
improved under the ‘twin-peaks model’ since there are extensive provisions in Part 2 section 
3 of the Financial Services Act 2012 governing this area. The sections set out the boundaries 
of each regulatory body and when the PRA can require the FCA to refrain from acting.  
However, there are concerns that the Bank of England is too powerful under the new 
regulatory structure and will become a single super-regulator (Scott 2010, Ferran 2011). 
Interestingly, the FSA had more powers than the powers given to any single Australian 
financial regulatory body (Primikiris 2004). It performed functions equivalent to three out of 
four regulatory agencies in Australia. The new UK regulatory framework, as shown above in 
diagram 14, reveals power concentration in the Bank of England. It is apparent that the FPC, 
which is part of the Bank of England, can recommend and give directions to the PRA and the 
FCA so that its objectives of reducing systemic risks and supporting the government’s 
economy policy are pursued. The relationship of the Bank of England, PRA and FPC is close. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that the Chief Executive Officer of the PRA is also a 
member of the FPC and a Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. The fact that the FPC 
can direct both PRA and the FCA is worrying. This is because the main principle of the 
‘twin-peaks’ model is to separate prudential regulation from consumer protection, where the 
regulatory strategy is different.  
With prudential regulation, the regulator relies upon a co-operative relationship with the 
financial institutions whereas the regulator responsible for consumer protection is more 
adversarial since it protects consumers from financial institutions (Taylor 1995). Therefore, 
when the Bank of England has powers over both the PRA and FCA, it would seem that there 
is a conflict with regards to the supervisory strategy. Ferran (2011) submits that the 
government sent out mixed messages regarding macro and micro-prudential regulation in the 
‘twin-peaks’ model. On the one hand, whilst the government said that the PRA has 
‘operational independence for the day-to-day regulation and supervision of firms’ (HM 
Treasury 2010) and micro-prudential regulation is the FPC’s responsibility, macro- and 
micro-prudential regulation is located ‘in a single institution’ (Ferran 2011). FPC’s oversight 
is going to blur the boundaries of the PRA/FPC further. In Australia, discussions were held as 
to whether APRA should come under the control of the Reserve Bank of Australia but this 
was rejected (Financial System Inquiry 1997). APRA is thus totally independent of its 
Central Bank. Indications from the UK so far suggest that although the UK are keen on the 
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autonomy of the prudential regulator, the UK government has no plans to adopt APRA’s 
independence (Ferran 2011).  
There are advantages and disadvantages of putting the roles of prudential regulation and 
monetary policy within the Bank of England. Advantages include the Central Bank can 
synergise information and provide better focus on reducing systemic risks (Ferran 2011). 
Goodhart (2002) argues that ‘micro-level supervisory information may be a valuable input 
into macro-level monetary decisions, certainly during periods of financial instability’. Peek et 
al (1999) submit that deciding on monetary policy issues is more efficient due to better 
information. Another advantage of the combining prudential regulation with monetary policy 
in the Bank of England is its capacity as lender of last resort. The new emphasis on financial 
stability in section 2(2)(a)(b) of the Financial Services Act 2010 lends weight to the argument 
that the Bank of England, as the lender of last resort, should have increased powers for 
financial stability. Bernanke (2011) supports the creation of the FPC within the Bank of 
England, the creation of the ESRB in Europe and the revamped Federal Reserve, where its 
focus on systemic stability has been broadened. It has been given new responsibilities for 
financial stability, including supervisory authority over nonbank financial institutions. The 
Bank of England can only provide liquidity assistance in times of crises if it has the relevant 
information. As Eichengreen and Dincer (2011) explain: ‘the Central Bank is the ultimate 
guarantor of financial stability, and it cannot make good on that guarantee in the absence of 
the kind of information that can only be obtained through hands-on supervision’. Blinder 
(2010) argues that the central bank should be the macro-prudential regulator because 
maintaining financial stability links well with the aims of monetary policy and lender-of-past 
resort. Empirical research from Cihak and Podpiera (2008) reveal that banking supervision 
under the ‘twin-peaks’ model produces better quality of supervision, even after adjusting for 
cross-country differences. The impact on supervisory quality in insurance and securities is 
not entirely different for the ‘twin-peaks’ model compared to other models. The ‘twin-peaks’ 
model relies on better prudential regulatory frameworks and practices (Čihák and Podpiera 
2008). Cihak and Podpiera’s research is extensive in that they covered 84 countries between 
the period of 2000-2005. 
A disadvantage of combining prudential regulation with monetary policy within the Bank of 
England is that potential conflicts of interest can arise between policy independence and 
prudential supervision (Ferran 2011, Goodhart 2002) For example, the Central Bank may be 
reluctant to control inflation when it is concerned that higher interest rates may lead to bank 
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failures (Čihák and Podpiera 2008). Potential conflicts of interest can lead to underinvestment 
in time for monetary policy since supervision is a time-consuming and thankless task 
(Goodhart 2002). The Central Bank will find it easier to gain credibility through 
implementing monetary policy than supervision since banking supervision is mainly about 
prevention of financial crisis. Regulators will only be mentioned in the press for supervisory 
failures. Therefore, ‘if an independent Central Bank feels the need to achieve credibility and a 
good reputation, then being yoked with simultaneous credibility for banking supervision may 
not be advisable’ (Goodhart 2002). 
A Central Bank can be seen as a firefighter in the short-term, stepping in financial crises and 
providing assistance to banks in the form of liquidity, thus minimising the damage to 
financial stability (Cukierman 2011). Barth et al (2009) studied the development of non-
traditional mortgages in the US between 2003-2006. They claimed that close monitoring of 
the loans by the Central Bank would have prevented the build-up of the sub-prime mortgage 
crises. They submitted that the Central Bank should work closely with the supervisory agency 
responsible for micro-prudential issues since financial innovations are primarily of a micro-
economic nature. In light of Barth et al’s research and the prevailing European and UK 
preferences for increased powers to the Central Bank, the issue now is how to prevent any 
potential problems due to power concentration. 
 
7.2.3 Germanic regulatory structure of the Bank of England 
The author submits that the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK is not a straightforward replica of 
the Australian model. The unique arrangement between the Bank of England, FPC and PRA 
resembles the German banking supervision model. In Germany, the German Central Bank 
(Deustche Bundesbank) shares banking supervisory duties with the German Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority, BaFin. According to section 6 (1) of the Banking Act 1961, BaFin is 
the administrative authority responsible for the supervision of institutions under the Banking 
Act. Section 7(1) of the Banking Act 1961 deals with the cooperation of German Central 
Bank and the German Federal Financial Authority (BaFin) in the banking institutions' 
ongoing supervision (German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 2014). The Banking 
Act 1961 has been revised several times since it came into force in 1961. Section 7(1) of the 
Banking Act 1961 states that as part of the ongoing supervision process, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank have a number of responsibilities. These include analysing reports and returns 
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which financial institutions have submitted and assessing whether the capital and risk 
management procedures of banks are adequate (German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority 2014). BaFin has also issued a ‘Guideline on the execution and quality assurance 
of the ongoing supervision of credit and financial services institutions by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. BaFin’s guideline is useful because it sets out clear guidance on various issues 
such as: functions and responsibilities of both the German Central Bank and the BaFin 
(section 1); co-operation between the German Central Bank and banking institutions (section 
1:2); supervisory review and evaluation process instruments (section 1:3); supervisors’ risk 
identification instruments (section 2); reporting and notification system (section 2:2) and data 
processing system (section 2:3). 
BaFin’s guideline deserves closer inspection because it is clear in setting boundaries. BaFin’s 
guideline reflects the position that the German Central Bank has macro-prudential 
responsibility under section 7(1) Banking Act 1961. Section 7(2) of the Banking Act 1961 is 
important because the statutory intention for having BaFin’s guideline to prevent overlaps 
and ensure there is consistency between the quality of supervision amongst the two 
regulatory authorities; clear division of responsibilities and good flow of information. 
Essentially, the German Central Bank has ongoing supervision duties and will report to the 
BaFin on its findings and evaluations as soon as possible. The German Central Bank has wide 
powers under Article 2(1) of the Banking Act 1961 to provide information to banking 
institutions by virtue of the Banking Act 1961 and circulars. This is an unusual power and 
emphasises the mutual duty of both regulator and regulatee to provide information. Further, 
under Article 2(1), the German Central Bank has powers to clarify with the institutions at its 
own discretion any discrepancies regarding the documents. It also has the right to demand 
information accordance to section 44(1) of the Banking Act. It is clear that the German 
Central Bank has considerable powers in relation to information gathering and ongoing 
supervision of banks. Co-operation is a key element of Article 2 and the German Central 
Bank supervises problem banking institutions (Article 5); institutions of systemic importance 
(Article 6) and institutions under intensified supervision (Article 7). These different levels of 
supervision reflect how risky institutions are under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP). SREP is defined in Article 1 of the Banking Act 1961. Article 10 then 
provides details of the SREP risk profile. SREP focuses on forward-looking risk assessment, 
taking into account current and potential risks.  It also uses a risk-based supervision plan. 
These are similar to the UK PRA Risk Assessment Framework discussed in chapter six. 
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Articles 5 to 7 highlight the importance of close co-operation and co-ordination between the 
German central bank and BaFin in making the final assessment of the institution, especially 
with banks under intensified supervision. For banks which are classified as ‘problem banks’ 
or institutions of systemic importance under Articles 5 and 6, the BaFin has the power to ask 
the German Central Bank to provide more facts and carry out deeper analysis. Article 9 
provides more information on further principles of co-operation. Article 19 further states that 
the German Central Bank and the BaFin should work closely together when conducting stress 
tests. These are commendable measures due to the importance attached to clear 
communication, co-operation and co-ordination between the regulatory bodies. Failure to do 
so would create overlaps and inefficient decision-making, as revealed in the FSA’s failures in 
dealing with Northern Rock and HBOS. 
Article 3(2) of the Banking Act 1961 is fundamental in understanding the relationship 
between the German Central Bank and the BaFin. This Article stipulates that: ‘the final 
assessment and decision-making power on all supervisory measures and questions of 
interpretation shall rest with BaFin’. BaFin is thus the supervisory agency responsible for 
micro-prudential regulation. Article 8 is interesting because it introduces the concept of a 
BaFin risk committee. The German Central Bank is a permanent member of the BaFin risk 
committee without voting rights. The German Central Bank has two members on the BaFin 
risk committee. The risk committee meets four times a year and its rationale is to act as a 
lynch-pin between the two supervisory bodies on both macro and micro-prudential issues. 
Article 8(3) Banking Act 1961 then introduces the concept of an ongoing-supervision 
committee. This committee can meet at either the German Central Bank or BaFin. It is more 
flexible in the frequency of meeting. Although it should meet four times a year, it can meet 
more frequently for informal purposes between two meetings (Article 8(3)). The 
establishment of the risk and ongoing supervision committees aligns the two supervisory 
bodies with the principle of sharing information of banks.  
Having examined the German legislation on banking regulation, the article by Paul et al 
(2012) provides an interesting insight into the relationship between the German Central Bank 
and BaFin. Paul et al (2012) conducted a survey in 2010 amongst 1,919 German banks. 
These banks include co-operative banks; savings banks, commercial banks and others. They 
conducted a similar survey in 2006. The survey of 2010 asked banks to rate statements from 
1 (completely untrue) to 5 (completely true). Each grade of this scale was weighted with an 
index value, ranging from 0 points for the value of “1” to 100 points for the value of “5”. The 
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response rate was 20%. Paul et al’s research is important because there was increased debate 
over the sharing of supervisory responsibilities between the German Central Bank and BaFin. 
Their survey in 2010 reveals that there are high scores for dialogues between the two 
supervisory agencies are focused, structured and concentrated on important issues. In 
particular, the statements ‘strong co-operation with supervisors’ (score of 80); ‘supervisors 
are familiar with the individual bank’ (score of 75) and ‘supervisors are familiar with the 
individual bank’s business in general’ (score of 74) (Paul et al. 2012). The scores for these 
statements in 2006 were similarly high. Paul et al (2012) then asked the banks for their 
opinions on both the German Central Bank and BaFin. The results showed that the 
supervisors at the German Central Bank are more competent; act more swiftly and 
pragmatically than the supervisors at BaFin. The difference in the quality of the supervisors is 
even starker in 2010 than 2006. Paul et al (2012) thus cast doubt over the German Ministry’s 
decision of keeping the current division of supervisory authorities and increasing the powers 
of the BaFin. In Paul et al’s opinion, ‘the more promising strategy would be that the two 
authorities should not be played off against each other but represent themselves as one 
independent institution resisting all attempts of bank lobbyism’ (Paul et al. 2012). The author 
agrees with this statement. Co-operation rather than an adversarial relationship should be 
adopted amongst the FPC and PRA.  
The author is concerned about the degree of power concentration in the hands of the Bank of 
England. However, since the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK has only been in existence of 
approximately a year at the time of writing, dismantling the current FPC and PRA structure is 
unlikely to happen. In light of this, the author finds the risk committee and ongoing 
supervision committee in the German regulatory model very useful. These committees should 
help to reduce the possibility of overlaps of responsibilities and problem of information 
sharing. The Bank of England in the UK does not have such committees. The governor of the 
Bank of England, the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability and the Chief Executive 
Officer of the PRA sits on the boards of both the PRA and FPC. The PRA and the FCA are 
also parties to other Memorandum of Understanding with the Bank of England as a whole. 
The author believes that these measures are insufficient to ensure that there is healthy 
information exchange and co-operation between the PRA and FPC. She submits that a PRA 
risk committee and an ongoing supervision committee should be established, following the 
German regulatory structure.  
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7.2.4 Avoiding regulatory capture 
The point about independence and avoiding bank lobbyism implied in the statement of Paul 
et al is important. ‘Regulatory capture’ is also known as the private interest approach (Stigler 
1971). Regulation is perceived as a product, enhancing the power of bankers and politicians. 
Competing interest groups such as bankers, politicians and consumers try to influence 
national policies towards banks in ways that favour themselves even if these policies do not 
maximise social welfare. According to Mervyn King, ‘One of the major problems in 
regulation in the last 10 to 20 years has been that of regulatory capture. By that I do not mean 
people were bought off but that the sheer weight of resources, time and legal effort put in by 
banks to try to persuade regulators that what they were doing was compliant with the rules 
made life extraordinarily difficult for the regulators’ (Joint Committee on the draft Financial 
Services Bill 2011). Thus, the private interest approach relies heavily on the market and 
information disclosure. Critics of regulatory capture argue that the causal relationship in 
regulatory capture is unclear in analysing the performance of regulators. Just because 
Parliament has adopted a policy supported by a group of bankers does not necessarily imply 
that there is something wrong in the process (Carpenter 2010). Yet, Baxter (2011) argues that 
regulatory capture can be seen in the US financial industry. For example, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency has utilised its powers to enable national banks to avoid 
restrictions on their activities. Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a 
‘consolidated supervised entities’ policy which meant that large banks were able to increase 
their leverage ratios to very high levels (Baxter 2011). In the UK, evidence of regulatory 
capture is manifested in the FSA adopting a light-touch regulatory style with banks; the use 
of computer models rather than the FSA’s risk assessment framework and asking rating 
agencies to assess important risks as  financial products became increasingly complicated 
(The Warwick Commission 2012, Watson 2013). Watson (2013) is of the opinion that 
regulatory capture and the ‘intellectual or moral failure’ to deal with risk concentration in 
Northern Rock and some Irish banks played a role in the financial crisis. The Warwick 
Commission (2012) believes that: ‘regulatory capture substantially contributed to the 
regulatory failure’. Boyer and Ponce (2012) opine that concentration of supervisory authority 
within a single supervisor such as a central bank increases the likelihood of regulatory 
capture where bank supervisors are likely to pursue their own self interests. This reduces the 
social welfare function of a central bank.  
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The Warwick Commission (2012) recommend two ways to reduce regulatory capture. First, 
macro-prudential regulation of liquidity, leverage and capital should adopt a risk-based, 
counter-cyclical approach, so that the regulator is strict in a bull market and more lenient in a 
bear market. Secondly, the host regulator should have more power than the home regulator to 
deal with potential issues quickly. When Icelandic banks such as Glitnir, Landsbanki and 
Kaupthing ran into financial trouble in 2008, the Icelandic government did not have enough 
financial resources to compensate UK depositors. The UK government (host country) had to 
step in and provide compensation to UK depositors even though the FSA only has secondary 
responsibility for regulating and supervising the branches of these Icelandic banks. Primary 
responsibility of supervision lies with the Icelandic regulator because the EU Second Banking 
Directive 1989, the Home State, has primary responsibility for prudential regulation of 
branches. Again with the collapse of Lehman Brothers International European, the UK bore 
the brunt of the financial disaster. Therefore, it is only logical that the host country regulator 
should take a leading role in regulation and supervision of cross-border banks. Article 40 of 
the Capital Requirements Directive should therefore be amended so that the host (not the 
home) supervisor has more supervisory powers. Legislative amendment in this will enhance 
financial stability, improve certainty and reduce bank lobbying. The author agrees with the 
Warwick Committee’s recommendations. Basel III measures of higher and better quality 
capital, counter-cyclical buffer of 0-2.5%, tier 1 leverage ratio (ratio of book capital to assets) 
of 3% and maintenance of minimum liquidity should improve macro-prudential regulation. 
Tier 1 capital ratio will increase from 4% to 6% but the overall capital ratio remains at 8%. 
The wide discretionary powers enjoyed by the FPC in making directions and 
recommendations and PRA’s supervisory style is based on judgement, the author is 
concerned about the prospect of regulatory capture, given the examples provided in the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. Legislation seems to be a good way forward to reduce 
regulatory capture because it is prescriptive and gives less room to regulators to manoeuvre. 
However, Basel III does not deal with the shadow banking sector so banks can Basel III rules 
by relying on securitisation. Australian regulators have recently increased regulation of the 
shadow banking institutions. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission now 
grants licences and imposes certain obligations on these institutions (Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission 2013b). The regulatory coverage of credit products under the 
National Consumer Credit Code has been expanded to include investor-housing mortgages 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013a). The UK government needs to 
adopt similar measures. It is encouraging to note that on an international dimension, several 
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advanced economies are working towards increased regulation of hedge funds and credit 
rating agencies. In the UK, Mervyn King believes that the Vickers’ report on retail ring-
fencing is a good idea and stated that: ‘I would rather the efforts and resources of the PRA be 
devoted to judging the risks which banks are taking on their balance sheets than a perpetual 
legal game of trying to define the ring fence’ (Joint Committee on the draft Financial 
Services Bill 2011). Retail ring-fencing is considered a compromise since full 
subsidiarisation is too costly and operational subsidiarisation is too minimal. The Independent 
Commission of Banking published its final report on 12
th
 September 2011 (Vickers 2011b). 
They recommended ring-fencing retail banking and a 10% equity baseline (Vickers 2011b).  
The government has since adopted retail ring-fencing and electrified it, this giving the 
regulator enforcement power. Part 1 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 
incorporates the ‘electrification’ of retail ring-fencing. Prescription in the form of legislation 
is thus a good way to reduce regulatory capture by the regulator, since this is not dependent 
on the regulator’s judgement. 
 
7.3 Recent investigations by the PRA and FCA 
Effective enforcement powers, like clear objectives, sufficient resources and independence 
are important to the success of a regulator. It will be interesting to see the results of the 
separate enforcement investigations by the PRA and FCA into the near collapse of the Co-
operative Group. There was a financial capital shortfall of £1.5bn in May 2013 at the Co-
operative Group and the shortfall was largely a result of the acquisition of the Britannia 
Building Society in 2009 (Goff and Gray 2014). There are also allegations against Paul 
Flowers, the ex-Chairman of the Co-operative Bank of inappropriate behaviour. The FSA, 
now FCA, has bolstered its enforcement strategy by pursuing a ‘credible deterrence’ policy 
(Teasdale 2011, Wilson and Wilson 2014). ‘Credible deterrence’ relies on proactive 
enforcement and publicity of successful convictions, judgements and decisions (Teasdale 
2011). It applies to both criminal and civil breaches by financial organisations. It is envisaged 
that the ‘credible deterrence’ policy is here to stay for two reasons. First, most of the staff 
from the Enforcement and Financial Crime of the FSA have moved to the FCA (Teasdale 
2011). Secondly, Margaret Cole, the current head of the FCA, has experienced the tougher 
and more interventionist style of the FSA (Teasdale 2011, Wilson and Wilson 2014). The 
PRA and FCA are thus likely to maintain the ‘credible deterrence’ policy when carrying out 
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objective and independent investigations into the Co-operative Group. A recent successful 
example of enforcement action by the ‘twin-peaks’ model is Standard Chartered Bank. In 
December 2013, Standard Chartered was told by the PRA to dismiss Richard Meddings, 
former Group Finance Director of Standard Chartered. The PRA was worried about the 
potential conflict between Meddings’s duty to oversee risk operations and his responsibility 
in finance (Wilson 2013). The FCA also imposed a fine of £8.75m on Coutts for failing to 
take reasonable care to establish and maintain effective anti-money laundering systems and 
controls relating to high risk customers, including politically exposed persons. The 
interventionist, pro-active styles of both the PRA and FCA are most encouraging. It is hoped 
that they will adopt the same styles with regulation and supervision of UK banks. The 
challenge is as Ferran (2011) opines, ‘to maintain an aggressively judgmental style when 
economic conditions improve and political sentiment moves on’. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the regulatory approach and structure of the UK ‘twin-peaks’ model. 
The UK has seen a shift from the functional approach to institutional approach to financial  
regulation, where the PRA and FCA are divided according to the legal entities rather than  
financial products. This is problematic because the UK still relies more on securitisation than  
intermediation compared to Australia. There is thus a mismatch between regulatory approach  
and structure of the regulatory agencies in the UK. The current European regulatory structure  
adopts an institutional approach too and the European Central Bank’s powers and has been  
given a major macro-prudential regulatory role. The author analysed the argument that the  
Bank of England has too much power by comparing the Australian and UK ‘twin-peaks’  
models. The latter is more complicated and there is power concentration within the Bank of  
England, where the FPC is part of the Bank and the PRA is a subsidiary of the Bank. Further,  
the FPC has powers to issue directions and recommendations to both the PRA and FCA. The  
sharing of supervisory responsibilities between the FPC and PRA is similar to the German  
Central Bank and the German Federal Financial Authority. The author then analysed the 
German Banking Act 1961 in detail and thinks that the establishment of a PRA risk 
committee and ongoing supervisory committee is a good method to increase information 
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exchange and co-operation between the PRA and FPC. Regulatory capture has been a 
problem in the UK financial industry and the author believes that legislation is a possible 
solution to curb the discretion and power of bankers. Prescription is helpful in that it provides 
certainty. Recent enforcement actions by the PRA and FCA are encouraging since their 
approach is more robust and pro-active.  
Hedgehogs and foxes are both required to remedy the regulatory and structural weaknesses in  
the UK ‘twin-peaks’ model. On the macro level, there needs a cultural shift from a functional  
to institutional approach to regulation The German concept of a risk committee within the  
macro-prudential regulator and an ongoing supervisory committee is a good way of sharing  
information, enhance communication and co-operation. Foxes are also necessary at the micro  
level. Legislation is a good mechanism to curb regulatory capture so the Basel III Accord and  
the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 are commendable. However, there is a  
weakness in the Basel III Accord since it does not deal with the shadow banking sector. It is  
hoped that legislators will look into this as soon as possible to deal with the possibility of  
bankers circumventing legislation. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In mid-April 2013, Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
opined that:  
“In too many cases – from the United States in 2008 to Cyprus today – we have seen 
what happens when a banking sector chooses the quick buck over the lasting benefit, 
backing a business model that ultimately destabilizes the economy. We simply cannot 
have pre-crisis banking in a post-crisis world. We need reform, even in the face of 
intense pushback from an industry sometimes reluctant to abandon lucrative lines of 
business.”(Lagarde in Aldrick 2013) 
Lagarde’s quote highlights the importance of financial stability, more traditional borrowing 
and a stakeholder approach to banking. She later added:  
“Especially in the periphery, many banks are still in an early stage of repair – not 
enough capital and too many bad loans on their books. Even outside the periphery, 
there is a need to shrink balance sheets, reduce reliance on wholesale funding, and 
improve business models.”(Lagarde in Aldrick 2013)   
This thesis agrees with Lagarde’s recommendations. This thesis started from the premise that 
banking regulation is important for two reasons. First, its liquidity function is important for a 
country’s economy. Businesses and individuals need banks in daily lives. Secondly, banks 
run on confidence and reputation. If a bank has liquidity problems, it generates panic and 
potentially a bank run. This then creates a seismic effect in the economy and financial sector. 
In the financial crisis of 2007, it has been seen that the effect was trans-Atlantic. Thus, 
regulation of banks is of public interest. Banking regulation reduces the collective action 
problem in representing broader stakeholder interests to ensure that social costs of bank risk 
taking are mitigated.   The Turner Report identified the macro-economic imbalances between 
China and the emerging Asian countries. Cheap credit was readily available and the 
development of securitisation enabled investors to diversify their risks in theory. In practice, 
highly leveraged banks retained the risks and a solvency crisis emerged.  
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The financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) failed 
to supervise banks such as Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley and HBOS properly. The 
main regulatory and supervisory failures of the FSA are due to organisational and 
management problems. There needs to be better information flow, co-ordination, co-
operation, engagement with banks and stricter internal controls. With regards to the statutory 
provisions on banking regulation, the FSMA 2000 is complicated, with standards and 
principles underpinning the FSA’s statutory core objectives. The FSA’s remit is too wide. It 
is responsible for regulating banks, deposit-taking institutions and insurance companies. With 
the development of complex products, increased use of securitisation and merging of 
financial services offered to customers, the tripartite system increasingly found it difficult to 
delineate their scope and responsibility. Overall, the FSA’s passive, non-interventionist and 
laissez-faire regulatory approach led to criticisms that its measures were too late and too 
little. 
The light-touch, laissez-faire regulatory approach led to banks essentially taking control of 
their own financial ratios. Christine Lagarde’s second quote earlier in this chapter advocating 
for less reliance on wholesale funding and more conservative business models are in accord 
with the findings in chapter four of this thesis. In comparison to the big four Australian 
banks, the thesis revealed that the big four UK banks had on average, higher cash ratio, 
higher leverage ratio, higher loan to deposit ratio, higher capital ratio, lower asset quality, 
lower ROA but higher ROE than the big four Australian banks. Interestingly, the core 1 
capital ratio was slightly higher amongst UK banks than Australian banks although the 
difference is slight. Australian banks did not require any government assistance during the 
financial crisis. Four UK banks required significant financial assistance from the UK 
government during the financial crisis. Macro-prudential regulatory changes are inevitable 
for the UK financial sector. UK financial institutions should rely less on short-term wholesale 
funding and more on cash, deposits and equity. Solvency and good quality assets are 
important. One must balance financial innovation with financial stability. 
Financial stability was inserted into section 2(2)(a)(b) of the FSMA 2000 as a statutory 
objective of the regulator. Further legislative reforms to improve financial stability include 
the Special Resolution Regime found in the Banking Act 2009 and retail ring-fencing of 
banks. The Special Resolution Regime was needed because UK insolvency law did not 
provide a mechanism to resolve a financially distressed bank prior to the Banking Act 2009 
was in force. The Bank Special Provisions Act 2008 was passed on 21st February 2008 to 
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facilitate the nationalisation of Northern Rock and part of Bradford & Bingley. The priority 
of the UK government during the financial crisis was to limit the costs of bank failures within 
the industry.  The Banking Act 2009 on 21st February 2009 replaced the Bank Special 
Provisions Act 2008 and the main rationale of the legislation is to minimise contagion risks in 
the financial system. Another legislative reform is retail ring-fencing of banks. The first 
report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards said that:  
“There is evidence to suggest that, as well as supporting financial stability and 
reducing the risk to the taxpayer, separation has the potential to change the culture of 
banks for the better and to make banks simpler and easier to monitor”(The 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 2012) 
Under Part 1 of the Financial Services Banking Reform Act 2013 (‘the 2013 Act’), retail 
banks are separated from investment banks through the use of subsidiaries. The 2013 Act 
does not ban proprietary trading so it does not go as far as the Volcker rule in the United 
States where proprietary trading is banned. Section 11(2) of the 2013 Act defines proprietary 
trading as ‘trading in commodities or financial instruments as principal’. Under section 9 of 
the 2013 Act, the PRA will conduct a review of proprietary trading within five years of the 
2013 Act coming into force. It will then pass its findings to HM Treasury to see if any change 
needs to be made. The most important implication of the 2013 Act is that both the PRA and 
FCA have a continuity objective of maintaining financial stability under clauses 1 and 2 of 
the 2013 Act. They do so by monitoring the risks which the ring-fenced banks are taking and 
minimise any adverse effects of the failure of a ring-fenced bank. The scope of ‘financial 
stability’ in section 2(2)(a)(b) FSMA 2000 has thus been broadened. 
The twin-peaks model in Australia was not an initial success. Under this model, the 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) is responsible for prudential regulation 
and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is responsible for conduct 
regulation. The Australian ‘twin-peaks’ model had its own teething problems. However, the 
important lesson is that the Australians learnt from previous mistakes, made changes and 
learnt from other common law jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The Australian regulatory framework is by no means perfect. Nevertheless, the 
aim of prudential regulation is not to prevent total financial disasters since this is impossible. 
After the HIH Insurance incident, Australia adopted a new risk framework. It is important to 
note that Australia studied the risk frameworks of the US, Canada and the UK but it did not 
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directly copy their models. Australia formulated its own risk framework and differs to the 
risk frameworks of Canada and the UK, which influenced Australian’s risk model. Since 
implementing the PAIRS and SOARS prudential regulatory risk models, the APRA became 
more proactive and interventionist in its regulatory style. At a macro-level, APRA uses a risk-
based, principles-based and outcomes-focussed style of regulation. Such a combination 
means that APRA can allocate resources effectively to high risks organisations and 
concentrate on the end results and tailored outcomes rather than the processes used. The 
unique regulatory style is an affirmation of APRA’s values. APRA's Framework for 
Prudential Supervision contains five important values: foresight, accountability, 
collaboration, integrity and professionalism. In pursuing these values, APRA is committed to 
provide consistent, high-quality supervision in a fair and balanced manner. APRA’s 
supervisory style and framework received positive feedback in the APRA Stakeholder Survey 
2013, especially in the areas of staff; communication and the APRA’s framework in 
achieving its mission. Weaknesses include inconsistency in supervision amongst banks; 
harmonisation of prudential standards across the regulated industries seems to be 
unsuccessful and APRA neglecting the costs of complying with regulation. The generally 
positive results from the APRA Stakeholder Survey 2013 confirms that APRA is doing its 
job and is well-received by the regulated organisations. APRA is able to identify risks and its 
PAIRS model has been identified as generally accurate. 
The UK moved away from a single regulator to a ‘twin-peaks’ model in April 2013. The 
Financial Services Act 2012 replaced the FSA with the Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(PRA), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Bank of England. The UK regulatory 
structure has changed from a single regulator to a ‘twin-peaks’ model, where the PRA is 
responsible for micro-prudential regulation and the Bank of England (together with the 
Financial Policy Committee, are responsible for macro-prudential regulation. The FCA is 
responsible for conduct regulation as well as being the micro-prudential regulator for other 
financial services firms. There is gradual convergence between the UK and Australian 
prudential supervisory models although there are still some differences between the two 
models. Financial stability is enshrined in both countries’ legislation and is a key priority 
after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Both regulators reject a ‘zero-failure’ regulatory 
policy. The PRA shares the APRA’s opinion that it is impossible to prevent all bank failures. 
Therefore, with the Special Resolution Regime contained in the Banking Act 2009,  the 
PRA’s role is to minimise the systemic effect of any bank failure. The PRA’s supervisory 
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style is based on judgement; risks; forward-looking and early intervention. This is very 
similar to APRA’s. PRA’s risk assessment framework and its supervisory responses based on 
the Proactive Intervention Framework. Yet, there are differences between the prudential 
regulatory and supervisory systems between Australia and the UK. The UK legislative 
framework is more complex than the Australian framework. Further, the PRA has policy 
setting powers although the vertical integration of financial regulation at European level may 
suggest that the PRA is unlikely to exercise this power very often. APRA on the other hand, 
does not have such wide policy setting powers. The UK Risk Assessment Framework takes 
more mitigating factors into account. Its Proactive Intervention Framework has five stages 
and early intervention is clearly a priority for the PRA, since it can start planning for 
resolution of an organisation even at stage 1. This is in contrast to the Australian SOARS 
methodology, where there are only four stages and resolution of an organisation takes place 
in the later stages. 
Although both Australia and the UK have a ‘twin-peaks’ model, Australia uses a functional 
regulatory approach whilst the UK uses an institutional regulatory approach. Australia 
adopted an institutional approach to financial regulation due to its reliance on deposits. There 
is currently a mismatch between the financial regulatory approach and the regulatory 
structure of the ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK. The functional approach to banking regulation 
was used by the FSA in regulating financial institutions in the UK due to the reliance on 
securitisation by UK banks. The single regulatory structure was argued to be better suited to 
deal with ‘functional despecialisation’ of financial products The UK ‘twin-peaks’ model 
splits micro-prudential regulation into deposit-takers, insurers and major investments firms 
on the one hand and other financial services on the other. The PRA is responsible for the 
former group and the FCA is responsible for the latter group. The FCA however, is also 
responsible for conduct regulation. The institutional regulatory approach of the ‘twin-peaks’ 
model is unsuitable for the funding model of UK banks. Either UK banks change their 
funding models and rely more on intermediation than securitisation or the ‘twin-peaks’ model 
has to change. Yet, the European regulatory structure endorses the institutional regulatory 
approach. Since 1 January 2011, the European financial supervisory framework came into 
force. The key features of the reform are the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board 
(‘ESRB’) and three European Supervisory Authorities (‘ESAs’), the European Banking 
Authority (‘EBA’), the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’). The ESRB is in charge 
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of macro-prudential supervision. The ESRB is chaired by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
president and supported by the ECB. The ECB has been given a major macro-prudential 
regulatory role. The PRA and FCA will have to adapt to the institutional approach of 
regulation by ensuring that they have adequate and experienced staff to supervise the 
different institutions. A potential solution is for the FPC to issue directions and guidance to 
both the PRA and FCA on changing their regulatory style from a functional approach prior to 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 to an institutional approach. 
There are concerns that the Bank of England is too powerful under the new regulatory 
structure and will become a single super-regulator. The new UK regulatory framework 
reveals power concentration in the Bank of England. It is apparent that the Financial Policy 
Committee, which is part of the Bank of England, can recommend and give directions to the 
PRA and the FCA so that the FPC’s objectives of reducing systemic risks and supporting the 
government’s economy policy are pursued. The relationship of the Bank of England, PRA 
and FPC is close. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Chief Executive Officer of the 
PRA is also a member of the FPC and a Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. The fact 
that the FPC can direct both PRA and the FCA is worrying. This is because the main 
principle of the ‘twin-peaks’ model is to separate prudential regulation from consumer 
protection, where the regulatory strategy is different. With prudential regulation, the regulator 
relies upon a co-operative relationship with the financial institutions whereas the regulator 
responsible for consumer protection is more adversarial since it protects consumers from 
financial institutions . Therefore, when the Bank of England has powers over both the PRA 
and FCA, it would seem that there is a conflict with regards to the supervisory strategy. 
One possible solution to avoid power concentration within the Bank of England is to establish 
a PRA risk committee and ongoing supervisory committee. The unique arrangement between 
the Bank of England, FPC and PRA resembles the German banking supervision model. In 
Germany, the German Central Bank (Deustche Bundesbank) shares banking supervisory 
duties with the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, BaFin. The German Central 
Bank and BaFin both belong to the BaFin risk committee and ongoing supervisory 
committee. The establishment of a PRA risk committee and ongoing supervisory committee 
is a good method to increase information exchange and co-operation between the PRA and 
FPC. Regulatory capture has been a problem in the UK financial industry. In the UK, 
evidence of regulatory capture is manifested in the FSA adopting a light-touch regulatory 
style with banks; the use of computer models rather than the FSA’s risk assessment 
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framework and asking rating agencies to assess important risks as financial products became 
increasingly complicated. The author believes that legislation is a possible solution to curb 
the discretion and power of bankers. Prescription is helpful in that it provides certainty. 
Recent enforcement actions by the PRA and FCA are encouraging since their approach is 
more robust and pro-active.  
 
8.2 Further research 
The author would like to conduct more empirical research with regards to the financial ratios 
of Australian and UK banks from an earlier period. As financial stability is still a matter of 
concern for most European countries, research can also be undertaken to include financial 
ratios up to 2013. It would be interesting to monitor the capital ratios and solvency positions 
of banks. Secondly, she would like to research more into the German banking regulatory 
system. It has been revealed that the structure of the Bank of England, Financial Policy 
Committee and Prudential Regulatory Authority is similar to the German regulatory system. 
If possible, she would like to interview regulatory experts and staff working at the respective 
regulatory organisations in the UK, Australia and Germany. It would be interesting to obtain 
their perspectives of the financial regulator in their country. Relevant ethical approval will be 
obtained where necessary. 
 
8.3 The way forward 
To move forward in banking regulation, it is submitted that the following steps should be 
taken. First, the new structure of the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation 
Authority alone will not solve all the weaknesses of the Financial Services Authority. What is 
important is that the lessons from the failures of the Financial Services Authority should be 
learnt. The new regulatory bodies, the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential 
Regulation Authority should communicate and co-operate more. They should also co-operate 
with the new European financial supervisory bodies.  
Secondly, the issue of power concentration in the Bank of England is of concern. The fact 
that the Financial Policy Committee is within the Bank of England and the PRA is a 
subsidiary of the Bank of England leads to a powerful Bank of England. To avoid the 
possibility of a single super regulator, it is recommended that a PRA risk committee and 
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ongoing supervisory committee are adopted. This should improve information flow between 
the regulatory authorities.  
Thirdly, healthy financial ratios regarding liquidity, debt, capital and asset quality are very 
important to maintain financial stability in the financial sector. The financial crisis of 2007-
2009 revealed the problems created by weak liquidity, capital and asset quality ratios. 
Chapter five revealed that excessive leverage and poor asset quality contributed to poor 
liquidity and solvency control. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was ultimately a crisis of 
solvency. The UK financial system is still on the mend, so there is no room for complacency.  
The pendulum should shift towards financial stability but without jeopardising economic 
growth. Better regulation and risk management are required. A leverage ratio and minimum 
liquidity requirements are welcomed. Good quality capital is necessary to absorb 
externalities. Basel III has laid down suitable recommendations but they are insufficient. In 
particular, the shadow banking sector should be subject to the same rules and regulations as 
the banking sector to create a level playing field. 
Statistics from the Bank of England in April 2013 showed that the UK is heading in the 
correct direction of restoring financial stability (Bank of England 2013a). UK banks continue 
to increase the amount of high quality assets such as government gilts and reserves held at the 
Bank of England. This is important as solvency is still a matter of concern to some banks. It 
is important that lessons can be learnt from the crisis of 2007-2009 and recommendations are 
adopted to reduce the impact of the next crisis. 
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